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Abstract
The objective of the current thesis is to contract the gap previous
literature has left around the issue of deploying multiple modes of
balancing the exploitation/exploration paradox simultaneously, and
help mature corporations maximize profit by leveraging organizational
levels to achieve ambidexterity.
For the theoretical part, snowballing is the primary research
method. An article by March (1991) served as the starting point, and
further theory was found by identifying articles where that particular
work had been cited. For the empirical part, an embedded case study
on Finn.no through interviews is the primary research method.
A total of three frameworks have been constructed to understand,
structure and solve the paradox on multiple levels. The Pathway
Framework suggests that exploitation and exploration are two explicit
pathways to profit, the Ambidexterity Framework is a way of
structuring the internal and external modes for balancing the paradox
and the Hierarchical Ambidexterity Framework links these balancing
modes directly to the locus of implementation and decomposes the
strategies into a structure of four organizational levels.
Several balancing modes from the Ambidexterity Framework
have been recognized in Finn, including contextual ambidexterity,
structural ambidexterity, punctuated equilibrium, and domain
separation. The efforts flow according to the Hierarchical
Ambidexterity Framework, at the individual, business, corporate and
network levels of strategy, respectively. Thus, Finn has solved the
paradox of exploitation and exploration operates ambidextrously.
Further, and most important for this thesis—Finn have even
succeeded in balancing exploitative and exploratory ideas on multiple
organizational levels simultaneously.
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Sammendrag
Hensikten med denne oppgaven er a˚ fylle gapet tidligere litteratur
har etterlatt rundt bedrifters mulighet til a˚ anvende flere modus
for a˚ balansere paradokset mellom disiplin og utforsking samtidig.
Oppgaven vil forsøke a˚ hjelpe etablerte bedrifter a˚ maksimere profitt,
ved a˚ utnytte organisasjonens ulike niv˚aer for a˚ oppn˚a ambidexterity.
Snowballing er den primære forskningsmetoden for den teoretiske
delen. En artikkel av March (1991) var utgangspunktet, og ytterligere
teori ble funnet ved a˚ identifisere artikler hvor dette arbeidet var sitert.
Case-analyse av nettstedet Finn.no gjennom intervjuer er den primære
forskningsmetoden for den empiriske delen.
Totalt er det i oppgaven konstruert tre rammeverk for a˚ forst˚a,
strukturere og løse paradokset p˚a flere niv˚aer i organisasjonen.
Pathway-rammeverket foresl˚ar at disiplin og utforsking er to
eksplisitte veier til profitt, Ambidexterity-rammeverket er en
m˚ate a˚ strukturere interne og eksterne moduser for a˚ balansere
paradokset og det Hierarkiske Ambidexterity-rammeverket kobler
disse balansemodusene direkte til punktet i organisasjonen hvor den
tilhørende strategien implementeres, og dekomponerer strategiene inn
i en struktur p˚a fire organisasjonelle niv˚aer.
Flere balansemodus fra Ambidexterity-rammeverket har blitt
identifisert hos Finn, inkludert kontekstuell ambidexterity, strukturell
ambidexterity, avbrutt likevekt og domeneseparasjon. Tiltakene
implementeres p˚a strategiske niv˚aer i samsvar med det Hierarkiske
Ambidexterity-rammeverket, p˚a henholdsvis individuelt niv˚a, for-
retningsenhetsniv˚a, konsernniv˚a og nettverksniv˚a. Følgelig kan det
konstateres at Finn har løst paradokset mellom disiplin og utforsking,
og mest interessant for denne oppgaven—de har lyktes med a˚ balansere
disiplinære og utforskingsmessige tanker p˚a flere organisasjonelle
niv˚aer samtidig.
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Part I
Background & Research
Method
1 Academical Background
1.1 Purpose
Companies from all across the world are struggling with the current
recessional economy, and many are flushed to take extreme measures trying to
restore short-term financial gain and long-term sustainability. The measures
are often premature and hasty, with multiple strategies being implemented
simultaneously. Innovation and effectiveness are two popular strategic goals
frequently encountered in such measures, and corporations will in desperation
often try to attain both. However, without ambidextrous capabilities, the
result is often mediocre innovation, average effectiveness and total confusion.
Effective production of products and services is a general measure to
ensure a total utilization of a firm’s available resources. Mature companies
are not only competing within its home country’s borders, but within a
market stretching across the entire globe. The threat from competitors’ easy
access to cheap labor on other continents has forced Norwegian companies
to have a tight control over resource usage. Innovation is another general
measure to ensure viability. Norway is built upon knowledge and information,
and should possess a considerable pool of resources ready to be utilized in
order to drive constructive innovation.
The confusion breaks out when companies fail to acknowledge that it for
many cases is neither necessary nor beneficial to excel in both effectiveness
and innovation simultaneously, as the two concepts contain fundamentally
contradicting ideas, and are challenging to combine. A dairy, forestry or
tool factory will be perfectly fine with beating competitors on effectiveness,
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while an advertising agency, technology firm or event organizer will survive
by delivering customers the best innovation. However, complex corporations
may actually be required to manage both strategies simultaneously, but this
co-existence will often give rise to managerial tensions.
The key to escape confusion and develop ambidextrous capabilities is to
balance the quest for innovation and effectiveness at the appropriate levels in
the organization. The challenge of combining the contradicting ideas is easy
to mitigate with a senior management team aware of how to allocate the
balancing efforts between the individual, business, corporate and network
levels of strategy, respectively. At that point, multiple strategies may be
implemented simultaneously without confusion.
1.2 The Authors’ Contribution
This master thesis will give a twofold contribution to senior management
teams for handling the strategic choice between effectiveness and innovation.
First, the authors will present a framework to help understand the
contradicting ideas involved, and why it is sufficient for many firms to only
pursue one of the strategies in order to maximize profit. The framework
includes suggestions on how to select the appropriate strategy in a given
situation, guidelines on how to implement it, and prospective outcomes of
each choice.
Second, the authors will present two additional frameworks for the
corporations required to manage both strategies simultaneously, to help
management teams develop ambidextrous capabilities by balancing the quest
for effectiveness and innovation without confusion. The thesis will include
specific modes available to balance the managerial tensions, and a structure
for determining which organizational level each particular mode should be
applied on.
As of today, ambidexterity is a popular field of study within organizational
theory, and many scholars have contributed with theory and empirical
observations. However, neither has considered the important distinction
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between business, corporate and network level strategy, respectively, as
domains for balancing managerial tensions. The authors will seek to contract
this gap by providing complete frameworks to help management teams
leverage organizational levels when developing ambidextrous organizations.
All theoretical contributions has been subject to empirical assessment.
1.3 Scope and Limitations
This thesis will consider exploitation, exploration and ambidexterity from
an organizational perspective. The scope of the research coincides with the
boundaries of the case company, its spin-offs and their current operating
environment. The information in this thesis is gathered and analyzed by the
two authors to avoid biases. The data is limited to one case company, but
nine embedded units of analysis were constructed within the company.
1.4 Introduction
An essential part of classic organizational theory is discipline and control. A
central field of study within this theory is the level of discipline exerted in
organizations, and what implications this level may have on profitability.
The ongoing debate was initiated by James March in 1991, where this
theory was conceptualized by presenting two extreme points of discipline,
namely exploitation and exploration. (March, 1991) Exploitation is to make
use of current organizational competencies, reduce risk, increase production
efficiency, and evolve products according to market demand. Exploration,
on the other hand, is to experiment with new solutions, recognize new
opportunities, and the quest for blue oceans. March (1991) presents
these concepts as two fundamentally contradicting and mutually opposing
organizational strategies. Excess exploitation in a company will limit the
number of exploratory projects, and thereby reduce the chance that one of
these projects will evolve into a market success. On the other hand, excess
exploration will limit the establishment and consolidation of core capabilities
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within the organization, and prevent the projects from being developed to
the point of sustained competitive advantage. (March, 1991)
A significant part of the literature supports this model of organizational
discipline, and certain scholars expand on this notion, and carry out
quantitative studies in order to examine the relationship between exploitation
and exploration. Many of these studies have aimed to investigate what
the optimal amount of each may be, and entire articles have been devoted
to determine the exact location of this point. (Nohria and Gulati, 1997)
Recently, a shift in opinion has been observed, where a growing consensus now
agrees that exploitation and exploration should be combined, and that true
competitive advantage arises from developing ambidextrous organizations,
by simultaneously capturing the best of the two extremes.
1.5 The Current Thesis
The main purpose of this master thesis will be to help senior
management teams in mature corporations to maximize profit by distributing
ambidextrous efforts more deliberately at different levels in the organization.
The thesis will suggest that multiple modes of balancing the paradox of
exploitation and exploration may be deployed simultaneously when the firm
is aware of such distribution of efforts.
Part I contains academical, theoretical and empirical background,
respectively, in addition to research method and introduction. The
theoretical background section provides brief presentations of exploitation
and exploration as separate organizational strategies. A discussion of
their formal scope, relevance in organizational theory and varieties between
different scholars’ perception of them are also included. Further, positive
and negative effects of both strategies have been considered, in addition
to guidelines for implementation of the two strategies, respectively. The
empirical background section contains brief summaries of the interviews, with
background of each interviewee, their general approach to the paradox, other
main points, and relevance to this thesis.
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Part II presents the core concepts of the exploitation/exploration
paradox, accompanied by the consensus of the current literature and its
approach to the issue. A new framework will be suggested, to provide a
better understanding of the nature of the paradox by breaking it down to
four explicit levels. These levels represent distinct steps in two different
approaches to organizational profit—exploitation and exploration. The
framework is subsequently tested empirically with information gathered from
Finn. Exploitation and exploration are still handled as separate concepts.
Part III suggests that the two extreme points of exploitation and
exploration may not be a contradiction after all, and that organizations
rather should balance the opposing forces to excel at applying both strategies
simultaneously, and thus attain ambidexterity. Several modes of balancing
the paradox will be presented, structured in two new frameworks suggested
in this part. Finally, the part is concluded with a merger of the frameworks
from Part II and Part III to suggest how multiple balancing modes may be
implemented simultaneously to maximize profit.
Finally, a formal conclusion is drawn and suggestions for further research
are included in Part IV
2 Theoretical Background
2.1 Definitions
2.1.1 Innovation
Innovation is an extensively used concept in business, yet a very challenging
one to establish a crisp definition of. The broadest definitions start by simply
stating that innovation is any kind of invention, improvement, idea or project
that the manager perceives to be new. (Chen and Taylor, 2009) Other
definitions declare that innovation is the commercialization of such projects.
(Van de Ven, 1986, cited in Chen and Taylor, 2009)
Common for most definitions of innovation is the element of uncertainty
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that lies with the concept of innovation by nature. (Nohria and Gulati, 1997)
Thus, determining the net present value of an innovation project will be very
difficult in the early phase.
Categories of Innovation A commonly accepted idea across the entire
literature is that innovation can be separated into two different categories,
depending on the height of the innovation in question—continuous and
discontinuous.
Continuous innovation is also referred to as exploitative innovation, and
is mainly concerned with the improvement of existing products, by leveraging
current knowledge. Activities based on exploitative innovation value
effectiveness, focus and convergent thinking. The prospective technology
development is considered an extrapolation of the current trajectory rather
than new inventions. Another notation for this category is incremental
innovation. (Christiansen, 1997; Dosi, 1982, cited in Smith and Tushman,
2005)
Discontinuous innovation is also called exploratory innovation, with the
intention of launching new inventions and solutions, by entering new markets
or new domains. Exploratory innovation activities value experimentation,
flexibility and divergent thinking. The prospective technology development
is shifted from the current to a new trajectory. Another notation for this
category is radical innovation. (Taylor and Greve, 2006, cited in Gupta
et al., 2006)
Some scholars take this framework one step further, by adding
architectural innovation as a third category, in addition to continuous and
discontinuous. (Henderson and Clark, 1990, cited in Smith and Tushman,
2005) Architectural innovation is thought of as the midpoint between the
two extremes. To be categorized in the architectural class, the innovation
is required to make fundamental changes to existing products or services,
and set a new aim for competition in the entire industry. The difference
between architectural and discontinuous innovation still remains clear—
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while architectural innovation makes fundamental changes to the current
technology, discontinuous innovation introduces a completely new technology,
that deems the current one obsolete. (Chen and Taylor, 2009) The
proponents of this view also extend the theory with one more dimension,
namely the target market of the innovation in question. Three categories
are defined on this dimension as well: current customers, new customers in
defined markets and customers in emerging markets. Altogether, this adds
up to a 3-by-3 innovation matrix. (Smith and Tushman, 2005)
Other scholars use yet another framework, with the introduction of a
fourth category—niche creation. (Abernathy Kim and William, 1985, cited
in Chen and Taylor, 2009) Niche creation involves identifying emerging needs
within a market niche, not currently solved satisfactory. (Chen and Taylor,
2009) Still, a mutual property that remains for all categories is the element
of uncertainty involved with innovation.
2.1.2 Effectiveness
Improved effectiveness is claimed to be the desired outcome in the
applied fields of organizational development and organizational design.
(Quinn and Rohrbaugh, 1983) Researchers try to explain what makes
some firms excellent, of high quality, productivity, efficient, healthy, or
possessing vitality—all proxies for the concept of organizational effectiveness.
(Cameron, 1986) The concept of organizational effectiveness, also called
organizational “success” or organizational “worth”, generally refers to goal-
attainment. Traditionally, effectiveness has been viewed mainly in the
terms of productivity. (Georgopoulos and Tannenbaum, 1957) Proponents
of this view has argued that the criteria of organizational success are
productivity, net profit, the extent of which the organization accomplishes
its stated objectives, and the success of maintaining its size or expanding it.
(Thorndike, 1949, cited in Georgopoulos and Tannenbaum, 1957)
Several scholars have attempted to identify typical effectiveness
attributes. Early studies (e.g. Taylor (1911)), described these attributes as
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production maximization, cost minimization, technical excellence, optimal
utilization of resources, and task specialization. Henri (1916) argued that
the attributes are division of work, clear authority and discipline, unity of
command and direction, order, equity, stability, and initiative. Mayo and
Thompson (2003) defined effectiveness attributes as productivity through
employee satisfaction, satisfaction through attention to workers’ physical and
emotional needs. (Lewin and Minton, 1986)
Sloan (1964) described effectiveness attributes as efficiency through
economy of scale, divisional return on investment, attainment of objectives;
Townsend (1970) as profitability, staff accessibility, simple structure, simple
rules, lack of meaningless (non-productive) “peaks”; and Peters and
Waterman (1982) as bias for action, closeness to the customer, autonomy and
entrepreneurship, hands-on, value-driven philosophy, stick to the knitting,
simple form, lean staff, simultaneous loose-tight property. (Lewin and
Minton, 1986)
Georgopoulos and Tannenbaum (1957) define organizational effectiveness
as the extent of which the organization, as a social system given certain
resources and means, fulfills its objectives without incapacitating its means
and resources and without placing undue strains upon its members.
Effectiveness is often be confused with another performance indicator,
namely efficiency. Efficiency refers to an input-output ratio or comparison,
whereas effectiveness refers to an absolute level of either input acquisition or
outcome attainment. (Goodman and Pennings, 1977, cited in Ostroff and
Schmitt, 1993)
2.2 Exploitation
2.2.1 Definition
The Scope Exploitation can be regarded as one of the two extremes in
the paradox of organizational resource allocation, and includes such things
as refinement, choice, production, selection, implementation and execution.
8
(March, 1991) The mindset is characterized by focus, convergent thinking,
and reduction of variance. (Smith and Tushman, 2005) At this extreme,
organizations following an exploitation strategy will engage in production
activities to the exclusion of experimentation and execution to the exclusion
of risk taking.
Their main objectives will be to continuously improve current products,
eliminate waste and ensure a highly efficient resource usage, through
flat organization structures, teamwork, and co-operative supply chain
management. (Green, 1999) The organizations will value efficiency over
flexibility and seek the refinement of current processes rather than engaging
in the search for new ones. (March, 1991)
Literature Consensus Exploitative organizations are often conceptualized
as profit-making machines where success depends only upon efficiency and
the needs of the customer. (Green, 1999) Many different views exist
about exploitative strategy and its impact on organizations’ capacity to
succeed with innovation. However, there seems to be a certain convergence
in the literature that an exploitative strategy limits the development to
improvement of existing products by incremental innovation rather than
radical. (Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009) The convergent thinking of these
organizations excludes all risky and uncertain development projects as
sources for incremental product innovation. Instead, the focus is shifted to
utilize current knowledge and harness current capabilities in order to reduce
variance. (Atuahene-Gima, 2005)
Extreme Exploitation: Lean A common comprehension in the literature
is the connection between exploitative strategy and the philosophy of lean,
where lean production may be regarded as the extreme point of exploitative
strategy. The idea evolved in the 1950s, and includes principles such as
quality management and just-in-time production. (Chen and Taylor, 2009)
The core concept of lean thinking consists of three parts: (1) continuously
improve the total flow of a production system, (2) ensure that all functions,
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activities and processes within the organization are in fact value-adding, and
(3) eliminate all types of waste1. (Hopp and Spearman, 2008, cited in Chen
and Taylor, 2009)
Lean thinking is controversial, and critics pose a question about which
organizational level the extent of value-adding in the different activities
should be assessed. They argue that lean production will remove any kind of
activities that do not add value to the current customers, and thereby remove
all activities that could possibly generate ideas at the same time. (Chen and
Taylor, 2009)
Extreme Lean: Six Sigma While lean may be regarded as the extreme
version of exploitation, Six Sigma is a strategy that may be regarded as the
extreme version of lean. It is a production concept that requires 99.99966%
of the products manufactured to be free from defects. Six Sigma has a clear
role in some pure production companies, but excessive adherence to it will kill
innovation; people will never deviate from the standard, and the companies
won’t have innovation. (BostonConsultingGroup, 2009)
2.2.2 Positive Impacts
Discipline The convergent thinking that characterizes exploitative
production forces the organization focus on perfecting their existing products,
increase the effectiveness of the products’ production line and remove all
wasteful activities. In effect, this will remove all organizational slack, increase
the overall production effectiveness and foster a culture of discipline. Without
discipline, projects with high risk and negative net present value may be
funded simply because agents realize they can afford to develop these “pet
projects”. (Nohria and Gulati, 1997) Conversely, in organizations with a
1Specifically, the literature on lean thinking identifies seven types of waste that
should be eliminated in organizations: transport (moving products), inventory (finished
products), motion (moving people and equipment), waiting (for next production step),
overproduction (ahead of demand), over processing (poor product processing activities)
and defects (faulty products). (Womack and Jones, 2003)
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culture of slack, promising projects could be abandoned because someone
ran out of energy or got bored. (Nohria and Gulati, 1997)
While some parts of the literature argue that slack is requisite for
innovation, there are plenty of situations where firms simply need a
task performed quickly. A vice president in a 125-employee consumer
product company was interviewed in a study investigating this further, and
elaborates: “A lot of times clients will come to us when they have a tricky
problem and they need the product to get out a lot faster than they have
ever done before. So it is important to have a certain degree of discipline”.
(Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009)
However, when a company encounters a possibility that potentially could
turn into a breakthrough project, a certain amount of slack might be
necessary to pursue the chance. In those cases, exploitation is what provides
the surplus and profit necessary. (Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009) The
exploitation of current products is what drives the development of knowledge
and routines to foster innovations. (Smith and Tushman, 2005)
Develop Core Competencies Exploitation is what really establishes
organizational routines and core competencies. Managers and department
heads choose to allocate resources in such a way that habitual processes and
knowledge are leveraged. (Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009)
Inhibit Slack Accumulation Discipline is necessary to prevent the
accumulation of slack at every organizational level. Some scholars approach
the problem by modeling companies as nested agent/principal relationships.
(Williamson, 1963, cited in Jensen and Meckling, 1976) At the top level,
shareholders are principals and top managers are their agents; at the next
level the top managers are the principals and divisional managers are their
agents. This structure continues down to the lowest level. According to the
classic agent/principal field of study, there is always a risk that agents will
act in their own best interest—not necessarily aligned with the principals’ or
the organization’s best interest. (Antle and Fellingham, 1990)
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The organization’s best interest may be to pool all excess resources and
slack at the top level, to distribute where needed or reduce where possible.
However, the agents’ best interest may be to accumulate enough slack from
the level directly beneath, to either give them slack to pursue their own
“pet projects”, or to leave them with a comfortable amount of slack to
handle sick leaves or unexpected periods of decline. The result is piles
of slack accumulated at every organizational level, and the right way to
align the interests of principals and agents is the elimination of slack and
implementation of exploitative strategy. (Nohria and Gulati, 1996)
Examples
Toyota The name of the Japanese auto manufacturer Toyota is often
considered to be synonymous with exploitative strategy in the literature.
(Chen and Taylor, 2009) Toyota has a reputation of being an innovative
company, despite having outsourced all innovation activities to suppliers,
partners and other third party companies. Toyota’s organizational goals
are somewhat self-contradictory, as they aim to minimize costs, maximize
specialization and minimize inventory at same time. (Smith and Tushman,
2005) This strategy is important for the organization, to keep all their
processes and activities lean without the bad influence from lax departments
such as R&D.
Toyota started the implementation of lean in the engine assembly facility,
by eliminating waste and developing core production competencies. An
outcome of the waste reduction initiatives was that Toyota now was unable to
engage in any idea generation activities; since these activities possible could
generate ideas with negative net present value, considered as waste. However,
the introduction of lean continued, and the next step was to evaluate the
present effects, and apply the same strategies in the overall automobile
assembly activities. Today, Toyota has implemented lean production in its
entire supply chain, and is still one of the world’s most innovative companies.
(Hines et al., 2004)
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Pixar Pixar, the American computer animation film studio, is worth
mentioning, as they have devoted a great effort into including exploitation
into their business, which by nature require a great amount of creativity and
innovation. They have broken down the creative process into smaller parts,
with continuous feedback loops, to overcome creative blocks and ensure an
idea’s success. (BostonConsultingGroup, 2009)
2.2.3 Negative Impacts
Exploitation of Humans Excessive exploitation will affect employees
severely in the long run. Critics claim that exploitative organizations’ quest
for lean production processes will turn the workplace environment into one of
control and surveillance. (Green, 1999) Furthermore, a company configured
to comply with business objectives such as coordination, productivity and
control will unintentionally crush all creativity that could have grown from
the workforce. (Chen and Taylor, 2009)
Losing creativity is only the first step. The introduction of further
exploitative measures, like standardized systems and monotonous job
routines would take away any commitment left with the employees. (Chen
and Taylor, 2009) Trapped in this situation, workers will feel like being little
screws in a big machine, and they will only perform tasks exactly within the
responsibility frame they are given. The workforce loses the passion they
need to possibly initiate any actions on their own that somehow could be
profitable for the company in the long run. (Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009)
Even more aggressive exploitation would approach the extreme point of
human slavery. In Japan, the birthplace of lean thinking, the industrial work
hours are among the toughest in the world. Examples of workers living in
company camps hundreds of kilometers from their families give evidence to
some of the human consequences of exploitation. (Green, 1999)
Inhibits Innovation A consolidated, strategic imperative from the
contemporary literature is that organizations must “innovate or die”. (Nohria
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and Gulati, 1997) However, the managerial focus in exploitative organizations
will be short-term performance rather than long-term experimentation and
opportunity recognition. (Nohria and Gulati, 1996)
And a great amount of authors from this field of study argue that
excessive exploitation jeopardizes a firm’s capacity for renewal, and inhibits
an integral driver of innovation—organizational slack. (Nohria and Gulati,
1996) More specific, innovation is inhibited because exploitation discourages
any challenging of project constraints, and any experimentation with
opportunities where the possible success and net present value is uncertain.
(Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009)
Examples
Polaroid Traditionally, Polaroid has been one the most innovative camera
makers, at least in the 20th century. But something went terribly wrong
as they tried to exploit the company’s core competence within analog
photography at the same time as trying to enter the market for digital
photography. (Tripsas and Gavetti, 2003, cited in Smith and Tushman, 2005)
The fundamental mistake was the senior management’s obsessive
commitment to the company’s core competencies during the digital
revolution. Their new solution was conceptualized as having the same
business model as the existing camera and film product, also known as the
razor/blade strategy or the Gillette model2. (Smith and Tushman, 2005)
Polaroid is a typical example of where the right choice would be to cease all
exploitation of current knowledge, abandon all current exploitation activities,
and adapt to the digital revolution by innovation.
2The Gillette model is a classic (and quite generic) case of a well-known business revenue
model (specifically one component of a business model), which involves pricing razors
inexpensively, but aggressively marking up the consumables (razor blades). (Teece, 2010)
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2.2.4 Implementing Exploitative Strategy
Fundamental Conditions There are considerable differences between
industries when it comes to the extent that organizations are able and
suited to adapt to exploitative strategies. When considering the three
different sectors of economic activity, the appropriateness for exploitative
strategy reduces as the sector in consideration shifts from primary to
secondary, and from secondary to tertiary. At the extreme point in
the tertiary sector, cultural establishments like theaters, dance shows and
movie productions represent businesses where exploitation is inadequate.
(Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009) Producers of homogeneous products like
sugar, wooden boards and matches, will however be very well suited for
exploitative strategy. Specialization in industries yields increased efficiency,
and enables exploitation. (Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009)
Guidelines for Implementation A series of different approaches may
be employed in order to successfully implement exploitative strategy. The
first step is to identify what products or processes to be exploited, and
then eliminate all waste from these activities. Parts of the literature will
again argue that this lean approach will remove any kind of activities slack
enough to possibly generate ideas. (Chen and Taylor, 2009) To overcome
this problem, organizations may choose to run a separate, non-exploitative
R&D department. That way, this development department can experiment
with new ideas without influencing the lean production part of the system.
Organizations may choose to outsource their innovation efforts to external
companies. That way, they can concentrate on developing core competencies,
and escape the risk of faulty innovation that doesn’t make it successfully to
market. This strategy is most effective in industries where the technology
innovation and progress speed is high, such as computer and car industries.
(Chen and Taylor, 2009)
Organizations may experience that recently developed and new products
not only become really successful, but also contribute to increase demand
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for the existing products. An example is a manufacturer of contact lenses,
who learnt that the introduction of soft lenses actually increased demand for
conventional lenses simultaneously. (Smith and Tushman, 2005) However, in
situations where there is no leverage between the existing product and the
innovation, the most beneficial solution may be to split out the innovative
parts into separate business units or companies. (Smith and Tushman, 2005)
2.3 Exploration
2.3.1 Definition
The Scope Exploration is the other extreme in the paradox of
organizational resource allocation, and is regarded as a contradiction
to exploitation. March (1991) defines the term exploration to include
things that are captured by terms such as search, variation, risk-taking,
experimentation, play, flexibility, discovery, and innovation. Exploration is
used by organizations to gain new information and thereby improve future
returns.
An exploratory organization has a mindset based on experimentation,
flexibility, divergent thinking, and increasing variance. (Flynn and Chatman,
2004; Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2003; Van de Ven, 1999, cited in Smith and
Tushman, 2005) This is encouraged through variance-increasing activities,
learning by doing, and trial and errors. (Smith and Tushman, 2005) Extreme
exploration is to continuously seek new opportunities, and give lower priority
to the firm’s existing operation. (Gupta et al., 2006; March, 1991)
Literature Consensus The exploration strategy is based on the quest
for new knowledge and alternatives, to yield innovation. (Vermeulen
and Barkema, 2001, cited in Gupta et al., 2006) An organization often
uses exploration to achieve radical innovation. (Atuahene-Gima, 2005;
Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009) The result of exploration is often highly
uncertain and distant in time, but the benefits when success, are regarded as
important for further development of an organization. However, there is a
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common agreement that exploration can compromise the firm’s effectiveness,
since there is a need for organizational slack. (He and Wong, 2004; March,
1991)
Organizational Slack Innovation does not appear out of nothing, it
requires supportive organizational activities. It is necessary for an
organization to allow for organizational slack in order to innovate (Henderson
and Clark, 1990), since it supports experimentation and change. (Cyert and
March, 1992, cited in Geiger and Makri, 2006) The term organizational slack
is defined in the literature in different ways. Slack is sometimes defined
as an asset that acts as a buffer for unforeseen uncertainties. (March, 1976,
1981, cited in Nohria and Gulati, 1997) Slack resources allow organizations to
adapt to environmental change. (McGrath, 2001) This buffer can contribute
to create an innovative organization culture, where the members do not worry
about risk and failure. (Nohria and Gulati, 1997; Bourgeois III, 1981; Herold
et al., 2006) In addition, since slack resources are not committed to an explicit
expenditure, they may be utilized and redeployed to achieve organizational
goals and innovation. (George, 2005; Dimick and Murray, 1978, cited in
Geiger and Makri, 2006)
Organizational slack also contributes to ease managerial control. (Geiger
and Makri, 2006) The ease of control may lead managers to pursue new
projects and allows for experimentation. Slack resources play a crucial role
in resolving latent goal conflicts and preventing organizations from breaking
apart. (Cyert and March, 1992; Nohria and Gulati, 1997)
The literature has also defined organizational slack as negative for an
organization. Neoclassical economy defines organizational slack as zero.
Slack only appears when the firm is not in equilibrium and should be
minimized. (Sharfman et al., 1988, cited in Cyert and March, 1992) Slack
is often associated with waste, and allows for organizations to operate
ineffectively, without meeting the full potential of the available resources.
(Nohria and Gulati, 1997; Comanor and Leibenstein, 1969) The use of slack
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could result in bad managerial decisions, which lead the organization to invest
in dubious innovation projects or execute unrealistic acquisitions. (Jensen,
1986, cited in Nohria and Gulati, 1997) This view is tightly connected to
lean thinking and effectiveness optimizing.
Agency-principal theory also holds a negative understanding of slack
resources. It proposes that slack resources are used to maximize an
agent’s personal interest, and could lead to a decrease in innovation and
experimentation. Accumulation of slack will allow the agents to pursue their
own goal, and not act in the best interest of the organization. (Antle and
Fellingham, 1990; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Nohria and Gulati, 1996)
Further, Nohria and Gulati (1996) have proposed an inverted u-curve
relationship between organizational slack and innovation. They agree that
slack is important for innovation, but recommends maintaining a certain
amount of slack in order to be effective. In other words, too much and too
little slack inhibit the organizations’ ability to innovate.
2.3.2 Positive Impacts
Long-term Viability Organizations explore in order to seek new
innovation and knowledge. A firm that only utilizes existing capabilities
and competences may run the risk of achieving short-term success at the
expense of long-term viability. Long-term viability can be secured by
investing in exploration of new opportunities. (Atuahene-Gima, 2005) This
success depends on the organization’s ability to adapt and change through
innovation. (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997; Tushman and O’Reilly III, 2006)
The search for new knowledge leads to new capabilities that can generate
radical product innovation. (Atuahene-Gima, 2005) Even though radical
innovation often is associated with higher risk, the possible return on
investment is regarded higher than for incremental innovation.
Innovation can give organizations access to new markets, and increase
customer awareness, not only for new products, but also for existing ones.
(Leonard-Barton, 1992; Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004b) Furthermore, it
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allows for organizations to stay ahead of their competitors. Organizations
that are too focused on improving their existing competencies and products
run the risk of being outdistanced by more innovative firms. The organization
will lack the novel skills and knowledge to generate new insights on product
development. This could incur severe costs for an organization. (March,
1991)
Managing Environmental Uncertainties Environmental uncertainties
are regarded as a threat for most organizations. Innovation and new
knowledge acquired through exploration can help organizations overcome
this threat. Organizations with superior abilities to manage exploration are
more likely to discover and adapt to environmental changes. Adoption occurs
through exploration due to its variance-increasing effects. When the rate of
environmental uncertainty increases, the importance of exploration increases.
Organizations that manage adaption will be able to gain superior advantages
compared to its competitors. Adaptability becomes increasingly important
when the competitive landscape intensifies. The succeeding organizations will
pursue variance-seeking activities instead of exploiting current capabilities.
New knowledge and routines can arise from these variance-seeking activities,
and result in adaption advantages. (McGrath, 2001)
Examples
Seiko The mechanical watch company Seiko was, in the 1960s, a dominant
player in the Japanese market, but was a minor player in global markets.
To reach new markets, Seiko made a bold move, and started to explore
new technologies. Seiko pursued every opportunity and transformed itself
from being merely a mechanical watch firm into being both a quartz and
mechanical watch company. This transformation resulted in Seiko and other
Japanese firms gaining larger market share, and the Swiss watch industry
suffering drastically. By 1980, Seiko was twice the size of the largest Swiss
watch firm. (Tushman and O’Reilly III, 2006)
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Pfizer Pfizer, the American multinational pharmaceutical corporation,
developed Viagra for its cardiovascular applications, but Viagra’s additional
applications have by far outpaced the original intentions. (Rosenkopf and
Nerkar, 2001) Pfizer’s ability to explore and go beyond local search, secured
one of their biggest success in company history.
2.3.3 Negative Impacts
Lack of Effectiveness One of the most debated downsides of exploration
is that it can lead to decreased effectiveness. Seeking new opportunities
can reduce the speed of the organization’s existing operation. (March, 1991)
Comanor and Leibenstein (1969) introduce the term X-inefficiency, and argue
that exploration creates a gap between an organization’s actual output and
the maximum output they may achieve. This output gap represents the
loss an organization experiences by operating inefficiently. Furthermore,
exploration can lead to “too many underdeveloped ideas” (March, 1991),
which translates to organization members spending their time on ideas that
by the end of the day are not realized.
Failure Trap Exploration of new alternatives that are uncertain and
distant in time, are often negative. Exploratory organizations often react
to failure with search for more new ideas. The firm therefore moves from one
opportunity to the next without exploiting prior learning and experience.
(Levinthal et al., 1993) This continuous search for new opportunities can
create a “failure trap” (Gupta et al., 2006), where the organization will
suffer the cost of experimentation with new ideas without gaining many of
its benefits. (March, 1991) The failure in the new field do not compensate for
loss in existing business. (Mitchell and Singh, 1993, cited in He and Wong,
2004)
Ignore Core Competencies Failed exploratory efforts may destroy
successful organizational routines. (Mitchell and Singh, 1993, cited in He
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and Wong, 2004) When focusing on exploration, organization seeks new
competencies in order to innovate. The core competencies can be ignored
in search for radical innovations. (Gupta et al., 2006) “Exploration can, in
the worst case scenario, lead to too little distinctive competence” (March,
1991), resulting in organizations without real core capabilities. It has been
argued that exploration can inhibit optimal use of resources, which leads to
organizations not meeting their full potential.
Radical innovations may create new market opportunities, but they could
also damage customer demands in the existing market, and cannibalize or be
in direct competition with existing products. (Smith and Tushman, 2005)
Examples
Ericsson The Swedish mobile phone company Ericsson, led the technological
development of the mobile telecom industry. Ericsson developed one of
the first analogue mobile systems; it led the industry-wide development of
the global system for mobile communication; and it has pioneered general
packet radio system and third-generation mobile technology standards.
But the impressive sales growth in Ericsson’s system business masked a
high-cost and bloated organizational structure. At its peak, the R&D
organization employed 30,000 people in approximately 100 technology centers
with considerable duplication of effort. Exploitation had eventually become
predominant, and the subsequent crash in the telecom industry meant that
Ericsson was hit harder than most. Since its peak in 2000, Ericsson has laid
off around 60,000 employees and closed most of its technology centers in a bid
to restore the profitability of its current business. This example shows that
too much attention on the exploration means building tomorrow’s business
at the expense of today’s. (Birkinshaw and Gibson, 2004)
2.3.4 Implementing Exploratory Strategy
Fundamental Conditions Similar to exploitation, exploration is more
feasible in some industries than others. The industry and product portfolio
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affects an organization’s ability to adapt to exploratory strategies. In contrast
to exploration will the appropriateness for exploratory strategies increase as
the sector shifts from primary to secondary, and from secondary to tertiary.
An organization with a heterogeneous product portfolio will have the highest
advantage of exploration.
Guidelines for Implementation Exploration is associated with organic
structure, loosely coupled systems, autonomy, improvisation, chaos and
emerging markets and technologies. (He and Wong, 2004) In addition,
decentralization is a key word when organizing an exploratory organization.
(Siggelkow and Rivkin, 2006)
Organic structures represent fluid job descriptions, loose organization
charts, high degree of communication and few rules. These conditions
may promote innovation because the organization members have few
constrains, allowing them to change flexibly and create new ideas.
(Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997) Loose coupling denotes possibilities and
freedom, and contribute to facilitate organization members to probe
opportunities and continuous experimentation. (Andriopoulos and Lewis,
2009) Decentralization gives low-level managers autonomy to explore
(Siggelkow and Rivkin, 2006), and decentralized firms are often characterized
as flexible, which allow them to adapt quickly to changes. (Mintzberg, 1979;
Child, 1984, cited in Siggelkow and Rivkin, 2006)
The managerial influence on an organization is often characterized in
term of two forms of oversight: (1) performance goal and (2) supervision.
For an exploratory organization, high level of goal autonomy and supervision
activities with high variance is desirable. (McGrath, 2001)
2.4 Summary of Section 2
O’Reilly and Tushman (2004) have proposed a framework for the
juxtaposition of exploitation and exploration, as shown in Table 1. As this
table indicates, the two require very different strategies, structures, processes,
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and cultures.
As mentioned, several scholars have proposed that exploitation and
exploration make up a paradox within an organization. They also argued
that the solution of this paradox is ambidexterity, by balancing the opposing
forces of the two extreme points. A more thorough theoretical and empirical
description of the paradox is found in Part II, and a theoretical introduction
of ambidexterity is found in Part III.
Exploitative Business Exploratory Business
Strategic
intent
Cost, profit Innovation, growth
Critical tasks Operation, effectiveness,
incremental innovation
Adaptability, new products,
breakthrough innovations
Competencies Operational Entrepreneurial
Structure Formal, mechanistic Adaptive, loose
Controls,
rewards
Margins, productivity Milestones, growth
Culture Effectiveness, low risk, quality,
customer
Risk taking, speed, flexibility,
experimental
Leadership role Authoritative, top down Visionary, involved
Table 1: Juxtaposition of Exploitation and Exploration
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3 Research Method
Several different strategies are available for researchers when examining
organizational theory issues, such as experiments, surveys, archival analyses,
history and case studies. (Yin, 2009) The empirical part of this master thesis
is conducted through the case study method. Yin (2009) has identified
this approach as the appropriate research method when (1) “how” or
“why” questions are being posed, (2) the researcher has little control over
events, and (3) the focus is on contemporary phenomena within real-life
contexts. It is also often preferred when considering organization-related
phenomena, because it allows the researcher to retain holistic and meaningful
characteristics of real-life events.
3.1 Research Design
3.1.1 Research Question
This master thesis is a continuation of the authors’ literature study concluded
December 2011, on the managerial paradox of exploitation and exploration.
The field of general ambidexterity research has been appropriately covered
by the literature, and a multitude of different strategies for balancing
the exploitation/exploration paradox has been suggested. However, the
literature study revealed that few scholars have considered companies
deploying multiple such strategies simultaneously. Also, very little work has
been published on deliberately distributing these balancing efforts across
different organizational levels. During the literature study, the authors
composed the following research question for further investigation:
How can mature corporations maximize profit, by leveraging organizational
levels to deploy multiple ambidexterity modes simultaneously?
Due to the vast comprehensiveness of this research question, the issue has
been broken down into problem statements of more manageable proportions.
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Three objectives have been formulated, and they will function as a recipe for
conducting this study. The objectives of this master thesis are to:
A) Provide an understanding of the exploitative and exploratory organizational
strategies, respectively.
B) Provide an understanding of why these strategies traditionally have been
considered two mutually exclusive extreme points of a paradox.
C) Provide an understanding of how mature organizations can solve the
paradox to achieve ambidexterity.
Objective A and B is handled in Part I and II, where Part I gives a
theoretical introduction, and Part II supplements with additional theory and
empirical assessments. Objective C will be handled in Part III, where both
theoretical and empirical analyses are conducted.
3.1.2 Research Proposition
The literature study fall 2011 was an exploratory study (Yin, 2009), where
a large amount of information provided from about 144 different articles
was analyzed. Subsequently, the information was organized and logical
consistencies between related theories were predicted, leading to two new
frameworks to structure the paradox of exploitation and exploration. The
current thesis, on the other hand, may be categorized as an explanatory
study. (Yin, 2009) The thesis aims to investigate theory developed in the
literature study using a deductive approach. This theory had previously
been developed analytical conceptually, where a researcher adds new insight
into traditional problems through logical relationship building. (Wacker,
1998) The deductive approach requires the researcher to identify a set of
propositions based on existing theories and examines them empirically. Seven
propositions are therefore suggested for further investigation:
H1: Exploitation and exploration are two distinct pathways to profit
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H2: Exploitation yields high effectiveness and low innovation rate
H3: Exploration yields high innovation rate and low effectiveness
H4: The two pathways represent extreme points of a managerial paradox
H5: The paradox can be balanced to combine exploitation and exploration
H6: The balance can be applied at different levels in the organization
simultaneously
H7: Solving the paradox redound to ambidexterity
Proposition H1 has evolved from scholars’ extensive investigation of
exploitation and exploration presented in the theoretical background of this
thesis. H1 will be investigated theoretically in Section 5 and empirically in
Section 6.
The background for propositions H2, H3 and H4 is the Pathway
Framework developed in Section 5. H2 and H3 will be empirically assessed
in Sections 6.1 through 6.3, and H3 will be evaluated in Section 6.
Proposition H5 has evolved from studies on how organizations can manage
both exploitation and exploration and solve the paradox. This proposition
will be examined theoretically in Section 9, and empirically in Section 10.
The theoretical assessment in Section 9 indicates that the different
strategies for balancing the exploitation/exploration paradox can be applied
at different levels in an organization, which give rise to proposition H6.
Section 11 will provide a thorough, empirical examination of this proposition.
The Ambidexterity Framework and the theoretical evidence produced in
Section 9, considering various ambidexterity strategies, lay the foundation for
proposition H7. Sections 10 and 12 will provide an empirical investigation of
this proposition.
3.1.3 Unit of Analysis
The case study method requires the researcher to identify a unit of analysis
related to the fundamental problem of defining the case itself and the
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environment in which the research is conducted. (Yin, 2009) The research
question in this thesis comprises the organization Finn and spin-off companies
originated from Finn, such as Penger.no.
Finn.no Finn.no AS is Norway’s biggest online classifieds website, and
was established in March 2000. Finn specializes in classifieds advertising
and services for purchases and sales between private individuals as well as
small and large enterprises. Finn’s shareholders are Schibsted ASA (90%)
and Polaris Media (10%). The CEO is Christian Printzell Halvorsen and the
chairman of the board is Didrik Munch. The market verticals are structured
as individual private limited companies, and include:
Bil (Auto) Focus on trading of auto related products, such as cars,
caravans, trucks etc. Part of Finn’s original portfolio established in
2000. 100% owned by Finn.
Eiendom (Real Estate) Specializes on sales and rentals of real estate.
Part of Finn’s original portfolio established in 2000. Eiendom is owned
by Finn (87.38%), DnB Nor Eiendom AS (7.55%), Obos (3.78%),
M2 Eiendomsmegling AS (0.60%), Øst Prosjekt AS (0.54%), and
Eiendomsmegleren Ringerike Hadeland AS (0.15%).
Jobb (Recruitment) Core activities are related to announcement of part-
time and full time work positions. Part of Finn’s original portfolio
established in 2000. 100% owned by Finn.
Torget (Marketplace) A marketplace for trading of commodities and
consumer products, such as antiques, arts, electronics, household
appliances, clothing etc. Established as a separate department in 2007,
but has been part of Finn.no since the beginning. 100% owned by Finn.
Reise (Travel) Specializes on travel related services, such as airplane
tickets, hotels, holiday houses, rentals, package travels, last minute
27
flights, travel suggestions and rental cars. Established in 2004. 100%
owned by Finn.
Oppdrag (Trades and Services) Specializes on trades and services from
craftsmen firms, cleaning firms and moving firms, and liking the offers
to consumers with matching needs. Established in 2005 and is Finn’s
youngest vertical. 100% owned by Finn.
Finn is currently the market leader in the verticals Bil, Eiendom, Jobb
and Torget. Relevant support functions include:
Finn Way of Innovation Responsible for innovation and continuous
improvement efforts. Three employees are working in this
department—two responsible for continuous improvement and one
for innovation. They have developed a program of seven principles
for continuous improvement to guide market verticals and support
departments in becoming more effective and understanding cause
and effect of actions. They are in the process of developing a
similar program for innovation, supposed to be a recipe for capturing,
developing and commercializing new ideas.
Platform and Architecture Responsible for the core technology, classifieds
advertising technology and search technology. The unit comprises
four architects—two application architects, one search architect, one
database architect. Together, these areas of responsibility make up the
platform similar for every vertical, except Oppdrag.
New Markets Established March 2012 with the purpose of identifying,
screening and developing new business cases. New Markets will employ
business developers and concept developers, as part of Finn’s innovation
and expansion strategy.
Finn has 320 employees, whereas approximately 34% are sales staff,
45% are programmers and product developers and 21% are responsible for
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administrative tasks and support functions like HR, marketing and financial.
Finn was awarded the best place to work in Norway in the Great Place to
Work Institute’s annual workplace environment survey. In addition, Finn
was the first runner-up in a survey done by Norstat, where 9000 Norwegians
were asked about their satisfaction of 192 different companies.
In addition to the subsidiaries, Finn has several support functions such
as Cooperation Customer Sales Department, Platform and Architecture and
Finn Way of Innovation. Finn Way of Innovation is a separate department
responsible for effectiveness and innovation efforts. At the moment, the
effectiveness improvement efforts through lean thinking are given highest
priority, but they are in the process of developing a fixed recipe for innovation.
In addition, several arrangements are designed for promoting innovation, e.g.
Finnopp and Finnovasjon.
Penger Penger.no AS is a spin-off company established July 2011 by
Christian Haneborg. Penger is owned by Finn (70%) and Dine Penger (30%),
and is therefore a part of Schibsted Media Group. Penger’s ambition is
to develop an Internet site that comprises every aspect of the Norwegian’s
personal economy. Penger has currently developed a service for home loan,
and the plan is to expand this to cover other types of financial services.
3.1.4 Context
To fully understand the units of analysis in this thesis, it is important
to consider the context. Finn is Norway’s biggest website for classifieds,
meaning that they operate in a competitive landscape with continuous
improvement in technology, and modifications in customer needs. Several
niche companies are challenging Finn on some parts of their core activities,
forcing Finn to strive towards new offerings and improve existing ones. These
efforts are enhanced by the market’s aggressive technology development.
Finn has experienced an impressive growth since its beginning, which could
indicate that the competitive landscape back then was less crowded, allowing
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Finn to get a head start and establish the brand.
Finn’s revenue model is configured such that the customers not are the
users of the website in every situation. The main customer is usually a small,
medium or large enterprise advertising their products or services online. The
users are mainly regular people, browsing the website for personal matters.
Finn’s improvement and development must therefore take both users and
customers into consideration when starting new projects.
Finn is a part of Schibsted, a Norwegian media conglomerate operating in
20 countries, with main focus on Norway and Sweden. As the largest owner,
Schibsted influences Finn through the network of media companies within the
corporate umbrella, constantly inspiring, helping and imitating each another.
One example is Schibsted Way of Sales, an articulated recipe for conducting
sales, now being implemented in several of Schibsted’s subsidiaries.
3.2 Data Collection
The data collection for this thesis was an intensive process, extending
over two months, through multiple sources of information: (1) semi-
structured interviews, (2) archival data and documents, and (3) observations.
Informant interviews were the primary source of inductive data, although the
authors’ understanding of the case was expanded through archival data and
observations.
3.2.1 Sampling
Eisenhardt (1989) specifies that random selections are neither necessary nor
even preferable in studies aiming to build theory from cases. The cases in
such studies should be selected on basis of their theoretical usefulness. The
goal of theoretical sampling is to choose cases that are likely to replicate
or extend the emergent theory. The case company in this master thesis is
selected on behalf of central theory from the previous literature study. Four
criteria were defined in order to select a suitable company: (1) nationality, (2)
maturity of the company, (3) the company’s ability to exert lean principles to
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attain effectiveness, and (4) the company’s ability to employ organizational
slack to attain innovation.
The literature review revealed that little or none research have been
conducted on Norwegian companies; the main focus has for example been
on companies from USA, Switzerland, Denmark and Sweden. (Birkinshaw
and Gibson, 2004; Raisch et al., 2009; Smith et al., 2010) Further, Norway
is a physically close market in which the authors possess prior knowledge
and connections. Thus, conducting a study on how Norwegian companies
encounter this paradox and the applicability of its solutions emerged as an
obvious choice. The paradox of exploitation and exploration are usually
linked to mature companies in earlier studies, making such companies less
interesting in the case company selection process. The final requirement was
for the case company to have objectives containing elements of operational
effectiveness through lean principles and innovation through organizational
slack included in their corporate strategy.
The choice of Finn as the research object is based on these four criteria.
The deciding reason behind the choice is rather trivial and practical—the
authors have already established contacts within Finn and their knowledge
of interest in this particular institution. The contact with Finn was initiated
fall 2011, and the agreement for the master thesis was concluded in February
2012.
3.2.2 Interviews
A major part of the data collected in this thesis is based on interviews. A
total of nine semi-structured interviews were conducted with individuals in
different positions at Finn and Penger. Of those nine interviewees, two were
women and seven were men. The process of identifying interviewees was
conducted in two steps. The first step included using information gathered
on the Internet and from key persons at Finn to identify suitable interviewees.
To further ensure that the sample included the most knowledgeable
informants, step two was done through the snowballing technique. (Streeton
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et al., 2004) Every informant was asked to recommend others within the
organization that could offer further insight. Every interview except one
included both researchers, lasted on average 50 minutes, and were all tape
recorded and transcribed verbatim. The transcriptions totaled 62 pages,
and were rewritten and transformed into summaries, which are included in
Section 4.1.
When arranging the interviews, a telephone conversation was conducted
with each of the interviewees. The purpose of this conversation was both to
make the arrangements for the meeting and to decide whether the person
was operating in a department closest to an exploitative or exploratory
mindset. The reason for this is that this case study was conducted with
two different case protocols, with questions designed for effectiveness-driven
and innovation-driven environments, respectively.
3.2.3 Archival Data
Before conducting the interviews, it was important to gather background
information about the case company. The authors analyzed annual reports,
relevant articles and web material related to Finn. This information was
crucial when designing the case protocol.
3.2.4 Observations
Since all the interviews were conducted at Finn’s headquarters in Oslo, the
authors were invited to inspect the working environment closely, and details
such as the office workplace configuration, ad hoc conversation spots (e.g.
the water cooler and reception) and the dining hall.
3.2.5 Academic Literature
The theoretical part of this thesis is primarily based on the article by March
(1991). Further research were found through search for articles were this
exact paper had been cited or referred to. The reference lists of every
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compelling article were used to stumble upon new research, by examining the
authors and titles relevant to this thesis. The technique is called snowballing
(Streeton et al., 2004), and allows researchers to quickly gather knowledge by
moving from one reference list to another. That way, the new literature may
in most cases be regarded as credible, by being cited in an article written by
an author already considered credible. (Descombe, 2003, cited in Streeton
et al., 2004)
In addition, several search terms has been used to identify suitable
articles: Exploitation, exploration, organizational slack, lean thinking,
lean management, lean manufacturing, innovation, radical innovation,
incremental innovation, effectiveness, efficiency, creativity, productivity,
organizational performance, paradox, ambidexterity, ambidextrous organizations,
contextual ambidexterity, structural ambidexterity, and temporal equilibrium.
When searching for articles, a rating system was developed to ensure that
the articles were of relevance to the assignment. By comparing search terms
to words in the title or abstract, the authors could ensure that the article was
worth spending time on. After accumulating and reading articles, they were
prioritized according to authors whose names were recognized in the initial
search. Among these names were Michael Tushman, Cristina Gibson, Julian
Birkinshaw, Kathleen Eisenhardt, James March, Dorothy Leonard-Barton,
Marianne Lewis, Rita McGrath, and Charles O’Reilly.
3.3 Data Analysis
The empirical data collected through the interviews was comprehensive, but
the amount was manageable and thereby subject to a thorough single-case
analysis. The analysis was conducted with embedded units of analysis, where
most of the market verticals, support units and spin-offs were considered
separate units of analysis. Altogether, nine embedded units of analysis
were analyzed—Bil, Eiendom, Jobb, Torget, Reise, Oppdrag, Platform and
Architecture, New Markets, Finn Way of Innovation, and Penger.
The data collected from each interviewee was divided into three main
33
topics (with some overlaps): exploitation, exploration, and combinations of
the two. Based mainly on the transcriptions, but also secondary data sources
such as press facsimiles, websites and presentations, every embedded unit of
analysis was studied within the boundaries of the three main topics. First,
a within-case analysis was performed, and the data was further categorized
into subtopics—such as lean, slack, effectiveness, and innovation, allowing
the researchers to obtain a thorough overview of the information collected
for each embedded unit of analysis.
Second, a cross-case analysis, based on similar subtopics, was conducted
between the different embedded units of analysis, providing insight on
similarities and differences within Finn. Both within-case analyses and cross-
case analysis of the embedded units of analysis are found in Part II.
Finally, the data from each embedded unit of analysis was extracted
and categorized for entire Finn and its context, allowing the researchers
to attain an overall understanding of the organization. This analysis
was mainly based on the combinations of exploitative and exploratory
efforts, and new subtopics such as ambidexterity, contextual ambidexterity,
structural ambidexterity, punctuated equilibrium, domain separation, and
senior management teams were used to structure the data. This analysis are
found in Part III
The main analysis method was pattern matching (Yin, 2009), where the
researchers looked for patterns in the empirical data, which corresponded
to the propositions predicted. Some of the main terms that were
specifically searched for in the empirical data includes innovation,
lean, slack, processes, intrapreneurial, entrepreneurial, plans, continuous
improvement, organizational structure, success, failure, performance, ideas,
culture, mindset, strategies, experimentation, projects, creativity, meetings,
prioritizing and long-term.
The process was highly iterative forcing the researchers to several times
step back and forth between the empirical data and analysis. As a
result of these analyses, the thesis was divided in three parts—background,
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understanding the paradox, and solving the paradox.
3.4 Research Validity and Reliability
Case studies are often criticized for providing little basis for scientific
generalization. Yin (2009) argues that they are generalizable to theoretical
propositions, where the goal of the research is to expand and generalize
theories, also called analytical generalization. This master thesis is based
upon well-known organizational theories, and the aim is to develop these
theories further.
There are two main reasons for why strategic selection of a case company
was used. First, it was vital to conduct this study in an ambidextrous
organization. Even though several Norwegian companies have shown
indications of both exploitative and exploratory efforts, the authors needed to
make sure the company genuinely focused on the two extremes and succeeded
with both. Second, the authors’ prior knowledge of the organization and
people within it, allowed them to rapidly get a comprehensive overview and
navigating themselves to appropriate interviewee candidates. In addition,
the authors’ acquaintance with the company resulted in employees and senior
managers were eager to assist and participate in the research.
Biases and partial information may have affected the data, but several
measures have been taken to minimize the effect. It was crucial for this study
to thoroughly define main terms before conducting the interviews to ensure
that the researchers held a common understanding of the words, and thereby
could pronounce questions accordingly. This was done to prevent poorly
articulated or vague questions that often lead to misunderstood answers.
In addition, interviewees have a tendency to form their answers according
to what they imagine the researchers are searching for. Another important
measure was to create a platform of trust in the beginning of every interview;
informing the interviewees of the formalities surrounding a master thesis. An
important limitation of this study is that the interviewees are all educated
and insightful people working in an ambidextrous organization, implying a
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likelihood of some prior knowledge in the field that could possibly influence
their answers. To secure reliability, the authors have found real actions or
efforts implemented in the organization to confirm the interviewees’ answers.
Due to the risk of revealing confidential information, the recorded and
transcribed interviews are not made publicly available. However, a summary
of each interview is included in Section 4.1. In addition, two interview guides
are included in Appendix A.
4 Empirical Background
The current section includes summaries of the interviews, including
background and position of each interviewee, their general approach to the
paradox, other main points, and the reason for being selected to this thesis.
4.1 Summary of Interviews
4.1.1 Ole Kristian Ullereng
Ole Kristian Ullereng started his professional career at Finn in 2005, and is
now the managing director of Torget and Oppdrag. He is also responsible
for developing a new initiative at Finn, a cross-corporate future department
called New Markets. The new department will have one single mission—to
identify new market opportunities and gather leads to such from all vertical
markets within Finn.
• Position: CEO Finn Torget AS and Finn Oppdrag AS
• Date of interview: March 15th, 2012
General Approach to the Paradox
A shared sense of ownership across the entire organization
will enable Finn to meet corporate goals through directed
experimentation The key point of his managerial vision is to ensure that
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all team members share a common understanding of the superior goal of
each project assigned to. At that point, he believes every effort is made
on how to get there, not why. The idea is originated as an opposite to
the traditional, hierarchical corporation, where senior management makes
decisions behind closed doors, and simply instructs the employees what to do.
He believes this eventually will lead to questions arising about superior goals,
inappropriately answered by micromanagement. Instead, if the entire team
shares the same sense of ownership, all members will be in complete control
of where they’re headed. He encourages directed experimentation within
those frames, allowing the team to chose their own path of getting there.
In a successful implementation of such an environment, Ullereng believes he
could be gone for months and still return to a team completely on track with
the task at hand.
Main Points
Established corporate environments inhibit experimentation Ullereng
has witnessed numerous unsuccessful attempts on engaging in experimentation
within established corporate environments, and points to the fact that
there are fundamental cultural differences between keeping a successful firm
profitable and creating all new markets. He further elaborates that trying
to be entrepreneurial in a large corporation is challenging when the firm
already is successful. He has later developed into a pioneer for promoting
intrapreneurial projects within Finn, and his clear advice is to establish
entirely new environments to conduct these initiatives within.
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Different S curve stages require different staffing Ullereng points
to the S curve3, and suggests that the professional skills required of the
development team change as a service travels through the different stages of
the curve. The intrapreneurial staff is constantly looking for emerging market
opportunities, while the daily operational staff is constantly looking for errors
and tiny improvements. The intrapreneurial staff doesn’t care about errors
and the daily operational staff doesn’t care about experimentation.
Reason for Selection
In the authors’ view, Ullereng will necessarily have to deal with the
paradox of exploitation and exploration every day, being the manager of two
departments where each of them represents one of the sides in the paradox.
Torget is an exploitative part of Finn’s core business, with proven market
success and significant revenues. Oppdrag is a more exploratory initiative,
and one of the few verticals where Finn is not the market leader. Thus, an
integral part of his job involves splitting resources and managerial attention
between a proven market success, and an uncertain project with potential of
becoming the next success.
4.1.2 Bent Ove Jørgensen
Bent Ove Jørgensen has a background from Eiendom, where he was
responsible for commercial campaigns within that particular marketplace.
He changed his personal career direction slightly in April 2012, when he
decided to join the Product & Concept Development Department as the
manager. The department is a novel initiative at Finn, as a measure to
3The product technology S curve framework indicates the current life cycle phase and
the maturity level of a particular product, technology or market. Nearly every technology
invention in history has been empirically proven to conceptually follow this curve. The
first stage of the curve is characterized by low maturity level, elementary features and
heavy development investments; the second stage is characterized by high maturity level,
sophisticated features and low production costs. (InnovationZen)
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redeem the superior, articulated goal of launching one new market each year.
Jørgensen’s personal responsibilities as the department manager are to create
commercial solutions for large companies and Finn partners, and establish
an experimental style of work with new processes and routines.
• Position: Head of Product & Concept Development
• Date of interview: March 15th, 2012
General Approach to the Paradox
Maintain enough slack to produce good ideas, but enough lean to
prevent losing them Jørgensen believes excess lean will kill all creativity,
but that excess slack will prevent Finn from capturing the best ideas. The
first step to comply with his philosophy is to define an outer frame in which
the experimentation should occur. This frame should allow for wide ranges
of experimentation, but somehow be connected to an external need from
the customer. Second, some processes should be established to capture the
solutions that surface in these activities. However, he believes that too rigid
routines will prevent good ideas from ever coming to light, and possibly turn
employees into robots.
Main Points
Project handovers compromise mental ownership Jørgensen does
acknowledge the S curve, but has personal experience of the disadvantages
with different people being in charge at different stages of the curve. Eiendom
is divided into two sections—strategic and operational—where strategic is
responsible for the exploratory market analysis phase of each new project,
and operational is responsible for the exploitative running phase. Jørgensen
witnessed a major loss of ownership in the handover process between strategic
and operational. In light of his experiences, this model is now in the middle
of a fundamental change process, where the original team to a larger extent
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now stays on the project along the entire S curve. Thus, his belief in this
matter is contradictory to that of Ole Kristian Ullereng.
Apply exploratory work style to everyday duties He explains about
the rigidity of Finn’s corporate strategy goals, comprising an overall one-
year strategy direction, decomposed into quarterly roadmaps, and three-week
sprints to tread the roadmaps. He believes exploratory projects are absolutely
necessary to counterbalance the myriad of routines and processes involved to
meet these strategy plans. However, as of today, projects has to fit somewhere
in the current roadmap in order to be granted by senior management.
Although some channels exist to enable more unbound experimentation, such
as Finnopp, Finnovasjon and Sandbox, Jørgensen is of the opinion that this
work style should be applied to a broader part of everyday duties.
Reason for selection
It is the authors’ opinion that Jørgensen’s background from an exploitative
market vertical with confirmed success makes him interesting in combination
with his new position in a more exploratory context. Even though his job in
Eiendom was launching new commercial campaigns, occasionally involving
some experimentation, there are still some aspects that always will limit the
experimentation possible in established and successful services like Eiendom.
An articulated goal for his new department is to increase the level of unbound
experimentation.
4.1.3 Lars Erik Ribe Anderssen
Lars Erik Ribe Anderssen has worked in Finn since 2005, and has the top
responsibility for every line of computer code written in the company. He
creates Finn’s general IT strategy and lays the technological foundation to
enable the organization to consecutively experiment, develop and maintain
market success. He is the general manager of four programmer teams,
including system architects and central functionality teams.
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• Position: Director of Platform and Architecture
• Date of interview: March 22nd, 2012
General Approach to the Paradox
Every project has an exploratory phase Ribe Anderssen is of the
opinion that the superior objective of every project’s initial phase is to
confirm the business model and demand, not the technology. Consequently,
he regards the choice of technology as irrelevant in this phase and his mission
is rather to get the product out there, showcase it for the customers, process
the feedback and iterate. The operation of bringing the code to perfection
should not start until a satisfactory service has been shaped, since the code
has to be rewritten and changed from the initial sketch anyway.
Main Points
Don’t allocate tasks—allocate mental ownership Employees’ tasks
and motivation should always originate from personal ownership. Therefore,
Ribe Anderssen does not simply allocate the explicit workload to his staff.
Instead, he allocates formal ownership of the tasks, with the ambition of this
resulting in a mental sense of ownership as well. As a consequence, a certain
continuity is required through a project phase, and he agrees with Bent Ove
Jørgensen that project handovers compromise mental ownership. However,
he allows for some team member replacements, as long as no clean-cuts are
made in the team at any point in time.
Flexible division of labor enables mental ownership even to routine
work Ribe Anderssen is confident that the concept of mental ownership
not only should be applied to exploratory initiatives, but also to everyday
work. If his programmers feel like they own the tasks themselves, and take
personal pride in the outcome, the entire project will increase in quality.
Further, he believes that when quality is increased, the effectiveness increases
accordingly.
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Reason for Selection
Ribe Anderssen is the general manager of a department most people from an
outside view would expect as the most lean, but in fact has exactly the same
elements of experimentation as the market vertical departments in Finn.
4.1.4 Christian Haneborg
Christian Haneborg started his career at Finn in 2007, and formally left in
2010, when his intrapreneurial start-up Penger branched out to a separate
company. The basic idea of Penger is to complement the capital goods at all
Finn’s market verticals with corresponding financing and insurance services.
Before the idea of Penger was conceived, he was in charge of developing
advertising solutions to key accounts across all Finn’s markets.
• Position: CEO Penger AS
• Date of interview: April 2nd, 2012
General Approach to the Paradox
Corporate success inhibits entrepreneurial spirit Haneborg’s main
concern is that Finn’s unprecedented success is counteracting the goal
of maintaining an entrepreneurial atmosphere in the office, and that
intrapreneurial efforts should be moved to a different physical location.
Company achievements are often publicly celebrated in the office, and most
employees have enough freedom to not spend more than six hours in the
office landscape any given day. He believes that Finn would remain as the
number one in most of its markets even if the entire staff stepped down
for a limited time, and that someone always pays the bills. Altogether,
this is not an optimal starting point for creating a cost-conscious culture of
entrepreneurial spirit. The solution, as Haneborg sees it, is to rather develop
the experimental projects in the incubator at Oslo Innovation Center4 than
within the corporate headquarters.
4Forskningsparken
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Main Points
Five failures and one great success still equal great success
Haneborg believes that intrapreneurial failures are a healthy sign, indicating
that the company engages in sufficient experimentation to ensure that at
least one great success eventually will be among the attempts. A corporate
imperative to ensure continuous intrapreneurial efforts is to establish mental
ownership among the team members by increasing their stakes. They should
be offered a substantial monetary reward if certain goals are achieved. The
reward will incur increased expenditures on the company, but will definitely
be worth it if it makes the team motivated enough to successfully establish
a new market vertical or sub-vertical.
Loss of cost consciousness A consequence of Finn’s unprecedented
market success is the loss of cost consciousness. Haneborg points out that
through the company’s entire history, not a single employee has ever been
laid off due to cost reductions. He believes that Finn easily could be run
more resource efficient without compromising the innovation rate.
Reason for selection
Haneborg is selected because he has taken an idea that at the initial starting
point was nothing more than a conceptual thought of mind, and transformed
it into a very promising independent business. He has experienced the
processes of experimental innovation through the entire company, and even
established some of them on his way.
4.1.5 Wakas Asif
Wakas Asif has worked at Finn since 2007, first in Torget and now as Key
Account Manager in Jobb. He is responsible for several of Finn’s most
important commercial customers, such as Statoil, Orkla and Dnb. He is
part of a team of eight account managers in Jobb.
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• Position: Key Account Manager, Finn Jobb AS
• Date of interview: March 14th, 2012
General Approach to the Paradox
Ad hoc pitches more efficient than internal innovation communities
Asif explains about the corporate culture in Finn, allowing personal ideas to
be pursued provided that someone gain mental ownership to them and takes
the appropriate measures required to bring them to the next level. However,
people do not realize that in most cases, that person has to be themself. In his
professional opinion, the problem with Finn’s internal innovation community
Finnopp is that few employees takes mental ownership to ideas posted there
by others. Thus, if you have a good idea and are prepared to personally
pursue it, Finnopp is simply a time-consuming intermediary instance, slower
than simply talking to your direct superior. He underscores that Finnopp
still has an important role for the most uncertain exploratory projects, with
no natural affiliation with any of the established verticals.
Main Points
Engage in experimentation even if the outcome is uncertain Asif
insists on Finn having an established culture promoting trial and error as
a legitimate measure to enquire into the potential of new ideas. In his
opinion, this is an important principle to maintain, especially to ensure that
even uncertain ideas are being evaluated. He appreciates the importance of
pursuing these ideas, knowing that future market successes not always stand
out as such in the initial phase.
Reason for selection
As Key Account Manager, Asif will not be engaging in the most experimental
projects himself, but will provide useful insights to how the inside of the
organization considers such projects.
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4.1.6 Bente Mari Kristiansen and Bjørn Henrik Vangstein
Together, Bente Mari Kristiansen and Bjørn Henrik Vangstein constitute
Finn’s division for continuous improvement and implementation of lean
principles, Finn Way of Innovation. The division’s mandate is to aid
other divisions by introducing lean thinking and applying a more explicit
innovation structure. A key point is that every involvement should yield
measurable results for the assisted division. They have both worked at Finn
since 2006.
• Position: Lean Experts
• Date of interview: March 22nd, 2012
General Approach to the Paradox
Structure facilitates innovation Kristiansen and Vangstein’s philosophy
is that corporate innovation will accelerate if a structural framework is
applied to the process. It should be clear to all employees exactly which
standards, tools and resources are available for them to pursue personal ideas,
and through what channels to ask for help. They still encourage exploratory
initiatives, as long as the experiments have clearly articulated goals, duration
and resource consumption.
Main Points
Seven principles for raising self-consciousness The overall mission
for Kristiansen and Vangstein’s department is to elucidate the cause and
effect of people’s actions in other departments. The seven principles
include clarification of processes, results and work style, prioritizing customer
value, definition of effectiveness and establishment of mental ownership,
communication and quality. They emphasize that with Finn’s extraordinary
success, they do not promote workforce reductions or expenditure cuts, but
rather maximizing the profit of the resources accessible in each department.
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Rationalize the intuition Not more than twelve years have passed since
Finn was simply a mere technology start-up, and elements of such are still
present in the corporate culture. Kristiansen and Vangstein are concerned
about projects still being pursued solely on the basis of intuition and gut
feeling. A fundamental purpose of their department is to help rationalize
people’s gut feelings, transform their intuition into facts and hypotheses,
and define KPIs to assess the experiments.
Determine individual KPIs originated from customer need The
lean experts’ policy is that all internal processes—everyday routines, trial
and error projects and experimental efforts—should have explicit objectives
defined before engaging. However, the objectives should not be standardized,
but individually assessed for each operation. An important property of these
objectives is that they must originate from a validated customer need.
Reason for selection
As certified experts in lean thinking, Kristiansen and Vangstein are
quintessential representatives of the exploitative extreme point in the paradox
of exploitation and exploration. Thus, they’ll provide useful insights on how
processes and routines come into being in a company by many regarded as
closer to the other extreme point.
4.1.7 Nina Moi Edvardsen and Niklas Larsson
Nina Moi Edvardsen started her career at Finn in 2000 as Marketing Manager
and Head of HR. In 2006, she was promoted to VP of Organizational
Development. Niklas Larsson started his career at Finn in 2010 as VP of
Strategy and Product Development. They are both part of Finn’s senior
management team. Larsson is responsible for the priority of new products
and strategies within and outside Finn’s core activities, and Edvardsen for
the organizational development, such as Finn Way of Innovation and HR.
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• Position: VP of Organizational Development (Edvardsen) & VP of
Strategy and Product Development (Larsson)
• Date of interview: April 27nd, 2012
General Approach to the Paradox
Multiple ways to achieve innovation and effectiveness Edvardsen
and Larsson’s opinion is that innovation and effectiveness will arise from
individuals that possess a mindset allowing for contradictory thoughts. But
there is also a need for separation of these efforts and thoughts. The success
culture at Finn does not make up a suitable environment for new ventures,
and it is vital to separate them and allow them to create an entrepreneurial
spirit.
Main Points
Build a new Finn The overall mission for Edvardsen and Larsson is to
build a new Finn in the next four years, implicitly expanding the existing one.
This is an ambitious goal, since it took about ten years to build the existing
platform with all its features. This strategy implies to build a structure
regarding how innovation should arise from Finn, with integral measures like
Finn Way of Innovation and New Markets.
Failure is the key to success Edvardsen and Larsson emphasize that
they appreciate past failures when it comes to innovation. Teams with
experience from failures will learn how to succeed with the next venture,
as well as build hunger for success with a “what ever it takes”-attitude.
Cycle between exploitation and exploration Finn has evolved from
being an entrepreneurial company, towards becoming a mature company with
established processes. Edvardsen and Larsson acknowledge that they are
afraid of becoming too bounded in their current operation mode, establishing
processes that overshadow the progress.
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Reason for selection
Edvardsen and Larsson are part of the senior management team, and are
thereby forced to handle the exploitation/exploration paradox in their daily
work. Thus, they’ll provide useful insights on how the senior management
team perceives ambidexterity and what measures Finn utilizes to become
ambidextrous.
4.2 Exploitative and Exploratory Efforts
4.2.1 Exploitative
Cascading corporate strategy Finn has implemented a rigid system for
strategic planning and goal achievement, comprising the entire scope between
long-term visions and weekly assignments. First, top management sets a
joint, superior long-term direction for the entire organization, known as the
corporate strategy. The corporate strategy is valid for three to five years,
and decomposed into market strategies for each vertical market. Within each
market, the marked strategy is then decomposed again, into sales strategy,
product strategy and organizational strategy, respectively. “The tradition of
instituting explicit three-year goals within each particular market has been
discontinued, after a record of such strategies never being realized in practice
anyway.” (Ullereng) Instead, a general direction is adopted, leaving the
means of getting there open for interpretation by the individual markets.
The vertical interpretation is known as a roadmap, each valid for one year.
They are broken further down to quarterly roadmaps, and once again down
to Scrum5-based three-week sprints.
Finn has a set of valid strategy drivers, known as the acronym CARS. The
letters indicate customized, aggregated, relevant and social, respectively. In
addition to the strategy drivers, Finn also has a set of internal values, namely
5An iterative and incremental development method for managing software projects
and product or application development. The method transforms an extensive project
execution plan into sprints of 2-4 weeks duration. (Schwaber et al., 1995)
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effective, helpful, enthusiastic and safe. The overall objective of every new,
strategic initiative at Finn is to increase the level of one or several CARS
indices, to achieve a higher score on one or several internal values. “Thus, we
are not becoming social just to be social, if so we could just create another
Facebook. It has to justified by simultaneously becoming more effective or
more helpful.” (Ullereng)
Continuous improvement Finn has institutionalized Finn Way of
Innovation as a separate department to oversee the implementation of lean
principles. Its objective is to teach every other department how to maximize
the outcome of the given resources, using lean thinking as the tool. With
Finn being quite a successful corporation, cost reductions and workforce
downscaling are not an integral part of their work. (Vangstein)
One of the core activities of Finn Way of Innovation is certification
of other departments according to the penetration rate of lean thinking.
They are currently working with 16 different teams across all market
verticals and support functions, by arranging weekly three-hour workshops
with each department. Motor (Bil) currently has the top rank, attaining
level 3 out of 4. (Jørgensen, Ribe Anderssen) The workshops are completely
discretionary for every department to participate in, and are split into
four separate levels. The goal in the first level is to call attention to the
present way of operating the department, in the context of processes and
procedures. The goal in the second level is to institute a structure for
output monitoring and prioritizing. The goal in the third level is to clarify
the internal communication, through insights, involvement and information.
Finally, the goal in the fourth and last level is to ensure technical quality.
Additionally, every level has a set of 29 checklist questions to benchmark the
progress. (Kristiansen & Vangstein)
Ribe Anderssen experiences the process as captivating, but sometimes
grim: “It can be pretty tough when we’re right in the middle of it. It
sometimes feels like the workshops are placed on top of everything else we
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have to do of ordinary work in the department.” He admits it gets easier once
a couple of team members are enthusiastic towards the initiative, because it
inspires the rest.
4.2.2 Exploratory
Finn has initiated a series of different activities to employ organizational
slack. Several of them are organization-wide projects structured as events,
arrangements or awards.
Finnopp Finnopp is an intra-organizational social community for sharing
business ideas between employees across different departments. “We use
it to gather completely new ideas or get inspiration to alter and improve
existing ones.” (Jørgensen) The community is open for ideas addressed
both to an employee’s own department, or to any other department in
Finn. It is designed as a mechanism to capture thoughts, opinions and
improvement proposals, especially in situations where the originators not are
in the position of personally effectuating the propositions themselves. Also,
Finnopp is designed to capture suggestions with no natural belonging in any
of the existing market verticals. The community further includes several
social elements, such as public commenting functionality, and the ability for
employees to vote different ideas up or down by giving out social credits,
known as kudos. (Asif)
Sandbox Sandbox is an initiative where internal developers are given
complete access to Torget’s databases, enabling completely unbound
experimentation as a measure to produce innovation. If you work out a
good idea using this database, you may spend all your leisure time to pursue
it, and even personally profit from it, as long as Finn gets a small commission.
Ole Kristian Ullereng is heading the panel of judges granting acceptance of
such projects. (Jørgensen)
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Finnovasjon Finnovasjon is an annual, competitive event in which all
interested employees get the opportunity to spend 48 hours to form teams and
develop ideas. It is designed as an arena for constructing business concepts
that do not entirely match the corporate strategy, and thus not will be
allocated resources from Finn’s regular operating budget. “This is where you
can bring that crazy idea that didn’t fit in anywhere else. It’s like taking the
back door” (Jørgensen) The requirement specification for the initial design
of Finnovasjon was very specific about the purpose of the event—to allow for
enough research time to provide a credible indication of each idea’s feasibility,
and the chance of providing future profit to the organization.
The event is kicked off in the canteen, by developers forming teams and
joining sales people at tables. Subsequently, everyone with an idea makes
visits at every table and pitches their ideas. Wherever there is a match, the
table team joins the pitcher, forms a group, and works together during the
next 48 hours to make mock-ups and prototypes. Every employee in every
department in Finn is allowed to either participate, or simply observe and
provide occasional input. “The event is still in an early phase, but the internal
publicity is good.” (Jørgensen) In the previous occurrence of Finnovasjon,
Finn’s CEO joined the event, and won the entire contest together with his
team.
Finnawards Finnawards is an annual event coinciding with the Christmas
Party, where the best intrapreneurial initiatives are awarded with prizes and
attention. “Finnawards is a secondary, yet effective motivation for engaging
in such activities.” (Asif)
4.3 Classification of Departments
When some markets have existed for almost a decade while others are still
young, the consequence is fundamental mindset differences between them.
Figure 1 is an attempt to illustrate the authors’ perception of the mindset in
each department, assigning each department to a linear scale between the two
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extreme points. The score will be used to analyze and compare departments
in Part II.
Exploitative operation Exploratory operation
--BIL--------------------------------------------------
---EIENDOM---------------------------------------------
---------------JOBB------------------------------------
--TORGET-----------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------REISE-------
----------------------------------------------OPPDRAG--
FINN WAY OF INNOVATION---------------------------------
-----------PLATFORM/ARCHITECTURE-----------------------
--------------------------------------------NEW MARKETS
Figure 1: Strategic Classification of Finn’s Departments
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Part II
Understanding the Paradox
In this part, a new framework will be presented based on the need for a more
logic way of structuring the previous theory; introduced by theoretical and
empirical means. Section 5 will present the theoretical framework itself, as
proposed by the authors. Section 6 will apply the framework to the empirical
material from Finn, and present any matches in pattern. Section 7 will
juxtapose the theory directly with the case company, to investigate the extent
of which the empirical material validates the suggested framework. The
results will be used in the final conclusion to assess hypotheses H1 through
H4. Finally, Section 8 will assess the credibility of the results, and draw a
formal conclusion on the framework’s general applicability.
5 The Pathway Framework: a New Theoretical
Framework for the Exploitation/Exploration
Paradox
Exploitation and exploration are described as two contradictions in
organization theory. In an organization’s effort to become more effective,
it will also inhibit its ability to innovate. Organizations with focus on
innovation may suppress their core capabilities and allow for slack instead of
effectiveness. (Gupta et al., 2006) March (1991) argues that organizations
managing both exploitation and exploration are able to secure success, but
since exploitation and exploration compete for scarce resources, they are
regarded as incompatible. (Gupta et al., 2006) More resources allocated to
exploitation leave fewer resources left for exploration, and vice versa. In
addition, the mindset and organizational routines required for exploitation
are radically different, and in opposition, from those needed for exploration.
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This leads to exploitative organizations promoting even more exploitation,
and exploratory organizations even more exploration. March (1991) therefore
concludes that an organization cannot pursue exploitation and exploration
simultaneously. The tension between exploitation and exploration are
regarded as unmanageable.
The framework proposed in this section seeks to illustrate the two very
general organizational strategies of exploitation and exploration, through a
structure of four different levels. The first level is where the fundamental
choice of a generic strategy takes place. The second level is the specific tool
suited for that particular strategy; what actions and culture the strategy
translates to in practice. The third level is the specific key performance
indicator where the organization is expected to perform best, following the
given generic strategy. The framework is concluded by an idea of exploitation
and exploration being two pathways to a common, superior objective—profit
maximization. Profit is the fourth and final level of the framework. A
proposition for further investigations has been identified: H1: Exploitation
and exploration are two distinct pathways to profit. The proposition will
be investigated both theoretically in the current section, and empirically in
Section 6.
Several authors have introduced partial versions of this framework before,
but most of them remain as incomplete attempts. (Nohria and Gulati, 1996;
Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009; Smith and Tushman, 2005) Only a few of the
models perceive the dimensional differences present in this field, for example
are breakthrough and profit often presented as two opposing extreme points
in a paradox of organizational emphasis. (Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009) The
current framework provides structural evidence on the questionable nature
of such comparisons.
5.1 Level 1: The Mindset
The first level is a choice of common organizational mindset—a choice
between exploitation and exploration as the fundament for future strategy
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formation. Exploitation might be said to build on an organization’s past,
while exploration creates future opportunities quite different from this past.
It is a fundamental mindset difference; the dictum of exploitation is discipline
and effectiveness, while the dictum of exploration is learning by doing and
trial and error. (Smith and Tushman, 2005) The choice of mindset is shown
in Table 2.
Even though the choice may seem clear for one particular firm at first
sight, it is in fact one of the most challenging issues for every team of top
management. Traditionally, exploitation has been regarded as the primary
source for short-term profit (Benner and Tushman, 2003), while exploration
has been regarded as the most important determinant for sustainability and
long-term growth. (Atuahene-Gima, 2005) The choice is complicated further
by the fact that most products conceived from exploratory strategy will be
in direct competition with an organization’s existing products. (Smith and
Tushman, 2005)
Exploitation Exploration
Figure 2: Level 1: The Mindset
Andriopoulos and Lewis (2009) have performed multiple case studies on
how organizations cope with this fundamental strategy choice. The studies
confirm that the choice is, in fact, a tough one. A manager from a computer
hardware producer characterizes the dilemma as “a daily struggle between
making money and doing what’s true to your heart. Because your ability to
make money the next day depends on how true you are to your heart the day
before”. Another manager also points out a certain tension between how he
and his firm believe a certain problem should be solved, and what his client
believes should be done, expressing the need to act exploratory within the
restrictions given by the client. (Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009)
Exploitation is a generic strategy rooted in traditional values from
resource-effective production of commodities. An organization with
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exploitative mindset will include aspects of the Kaizen6 way of thinking,
where any activities that consume resources without creating value will be
ceased. (Chen et al., 2010) Examples of industries where exploitation is
the correct choice of strategy would be production of homogeneous articles,
such as sugar, milk, wooden boards or refinement of raw materials. It is the
preferred strategy both in times of depression, and in times of great gains.
In the latter situation, managers will take a risk-averse stand in strategy
formation, to ensure a total exploitation of the current business cycle peak.
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, cited in Smith and Tushman, 2005)
Exploration, on the other hand, is a generic strategy emerged from
modern values such as differentiation, modernization and innovation.
(Siggelkow and Rivkin, 2006) An organization with exploratory mindset will
appreciate experimentation, and not only accept, but expect its employees
to trial and error. (Smith and Tushman, 2005) Examples of industries
where exploration is the correct choice of strategy would be all producers
of services and heterogeneous products, such as news and media, marketing,
retail, education, motion pictures and most parts of the tertiary sector of the
economy.
5.2 Level 2: The Tool
The second level is the optimal tool that corresponds to each of the two
generic strategies, as shown in Table 3. Once an organization has determined
whether exploitation or exploration will be the foundation for strategy, the
tools used to effectuate that strategy must match the corresponding mindsets.
The specific tool corresponding to exploitative strategy is lean. (Chen
and Taylor, 2009) As pointed out earlier, the concept of lean involves ideas of
6Japanese for “improvement”, or “change for the better”. Refers to philosophy or
practices focusing on continuous improvement of processes in manufacturing, engineering,
game development, and business management. The objective of Kaizen is to reduce costs
through eliminating various forms of “waste” and non value-adding labor. Workers are
expected to assist in the constant refinement of work methods. (Robertson et al., 1992)
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Exploitation Exploration
Lean Slack
Figure 3: Level 2: The Tool
waste reduction, effective resource utilization and continuous improvement.
(Green, 1999) Applying this concept on the example of homogeneous
articles will translate to a strategy of producing commodities with maximum
effectiveness; that is to maximize the unit production of milk with respect to
required resources. Once the dairy has adopted an exploitative strategy, the
tool of lean will induce a goal of producing milk with minimum resources in
terms of man-hours, buildings and livestock.
Conversely, the tool corresponding to exploratory strategy is slack.
(Nohria and Gulati, 1996) If this concept were to be applied on the example of
heterogeneous products, a major concern for the focal firm would be to enable
enough trial and error attempts and experimentation to ensure that at least
one of the attempts results in a real market success. (Smith and Tushman,
2005) For instance, it may be very hard for an entertainment corporation
to anticipate exactly what ideas have potential to strike the mass markets,
and attempts to predict this by analytic methods could be a very expensive
solution. A more cost-effective course of action would be to launch enough
ideas for at least one of them to succeed. A marketing firm would probably
go even further and give its employees carte blanche to create whatever ideas
they want, based on their educated guesses about demand.
Thus, organizations driven by exploratory mindsets will not succeed in
using lean production and waste reduction as the main tool for strategy
implementation. Standardization, rules and routine work will cause
employees to gradually lose their commitment and motivation. In the
extreme case, the end result of this unsuitable combination of mindset and
tool will be total elimination of all creativity. (Amabile, 1998, cited in Chen
and Taylor, 2009) Conversely, organizations driven by exploitative mindsets
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will not succeed in using extensive slack and experimentation for strategy
implementation. An exaggerated drive to pursue new opportunities and blue
oceans will result in traps. (Gupta et al., 2006) At the extreme point,
this other unsuitable combination will cause organizations to completely
disregard market demand, and turn their products into mere designer whims.
(Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009)
However, one issue concerning the proper choice of strategy implementation
tool still remains unresolved. While lean organizations strive for the
elimination of all processes that are not value-adding, the concept of lean
clearly postulates that end users are the only entity where this value may be
defined. (Chen and Taylor, 2009) Thus, lean organizations would fail in the
myriad of situations where customers don’t know their own best, or at least
are unable to foresee the great product improvement they actually demand.
And where the experimentation of a slack organization still could produce the
breakthrough product, the discipline of a lean organization would eliminate
the very activity that would lead to this product being conceived. (Chen
and Taylor, 2009) Lean organizations eliminate all activities that are not
value-adding and leave it to their customers to define value. (Womack and
Jones, 2003) The question that remains is how value and well-spent time is
measured when customers may be wrong.
5.3 Level 3: The Result
Which specific performance index that is expected to achieve superior scores
over the other is tightly connected to the choice of generic strategies. A
choice of exploitative strategy will imply lean being used as a tool for putting
discipline and control in effect throughout the firm. Such organizations
should expect a distinction in effectiveness performance. (Porter, 1996, cited
in Piercy and Morgan, 1997) However, firms with exploitative mindsets
should not expect a particularly high innovation rate, as innovation is
fostered through slack environments rather than lean. Conversely, a choice
of exploratory strategy will imply slack being used as a tool for putting
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risk-taking and experimentation in effect. Such organizations should expect
a distinction in innovation rate. (Nohria and Gulati, 1996) Firms with
exploratory mindsets should not expect a particularly high effectiveness
performance, as effectiveness is fostered through discipline rather than
experimentation. The relationship is shown in Table 4. Innovation rate
in the context of this framework is defined to include at least some elements
of discontinuous innovation.
Exploitation Exploration
Lean Slack
Effectiveness Innovation
Figure 4: Level 3: The Result
The relationships stipulated in Table 4 have given rise to two propositions:
H2: Exploitation yields high effectiveness and low innovation rate and
H3: Exploration yields high innovation rate and low effectiveness. The
propositions will be empirically assessed in Sections 6.1 through 6.3.
5.4 Level 4: Profit
A fundamental attribute of all corporations is their objective of profit
maximization. Regardless of industry, organizational structure, ownership,
region or origin—profit remains as the superior purpose. A reasonable
elaboration to the framework would therefore be that exploitation and
exploration are, in fact, two different pathways to profit. Table 5 indicates
the relationships. The complete framework will be subject to empirical
consideration in the following sections, to identify any matching patterns.
The primary objective is to assess the extent of which the current framework
is a paradigm of reality, and further identify any constraints or exceptions in
the circumstances of which the framework is a valid approximation.
However, there seems to prevail a certain unawareness in the literature
about the existence of these explicit pathways to profit. While both
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Exploitation Exploration
Lean Slack
Effectiveness Innovation
Profit
Figure 5: The Pathway Framework
effectiveness and innovation are very common organizational KPIs, an
integral corollary of the current framework is that organizations not
necessarily have to achieve both simultaneously in order to maximize
profit. Once a choice has been made between exploitation and exploration,
organizations should only expect the single corresponding KPI as result, not
both.
No Need for Innovation in Exploitative Organizations An
immediate contradiction to the current framework is the apparent imperative
need for lean organizations to be innovative. A recent paper aims to “explore
the effects of lean management on an organization’s innovation capability
and its employees’ creativity”, as well as present “techniques and strategies
for an organization to achieve balance between successful lean practices
and continuous product innovation”. (Chen and Taylor, 2009) Thus, the
paper investigates what effects lean management may have on creativity
and continuous product innovation, respectively. It seems that unexpected
outcomes of lean management are to be explored, since the first, creativity, is
a direct contradiction to lean principles. (Hoerl and Gardner, 2010) However,
the objectives of the paper are inconsistent, as continuous product innovation
is one of the core concepts of lean, and hence, not a contradiction at all.
Evidently, there is confusion in this field of study, and clarification on the
subject is needed.
This is confirmed in the case studies by Andriopoulos and Lewis (2009),
where a CEO of a consumer electronic company questions an organization’s
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ability to truly drive profitability without being creative. Further confusion
is found throughout the lean production field of study, where a number
of publications investigate possible ways of cultivating for innovation-
encouraging culture in lean companies, and how innovation activities may
be defined such that they are not eliminated as waste. (Chen et al., 2010)
The question remains—once an exploitative strategy has been chosen, why
struggle to immediately implement the principles of the opposite strategy?
The current framework implies that lean organizations should not expect
to be very innovative, and slack organizations should not expect to be
particularly effective, given that exploitation and exploration are the two
extreme points of the paradox, and unable to combine.
Comparing Different Levels Yet another misapprehension regularly
encountered is the definite levels of this framework, and specifically where
innovation is found. The CEO of a consumer product company reveals his
thoughts in the same case study: “You must be profitable and creative. You
need everybody thinking like that, right down to the interns.” (Andriopoulos
and Lewis, 2009) The problem here is that creativeness (i.e. innovation) and
profitability are not two independent concepts to be combined, but rather
sequential in terms of the exploratory pathway. Once exploration is the
chosen strategy, and slack successfully implemented as the tool to implement
that mindset, the firm will most likely experience a significant increase in
innovation rate, and make considerable profit accordingly.
Pathways to Different Types of Profit The idea of exploitation and
exploration being two different pathways to operational profit is subject to
debate in the organizational theory literature. A relevant discussion has
emerged in the last couple of decades, where some scholars have claimed
that the two pathways in fact lead to different types of profit. More specific,
the claims are that one pathway leads to short-term profit, while the other
leads to long-term profit. (Abernathy, 1978, cited in Benner and Tushman,
2003) The current consensus is that incremental improvement projects
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Exploitation Exploration
Lean Slack
Effectiveness Innovation
Short-term profit Long-term profit
Figure 6: The Pathway Framework extended: different types of profit
and exploitation of core capabilities pay the bills, while radical innovation
projects and exploration build new capabilities. (Wheelwright and Clark,
1992, cited in Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009) Sustained performance is thus
rooted in managing both short-term efficiency and long-term innovation
simultaneously. (Smith and Tushman, 2005) This paradox has contributed
to the postulation of another proposition: H4: The two pathways represent
extreme points of a managerial paradox. The proposition will be evaluated
empirically in Section 6.
When the concept of exploitation and exploration as two respective
pathways to different types of profit is merged into the previous theory in
this section, the result is an extended framework as illustrated in Table 6.
6 Empirical Assessment of the Pathway
Framework
The main objective of the current section is to apply the Pathway Framework
to the empirical material from Finn, and investigate whether Finn recognizes
exploitation and exploration as two explicit pathways to profit.
Finn is one of the most profitable companies in Norway. Established
in 2000, it is also a fairly young company, considering this exceptional
success. It ranks second at Norway’s most visited web sites, and concluded
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the fiscal year of 2011 with an operating margin of 47%7. The employees
have an impression of Finn delivering results of unparalleled performance,
and Christian Haneborg admits that “if half the workforce didn’t show up
for work, a couple of months would probably still go by before we would trace
any significant decline in revenues”.
This remarkable success is a great influence on the corporate culture,
and the staff generally perceives Finn as a generous organization, sharing its
success with the employees. They have the luxury of extravagant weekend
trips to European capitals and Norwegian mountains, an office located right
in the middle of Oslo’s city center and uncommonly flexible office hours:
“I’m sure management has noticed that the number of unoccupied desks at
9:15 AM is pretty high, and if they return at 3:15 PM, it’s about the same”,
Haneborg notes, pointing to fact that Finn has established an environment
where people’s capabilities to fulfill their duties are trusted also outside the
office walls.
Together with the strong financial results, these perquisites have made
the employees vote Finn to the top position of Great Place to Work Institute’s
annual workplace environment survey, giving Finn the award for being the
best place to work in Norway 2011 and 2012. Finn’s rapid success has
left traces of entrepreneurial culture in the company. When the first lean
initiatives appeared in the organization, the first thing they realized was
that until that point, the entire operation had been run on gut feeling and
intuition rather than processes and routines. (Ole Kristian Ullereng)
6.1 Level 1: The Mindset
Technology adaption curve is a determinant for mindset Several
interviewees in the empirical material acknowledge the S curve as an
important determinant for the current modus operandi within a given
7Operating margin is a ratio used to measure a company’s financial efficiency, calculated
by dividing operating income by net sales. In comparison, Google Inc. has an operating
margin of 32%, Apple 36% and General Electric 10%. (Investopedia)
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department. (Ullereng, Jørgensen, Ribe Anderssen) At this curve,
experimentation is at the bottom, then development and refinement, before
the operational running phase. Ullereng is of the opinion that different
stages of this curve require different staffing. He points to the fact
that intrapreneurial people constantly are looking for emerging market
opportunities, and thus should be assigned to the initial, experimental phase.
Conversely, the operational staff is constantly looking for errors and tiny
improvements, and should thus be assigned to the daily running phase. “The
intrapreneurial staff doesn’t care about errors and the daily operational staff
doesn’t realize new market opportunities, so I wouldn’t have them mixed
up”. (Ullereng)
Jørgensen has the complete opposite view. Although he acknowledges
the point of all people not being equally qualified for all stages of the S
curve, he has personally witnessed that the disadvantages of having workforce
handovers—from the strategic to the operational section—in the middle of
a project is of greater magnitude than those of having both entrepreneurial
and operational staff in the same phase. The evidence originates from his
previous position in Eiendom as Strategic Head of Product development,
where he managed the strategic section and had to hand projects over
to the operational section once they were proved successful. He was in
charge of contemplating the department in a long-term perspective, and his
responsibilities included roadmap planning, feasibility analyses on proposed
projects and effectuation of such projects up to the implementation phase.
At that point, the team had accumulated mental ownership to the project
since the idea conception. (Jørgensen) With mental ownership, the strategic
team then has to start from scratch in a new project, and the operational
team has to start from scratch in the project handed over to them. “You lose
mental ownership in a project handover. It is also equally difficult to take
over”. (Jørgensen) In light of his experiences, the policy for project staffing
in Eiendom is now being fundamentally changed. To the extent possible, the
original team will now stay on the project along the entire S curve.
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Ribe Anderssen takes a third, yet different stance on the subject
of staffing, somewhere in between the two previous views. He does
acknowledge the need for heterogeneous S curve staffing, and in the context
of programming, he mentions that “I guess the kind of programmers able
to get a prototype up and running fast are a different kind versus the ones
completing the stable, operational version”. However, he is certain that there
has to be some level of continuity through the life cycle of a new product or
service, and that handovers are unfortunate: “I believe the most important
thing is to avoid clean-cuts in the team”. (Ribe Anderssen) His strategy is to
allocate sufficient mental ownership for employees to personally see projects
through, and simultaneously allow for employees whose personal skills reside
in either extreme point of the S curve, to not be assigned to the other.
Allocate mental ownership, not specific tasks Ribe Anderssen’s
department has already conducted the same change process now imminent at
Eiendom. His own philosophy is that both the product and the team benefit
from giving all team members the opportunity to participate in the success
without being forced to hand it over to the operational team. In his opinion,
people will lose motivation knowing that someone will take over their work
once it starts to look promising.
Mitigating the challenges of dissimilar personal skills requirements along
the S curve is where Ribe Anderssen applies his personal strategy. He
allocates ownership to his employees, both mental and formal, instead of
asking them to deliver specific tasks. That way, the team members on every
project own the entire venture, and will not suddenly be leaving the task.
“I like to think of it as if we’re not doing projects, but rather allocate an
ownership. Then, someone will be attentive to that product for its entire
life cycle.” There is always a risk that some employees never develop mental
ownership to any given project, and thus are less motivated to contribute with
passion. Ribe Anderssen’s model enables them to quit the current project
and establish their ownership on the next initiative instead.
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The concept of mental ownership has a wide acceptance across Finn, and
is the principal point of Ullereng’s personal managerial vision. Jørgensen has
taken the lead in introducing the exact same mindset in his own department:
“General motivation will always fluctuate, but the level of involvement is
important.” He insists on constantly involving all levels in the organization,
and believes Finn is excelling when it comes to flat organization structure:
“There are no bossing around of people here or superiors trumping through
decisions.” Moreover, he explains the background of his belief of involvement
being of such high importance in organizational management: “You are
driven by your own, personal dedication rather than a given dedication.
When you see a personal value, the mindset will change accordingly.”
(Jørgensen)
6.1.1 Exploitation
Exploitative culture inhibits entrepreneurial spirit Through the last
couple of years, Finn has proven its position with several profitable services
approaching 100% market share. An obvious agenda is to keep the services
that way, and exploit their potential completely. Torget is an example where
Ullereng’s mission, as the current CEO, is to weed out all experimental
ambitions. This exploitative success is evidently making an impact on the
corporate culture, with the extravagant weekend trips, centrally situated
headquarters and flexible office hours. A culture of achievement prevails in
the corridors, and Haneborg elaborates: “Celebrating ourselves with cake in
the meeting rooms every second day—it does influence people’s attitude.”
Finn has excess amounts of money, and there is a general understanding
that someone always pays the bills. Haneborg admits that the culture of
constantly being best diminishes cost consciousness, and compromises the
organization’s ability to maintain the entrepreneurial spirit: “It is challenging
to establish a culture of counting your coins every night and expecting people
on intrapreneurial initiatives to work late when everyone else arrives at 10
AM and leaves at 3.”
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Ullereng has witnessed numerous unsuccessful attempts on engaging
in experimentation within established corporate environments, and points
to the cultural mismatch between experimental projects and operational
projects. Haneborg agrees: “Every department is doing lavishly appointed
bonus trips to New York or South Africa, not exactly signaling a shortage of
money. It enables a huge scope of opportunities for innovation and capital
influx, but my personal opinion is that it compromises the entrepreneurial
spirit.” Every time Finn has succeeded with intrapreneurial measures, they
originated by establishing separate environments within Finn. Penger is the
most recent venture, located in their own office space farthest down the
corridor. (Ullereng)
Haneborg, as the CEO of this initiative, would go even farther when
establishing these separate intrapreneurial environments: “It is challenging
to establish an entirely new market vertical, and impossible to do it between
half past eight and four. Ever since I started, I’ve said that if I were
a stockholder, I would relocate my department to the incubator at Oslo
Innovation Center together with other entrepreneurs.” This is consistent
with the kind of employees he wants to attract; the ones who are willing to
sacrifice 100.000 NOK in salary, rather get 1% shares in the initiative and
have the chance to realize 3 million NOK in gains three years later. However,
he is concerned about this kind of programmers being impossible to breed
within the prosperous culture of Finn, encouraging total balance between
work, leisure and family. Finn is simply performing too well to capacitate
the feasibility of a true entrepreneurial environment within the same office
walls, and that is also the main reason for his suggestion to completely extract
these environments from Finn’s current physical location:
“It is all about burning platform. All entrepreneurs I know,
and everyone who has ever written about entrepreneurship are
completely aligned on this matter. People need to feel that
something is burning underneath their feet. I think that’s
stimulating, it’s good. I don’t think people exactly get the feeling
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that things are burning around here.” (Christian Haneborg)
Attitude towards continuous improvement Jørgensen confirms the
absence of free experimentation in his former department and that, as he
puts it, “a greater share of attention instead has been drawn to renovate the
basement”. This confirms the exploitative mindset in Finn’s leading verticals,
where the superior objective is to make the existing services even better.
(Ullereng) There is an inherent culture in these departments to never be
completely satisfied, always keep an open mind for even the perfect product
to be improved, and realize that tomorrow might bring better ways of doing
today’s business. “That is why lean thinking works at Finn. We manage to
apply the mindset without pushing it in people’s faces”, Ullereng concludes.
6.1.2 Exploration
Culture for intrapreneurial success Ever since the beginning in 2000,
Finn has strongly encouraged personal projects, and integrated a culture
for pushing people to accomplish and fulfill their own initiatives. (Asif,
Haneborg) This culture has recently been materialized in the current
corporate strategy, which now contains a section aiming to increase the level
of experimentation across the organization. (Jørgensen) Ullereng confirms
with an example:
“Back in my days at Bil, I once suggested we should improve our
output analysis and measurement activities. Then one Tuesday,
I fought through a decision in the management team about
instituting a new organizational section for these improvements.
The immediately following Thursday, the incorporation of the
Market and Sales Development section was communicated to the
organization, as a response to my suggestion.” Ole Kristian
Ullereng
Asif also confirms the internal culture encouraging intrapreneurial
success. However, he highlights that submitting a myriad of ideas to Finnopp
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doesn’t quite cut it: “You must be prepared to personally pursue your
proposals. If so, you’ll experience that your suggestions are effectuated in the
management team rather quickly.” Further, he explains that management
promotes trial and error attempts as a measure for employees to explore
their own thoughts, and that this kind of experimentation even is allowed
within the regular work hours: “As long as I deliver my numbers and results
at deadline, and my ideas show evidence of at least a small potential of
success, I’m free to organize my own schedule and get full support from
the entire section.” (Asif) If an exciting idea is conceived over lunch,
management not only approves, but encourages him to spend the afternoon
doing some experiments: “Finn engages in several such projects even when
the anticipated chance of success is less than 100%.”
Ullereng points out that the conception of ideas over lunch, and the
afternoon experimentation, is exactly how Penger originated, and finally was
taken along the path to corporate funding. Haneborg, the inventor, does also
appreciate the complete work hour sovereignty Finn has given its employees:
“I can’t tell exactly if I developed Penger between 8 and 4 or in the evening.
Luckily, we do not have to make that kind of distinction.” He found time
to cope with both his daily duties and the new idea. However, he admits
that the major part of his attention was directed at the venture, partially
due to the pushing culture: “I received support and positive feedback from
all directions. None of the feedback was negatively pitched.” He did have to
make some shortcuts to finally get Penger operational—shortcuts he believes
were crucial for the success. Also, he is left with the feeling of being trusted
to try again if Penger didn’t work: “Part of the great culture here is to accept
that it may take five failures to produce that one great success.” (Haneborg)
Directed experimentation ensures outcomes within the scope
of corporate strategy Ullereng refuses that Finn would be able to
conceive fundamentally new ideas without experimentation, but does not
encourage completely unbound experimentation either. He advocates a
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line of action where the team is preliminary instructed what issues will be
subject to different try-outs during a given day or project, called directed
experimentation. However, before any experiments are allowed to happen,
he is careful about allocating the mental and formal ownership to all team
members in advance. He is completely aligned with Ribe Anderssen and
Jørgensen when it comes to involvement and allocation of mental ownership,
and insists that the team “have to feel like they own the project themselves”.
An important point is to avoid the traditional, hierarchical corporation
layout, where senior management makes decisions behind closed doors, and
simply instructs the employees what to do. If the entire team shares the same
sense of ownership, all members will be in complete control of where they’re
headed, and make every effort to get there—not question the reasons: “Once
you succeed with establishing a mental ownership, the culture of never being
completely satisfied will produce a significantly larger contribution to benefit
the organization, because everyone knows where they’re headed and what to
look for.” (Ullereng) Further, he mentions the need for micromanagement as
a symptom of unsuccessful allocation of mental ownership.
Unbound experimentation is a powerful tool to produce innovation and
challenge the present way of thinking, but might yield results inconsistent
with the corporate strategy, and thus of no particular value for Finn. The
need for still being able to capture the fragment of ideas that in fact do
match the strategy is how Ullereng’s managerial vision materialized: “We
named it directed experimentation. For example, I might say to the team
that right now, this is the field where the experiments should occur.”
Behind that articulated direction is a tight connection to the corporate
and market strategies, and a firm sense of the implications for maintaining
or even increasing brand equity. Still, the potential power of unbound
experimentation and the great amount of creativity that lies with talented
software developers are well appreciated at Finn. Several organizational
initiatives have been arranged to discharge this power into potential business
cases for Finn, organized as different events and internal competitions. In
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addition, different schemes enabling developers to experiment further in their
leisure time are also being tested. Such initiatives will be further investigated
in Section 6.2.2.
Every project has an exploratory phase Even though Finn’s workforce
has an affectionate attitude towards continuous improvement, every project
has an exploratory phase where lean thinking may be premature. (Ribe
Anderssen) In market-driven projects, the objective of that first, exploratory
phase will always be to either confirm or invalidate a customer need, and
determine whether the business idea is entitled to life. “If not, you should
cancel the entire project immediately, but if the market indicates a possible
interest, you should be prepared to rewrite for scalability and performance.
Thus, in that phase it’s better to mock up a prototype fast, than to wait two
years for perfection with no sense of market demand.” (Ribe Anderssen)
The next objective in the exploratory phase is to examine the market
and get as much customer feedback as possible: “In my opinion, the choice
of technology is irrelevant in the exploratory phase, and the same goes for
quality of programming—it’s bound to be rewritten at some point anyway,
when the feedback is to be processed. So get it out there, showcase it for
the customers, and review what refinements or changes they want.” (Ribe
Anderssen) An important principle in these stages is to allow the executive
team to include the programmers of their choice, to match the intrapreneurial
work style of new product introductions: “The critical phase for every new
campaign is the initial phase, where we might find ourselves in a situation
where personal skills and passion may be the ultimate determinant for the
campaign’s success or failure.” (Ribe Anderssen) In this phase, excess
lean thinking would delay the point in time of which the market demand
is confirmed. Thus, if the market demand is not confirmed, but rather
invalidated, every effort made in the project that far would be in vain anyway,
and should be minimized.
Finally, there is a third phase, where the emphasis now is on operation,
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complete automation and maximization of effectiveness. At this point,
market demand should be thoroughly confirmed, and this is where continuous
improvement and lean thinking should be introduced. (Ribe Anderssen)
6.2 Level 2: The Tool
Maintain enough slack to produce good ideas, but enough lean
to prevent losing them Jørgensen is certain that Finn needs to cope
with both lean and slack tools simultaneously in order to achieve sustained
competitive advantage, with a very specific amount of each. In general, he is
serious about every organizational action having to be justified by a tangible
customer need or anticipated market demand. Further, all actions should be
conducted within a structural framework that ensures your journey from A
and arrival at B.
Organizational slack is the tool to kick-off every new campaign; however
it could quickly get out of hand if no boundaries are defined:
“We severely deplete our resources when the experimentation is
running in too many directions at once. It’s all over stock and
stone, and it’s the process here that has to be lean. There is a
low level of structure in my department; you need some metals
to attach to once in awhile. We want to be in that successful
carriage instead of driving four trains simultaneously.” (Bent Ove
Jørgensen)
The thought here is obviously to comply with Ullereng’s philosophy
for directed experimentation, to ensure that the outcome harmonizes with
corporate and market strategy. Slowly but surely, more processes are
constantly being applied as the projects matures.
The challenge is not to produce enough good ideas; the employees are
too passionate for that to be a problem. Rather, Jørgensen is worried that
some of their good ideas might be lost due to lack of proper processes, or not
followed up due to lack of ownership. He suggests that this may be a good
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point to allocate mental ownership, and systems to capture ideas. Also, he
highlights the importance of maintaining a certain freedom of action, and
acknowledges Ribe Anderssen’s philosophy of every project having a slack
phase, in which it’s too early to apply the exploitative mindset:
“Too much lean thinking will make you take the same road to
school every day. Conversely, too much slack makes you running
around randomly. I want the one in the middle, that doesn’t ruin
creativity.” (Bent Ove Jørgensen)
Ad hoc pitching When it comes to the use of organizational tools to drive
profitability, Asif underscores the value of pitching his ideas ad hoc in the
work landscape. The multitude of recurring meetings in each department is
an effective channel of running your thoughts past the management and co-
workers: “We have monthly department meetings, regular Monday morning
meetings, weekly sales meetings, section meetings and whiteboard meetings.”
The threshold for pitching new concepts here is low. Moreover, it may even
be superfluous to every time attempt to fit the pitch into one specific meeting,
if rather coffee breaks and random water cooler encounters were used more
effectively. Asif believes that the road through tools such as Finnopp and
the lean principles never will be able to compete with ad hoc pitching on
expeditiousness: “If nothing happens with your awesome idea, those kudos
on Finnopp suddenly aren’t worth that much any more.”
6.2.1 Lean
Finn Way of Innovation to implement seven lean principles Finn
Way of Innovation is an integral part of Finn’s strategy to utilize the tool
of lean thinking in the organization. The department currently employs
three experts in lean thinking and innovation, with a philosophy of structure
enabling innovation. They have developed a set of seven principles to
implement lean thinking in the organization, employed through workshops
in each department. The first principle is to elucidate internal processes and
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results, and a technique to describe the current modus operandi. The second
is the principle of continuous improvement, of both products and processes.
The third is to identify the set of projects and tasks resulting in maximum
customer value, and give priority to such activities. The fourth principle is to
seize a fixed measure of effect, to be able to continuously monitor outcome of
activities. The fifth is to ensure involvement and enlightenment. The sixth is
communication. The seventh and final principle is to assure quality of work.
They have also established a framework encapsulating the entire
innovation process, from idea conception all the way to market entry and
success. They recognized the need for employees to know what to do if they
should encounter an interesting idea or think of something that might be a
successful new Finn product, feature or fix. (Kristiansen & Vangstein) For
the idea conception phase, they have established processes for everything
that happens along the path from taking the first, initial though to a
presentable business case. First, they have established routines for where
in the organization to inquire to get a preliminary feasibility assessment,
and what people in each department these inquiries should be addressed to.
Then, a protocol has been designed including every single aspect that has
to be taken into consideration when moving forward and working out the
business case, including specific schemes for financial support, guidelines for
how to apply and templates for constructing a presentation. The framework
is compiled to ensure that all employees know the next step in this process
at any given point in time. (Kristiansen & Vangstein)
Further, they have established processes for the market analysis phase.
At this point the framework contains a set of standards, tools and resources
available to employees working on intrapreneurial campaigns, in addition
to a recommended line of action on how to assess the market demand
and customer requirements. Finn Way of Innovation strongly encourages
people to define some experiments of fixed length and with a couple of
articulated hypotheses, before conducting the market investigation. This will
prevent employees from running in every direction at once, as Jørgensen also
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highlights as unfortunate. “Our sole objective here is the principle itself,
of defining some experiments, a pilot, or at least some superior questions
to answer.” (Kristiansen & Vangstein) For the development phase, they
have established processes for prioritizing, urging all employees engaging
in intrapreneurial processes to deliberate their reasons for every action
or experiment conducted. That way, it will become clear what tasks to
prioritize:
“One team now knows how to prioritize, and is conscious about
why certain tasks need to be carried out before others. Another
team wants to do everything simultaneously. They’re not able
to see that one thing could trigger the other, and why one
particular sequence of tasks is better than another.” (Bente Mari
Kristiansen)
Rationalize ideas based on intuition Another way the lean experts
interpret lean thinking is to eliminate all traces of pure intuition as foundation
for decision-making, still left in the organization from the days Finn was a
true start-up company:
“In those days, it was all about gut feeling and some geniuses
devising their department what to do. That’s a problem in the
long-term perspective. We want to get rid of that gut feeling, or
at least force people to articulate it clearly so it can be discussed.”
(Bjørn Henrik Vangstein)
He refuses that their mission is to completely eliminate intuition, and
acknowledges that several profitable business cases in Finn has come into
existence purely through someone’s gut feeling, creativity and personal
passion.
Still, the gut feeling has to be articulated: “At some point, you must be
able to justify and argue for your idea in an open forum. You must be able
to tell your co-workers what you’re trying to obtain.” (Vangstein) To clarify
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their own message, Kristiansen and Vangstein suggest that defining some
KPIs for the idea is a good way to communicate the intuition to others,
and make it more rational. Further, they propose small experiments as a
natural extension of these KPIs, and an affordable method of assessing their
feasibility.
Finn Way of Innovation provides certification of internal departments
according to the amount of lean thinking they are able to implement in
everyday business. Bil is currently the department with the highest level
certificate, and at this level they monitor even the smallest change to products
or features. Kristiansen tells a simple, but convincing example about Bil
moving a block of hyperlinks from the right to the left side of the site, after
which they experienced a rise in conversion rate of 500%: “If they didn’t
monitor the outcome, they would never record the 500% increase or know
what caused it.”
A second example, again from Bil, included an experiment in which a
new module was to be introduced on their front page. The module would
generate revenues for Finn each time a visitor clicked, and thus, the obvious
KPI was the daily conversion rate on this button.
“At first, they made a flashy, colorful and ostentatious design,
convinced that visual attraction would speed up conversion. It
did not accelerate significantly. A couple of weeks later, they
changed the design to the totally opposite—pale, colorless and
discreet—and experienced that customers now thought the button
was part of the site functionality, and conversion rate increased
accordingly.” (Bente Mari Kristiansen)
Thus, Bil’s initial gut feeling was rejected, but they managed to still profit
from it, by rationalizing the intuition.
Mental ownership to routine work Ribe Anderssen is confident that
Finn will profit from limiting the amount of time his chief architects spend
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writing code to 50%. In most technology firms, people would expect the
programmers to spend most of their time writing code. However, when
forcing the amount of time programmers have to spend code writing to
approach 100%, they will lose their personal motivation and drive to deliver.
At the extreme point, they will regard themselves as robots delivering
commissioned work to the organization. On the other hand, Ribe Anderssen
encourages his employees to spend the other half helping others, audit
adjacent teams or explore novel solutions to existing challenges. His basic
philosophy is to establish a sense of personal ownership through self-governed
time.
6.2.2 Organizational Slack
Escaping the exploitative culture Ever since the beginning, Finn
has administered a broad adoption of slack in the organization. More
recently, several of the slack gambits have been invoked as countermeasures
to the exploitative mindset that established corporate environments incur.
Even though Christian Haneborg has not yet succeeded in transferring
intrapreneurial activity outside the building, they are more deliberate on
the necessary separation: “That’s how we configure pure experimental
innovation now, we establish separate environments.” (Ullereng) Further,
he explains how he gradually realized that unbounded experimentation often
was being relegated in the everyday business operation, and how the need
for maintaining this kind of experimentation subsequently emerged.
The most recent addition to the portfolio of slack initiatives is the cross-
corporate department New Markets, currently in the early development
phase and managed by Ullereng. The new department will have one single
mission—to identify new market opportunities and gather leads to such from
all vertical markets within Finn. New Markets will be a pure innovative
environment with fairly free reign, staffed by business developers and concept
developers. It may be reminiscent of a venture capital company identifying
opportunities.
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Kristiansen and Vangstein are concerned that some of the efforts to
facilitate free experimentation lack sufficient procedures to ensure a decent
follow-up of all the promising contributions. The efforts include Finnopp,
Sandbox, Finnovasjon and Finnawards, and the employees’ attitude towards
such initiatives will be investigated further in the next few paragraphs.
Finnopp Since the beginning a couple of years back, the intra-
organizational social community Finnopp has experienced an exponential
growth in number of submitted ideas. The subject scope in which the system
receives input is also constantly increasing, making it challenging to apply
sufficient structure to track every single contribution. Jørgensen elaborates:
“As of today, it’s more like a house of problems. Many of the suggestions
are simply rubble and broken bricks.” Haneborg points out the significant
decline in the number of ideas from Finnopp being realized over the last
couple of years: “In my opinion, Finnopp didn’t work, and the ideas winning
the kudos wasn’t critical enough for business. I think we started to get too
many ideas like ’I want to install water coolers in the gym’.”
The lack of a satisfactory structure is starting to undermine the system
itself. Jørgensen’s department tried to arrange one weekly meeting to discuss
possible beneficial ideas to extract from Finnopp, only to experience that it
constantly became subject to deferral: “Finnopp has simply abased itself to
a bottleneck. Or a heel of Achilles you feel like you haven’t stretched for a
while.” He concurs with Asif, and acknowledges that doing ad hoc pitches
in the landscape is more effective. Also, as a manager, he is more market-
driven, and fond of rather spending his time as a fly on the market wall than
within internal systems.
Sandbox Ullereng created Sandbox with the intention of offering his
teams a novel and unconventional method of conceiving completely new
ideas. Haneborg agrees that the model is exciting, but does not seem to
think it has been successful so far: “Time will tell if the possible pay is
enticement enough for the programmers, but the potential may be too small.
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You’ll never become the new Steve Jobs with Sandbox, but make a couple
of hundred thousand kroner extra if you sacrifice a lot of time and energy.”
In addition, he believes many people are happy with their job situation as it
is, and won’t go through the hassle of Sandbox for, what he believes, is too
low pay.
Ribe Anderssen points out that the issue of mental ownership applies
to this situation. Even though Finn’s employees are extremely creative,
there will always be an amount of this creativity mismatching the corporate
strategy, and thus won’t be allocated resources from the regular operational
budget. Sandbox was designed as a measure to maintain all the creativity
within Finn nevertheless. However, when an idea is being developed in
Sandbox, it is, per definition, outside the corporate strategy. As long as
this equilibrium persist, Finn will not allocate neither more resources nor
mental ownership to any other than the idea originator. (Ribe Anderssen)
Apply exploratory work style to everyday duties Jørgensen
appreciates organizational slack as a tool to generate innovation, and takes
great pleasure in implementing the corresponding work style. Being the head
of several sales and product development teams, he is the one receiving and
handling requests from employees who occasionally want to replace regular
work hours with unbound experimentation and participate in the above-
mentioned slack initiatives. He accepts, and even encourages his employees
to engage in such activities:
“I think it’s awesome. I think it will make people feel more relaxed
in a long-term perspective. It’s innovation right there. Generally,
we have a rigid work style, with one-year strategy directions,
decomposed into quarterly roadmaps, and three-week sprints to
tread the roadmaps. Thus, to employ slack is absolutely necessary
to counterbalance all that structure.” (Bent Ove Jørgensen)
Jørgensen contemplates the operational pace at Finn: “In the daily
business we have constraints on both time and resources, and there’s always a
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lot of things to do. Besides, when all deliberate strategy in the organization
ultimately has to originate from a customer need, it limits the amount of
crazy experimentation we’re able to do.” In his opinion, there should be
more, but he has realized that there simply aren’t enough available time
slots in the roadmap to make it happen. To compensate, he often implements
some of the principles to everyday duties.
6.3 Level 3: The Result
There is a conspicuous convention in Finn of always monitoring the
outcomes of all activities. Prior to start, all projects are assigned specific
key performance indicators (KPIs), set individually and adjusted by the
team members. The KPIs may vary between different projects; the only
requirement is for them to originate from a confirmed customer need.
(Kristiansen & Vangstein)
An average set of performance indicators may include 5-7 for each project,
determined by the team members and approved by the product manager or
sales manager in each market vertical. “The objective being monitored might
be to produce a certain increase in site traffic, demonstrate a substantial
decline in complaints received by customer support, or turn out a surge in
pan-site conversion rate.” (Kristiansen & Vangstein) In addition, the team
members themselves are being monitored on fixed indicators—result, quality
and activity. For example, if a key account requires at least three visits from
Finn each year, that’s one of the dimensions the team members will be scored
along. (Asif)
Finn is not only monitoring the result of its activities, but also the
trajectory of getting there:
“We do also have some process performance indicators, in addition
to the conventional project performance indicators. It’s done by
simply denoting different activities by red, yellow and green, and
execute actions accordingly. This is carried out every week.” (Bent
Ove Jørgensen)
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Mixing the tools damages both Lean thinking and organizational slack
are the tools companies may employ to be profitable through effectiveness
and innovation, respectively. Ole Kristian Ullereng is clear when he dissuades
from mixing the two of them, and encourages people working with slack
to relieve themselves from other duties. If not, the outcome will affect
both effectiveness and innovation disadvantageously. He points again to the
challenges of running innovation in established corporate environments: “The
innovation will be half-hearted, and the original product will fall technically
behind.” Thus, to some extent he disagrees with Jørgensen about applying
exploratory work style to everyday duties.
6.3.1 Effectiveness
Excess lean kills innovation Finn’s excellence in the implementation of
lean thinking has risen from the numerous mistakes when Finn a couple of
years ago agreed to formally transform the organization from an overgrown
start-up to a large corporation. The change process brought a number of
misinterpreted lean principles: “I guess we started out wanting to become
Toyota, having the methods as objectives. It didn’t work.” (Ullereng)
They required all departments to implement Scrum, only to discover that
all the processes killed creative thinking and innovation. They required all
three-week sprints to be concluded with contrived deliveries, resulting in the
launch of incomplete products every three weeks. “Customers are fast enough
to turn their back on a product forever if it isn’t satisfying the first time.
At that point, the road back for the product creator is so extremely long.”
(Ullereng)
As of today, they are conscious about keeping the level of rigidity below
a certain threshold: “Once you force too many rigid procedures into the
workflow, you lose all creativity. You turn employees into robots, and in
my opinion, that’s wrong.” (Jørgensen) “Finn has now reached a common
understanding of lean processes not being an objective itself, but a tool to
apply to everyday duties. Finn Way of Innovation is working on the theories,
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and we are working on the implementation.” (Ullereng)
Strategic attainment occupies every time slot available If
effectiveness were defined to measure the amount of time spent to attain
the corporate strategy direction and roadmaps, it would likely approach
100% at Finn. When a strategic goal is locked down to the yearly roadmap,
the commitment to achieve that goal is consolidated both internally and
externally. “Even though the roadmap planning now occurs quarterly, the
time surplus of running secondary projects in parallel is extremely limited,
once the roadmap is locked in. It will be a question of which quarter to
put it”, Jørgensen explains. At that level, such projects will be subject to a
thorough evaluation with respect to both value and risks, before an attempt
is made to push it through the eye of the needle.
Effectiveness is determined by quality Ribe Anderssen is clear that
the base IT architecture at Finn has to meet a satisfactory quality level
at all times, to prevent the code from containing bugs and errors: “In
those cases, modules have to be rewritten, and done over and over again.
Consequently, the overall manpower effectiveness is reduced.” He ascribes
part of the problem to previously malfunctioning feedback loops, which he
recently has completed an internal project to improve: “If I were to highlight
one successful attainment from last year, it would be this.”
The feedback loop improvement project raises awareness on the
performance of other deliveries, through visual aids such as indicators, red
arrows and screens strategically located around the work landscape. The
attributes being measured are quality of code and technical debt. (Ribe
Anderssen)
Success counteracts cost consciousness Being one of the most
profitable companies in Norway, Finn has never dismissed a single employee
as a result of expenditure cuts. Overheads are not a general concern in the
organization, and Haneborg believes Finn could be operated more effectively:
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“I think Finn could be run more cost-effectively. And I think it could be run
more cost-effectively without significantly influencing the innovation rate.”
6.3.2 Innovation rate
Slack work style no barrier for effectiveness Most people at Finn
believe that innovation is necessary to achieve sustained competitive
advantage, and that organizational slack in the proper departments is the
appropriate tool to fuel it. According to the dictum of exploratory mindset,
such departments will never be able to compete with lean departments on
effectiveness. However, Jørgensen suggests that in some cases, slack work
style does not necessarily imply decreased effectiveness at all: “Apart from
staffing, we have very few other expense accounts. Beyond that, we do not
have to pay designated programmers or administer continuous improvement.”
Haneborg introduces another interesting perspective when he considers
the appreciated working conditions and perquisites available to Finn
employees, as described in the beginning of Section 6. People often come
in late and leave early, they have the weekend trips to European capitals and
Norwegian mountains and they are trusted with fulfilling their duties when
working from home. “I think that when people are happy, they are also
more effective.” (Haneborg) Obviously, keeping a slack culture may actually
contribute positively towards the level of effectiveness.
Lack of strategic anchoring yields useless exploratory results After
employing organizational slack, different departments have experienced that
the outcome of unbound experimentation often lies outside the catchment
area of corporate strategy. Thus, the results will by definition not receive
further funding by Finn. For instance, Eiendom recently launched a series of
new features, including a carousel of pictures to each classifieds ad, a voting
mechanism to move the images up or down, and an interactive floor plan
where customers could insert furniture and move it around. The operation
of all these features had to be ceased within just a short time period after
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their launch. (Jørgensen)
This proves the point of directed experimentation as a necessary
measure to harness the powerful, but unpredictable outcomes of unbound
organizational slack.
6.4 Level 4: Profit
Exploitative Path
Torget is the most strategic valuable market vertical in Finn, and currently
a distinct operator of the exploitative path to profit. With 1.2 million page
views each week, Torget is credited for a fair amount of Finn’s nation-wide
brand recognition. Even though other markets may have slightly higher profit
margins, this unsurpassable traffic generation is the origin of its strategic
importance. (Ullereng)
All mature markets like Torget, including Eiendom and Bil, have
thoroughly verified business models, and are running with profit. (Jørgensen)
Substantial changes in these markets will necessarily affect the entire
organization: “If we mess up, not only do we ruin our own projects, but we
compromise Finn’s entire brand equity.” (Ullereng) Thus, an unsuccessful
experiment within these markets could possibly incur repercussions by far
exceeding the experiment itself. Even tiny changes or incremental feature
improvements result in the customer support center drowning in phone calls
with suggestions and complaints. (Ullereng)
Another example is the sub-markets in Eiendom, linking Finn’s customers
to third-party suppliers of financial services. “If we alter the links improperly,
it could cost millions of kroner if the traffic to these sub-markets decreases.”
(Jørgensen) With millions at stake, the procedures for making changes grow
accordingly, to ensure that everyone watches their step.
“My first course of action after being appointed CEO of Torget was
to deliberately eliminate all experimentation. Any such activity, except
on the feature level, should be conducted outside Torget, to mitigate the
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risk of compromising the brand.” (Ullereng) He stresses once again the
challenges of running innovation in established corporate environments, and
adds that with Torget’s comprehensive maintenance and upkeep operations,
it’s challenging for the same team to relieve themselves sufficiently from other
duties to produce good innovation anyway.
Exploratory Path
Oppdrag is one of the youngest market verticals in Finn, and currently a
distinct operator of the exploratory path to profit. The young markets are
of no particular strategic value to Finn yet, thus any experimentation here
is conducted solely with financial risk. (Ullereng) Jørgensen insinuates that
exploration may actually be absolutely necessary, to avoid simply duplicating
competitors, but rather challenge them: “It’s obvious that Oppdrag has to
make use of organizational slack to a larger extent than Eiendom. They have
still not decided on a final course to set, and need slack to decide on a final,
future vision to work towards.” Further, it is an innate property of younger
projects to take a more exploratory work style. (Kristiansen & Vangstein)
Ullereng suggests that this is where it went wrong for Sesam, the former
Norwegian search and directory gateway: “They tried to copy both Gule
Sider and Google at the same time. They came in second in both categories,
and it didn’t work.” As opposed to Torget, Oppdrag is still inside-out driven,
and independent of most external stakeholders. Where Eiendom has to run
all minor changes and improvements through their strategic partners prior
to implementation, Oppdrag has the freedom of doing the exact opposite,
and just announce the changes publicly as they are carried out. (Jørgensen)
Penger was forced to detach from the brand to reduce strategic risk. The
nature of its services includes collecting and managing sensitive information,
like people’s national identity numbers, income tax forms and credit card
statements. A fatal error in sensitive information management will in
most cases force the service in question to shut down immediately, but by
separating the project into an all-new brand, taking down the rest of Finn
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simultaneously is prevented. “The option of putting all the blame on a brand
with no current value is a value itself, versus developing everything within
Finn and risking a brand worth five billion kroner.” (Haneborg) Thus, it
takes some of the pressure of, and relaxes some of the exploratory boundary
constraints from the entire Penger project.
Haneborg declares that when following the exploratory path to profit,
it’s important to keep in mind that most of the attempts will in fact fail:
“If you launch five new market campaigns and one of them is successful,
it’s still a great success.” Finn has yearly revenues of 1 billion kroner and
a profit of 400 million kroner (Edvardsen), making the market positions the
company controls extremely attractive. It might be easy to underestimate
the developers’ stake in a project if they don’t initially have sufficient mental
ownership. However, many of them have not yet settled with a family, and
have plenty of time to work; it’s all about giving the appropriate incentives:
“Design a deal that gives the developers three million kroner each if a certain
set of objectives is reached within three years. It will cost the company
30 million kroner, but if that enables you to establish a brand new market
vertical position, it could presumably be one of the best company investments
in history.” (Haneborg)
7 Theoretical and Empirical juxtaposition of
the Pathway Framework
Section 5 has introduced a conceptual way of structuring the academic theory
about exploitation and exploration, and Section 6 has provided empirical
insights into how Finn contemplates the same concept. The current section
will juxtapose these two sections, to investigate the extent of which the
empirical material validates the suggested framework. The four levels will be
examined sequentially, to highlight similarities and differences between the
theoretical material and the case study data from Finn.
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7.1 Level 1: The Mindset
The framework is introduced with the first level being a choice of common
organizational mindset as the fundament for future strategy formation. The
empirical material on this level confirms that exploitation and exploration in
fact are two distinct mindsets, but that the choice may already be determined
by the organization’s progression through the S curve.
Exploitation is claimed to build on the organization’s past, while
exploration is claimed to create future opportunities different from this past.
The data from Torget and Oppdrag does confirm these hypotheses. Torget
is currently in a distinct exploitative mode as the main site traffic driver at
Finn, and does indeed build on Finn’s past, being one of the earliest market
verticals Finn established. However, a shortcoming of the framework may be
that yet no indications are present that Torget will be less successful in the
future. Contrary, Oppdrag is in an exploratory mode, not yet decided on a
strategic objective. Whether the market will be an integral part of Finn’s
future business is difficult to hypothesize at this point, but no empirical
material indicates the opposite. Either way, resources are currently being
disbursed to finally settle the future strategic objective of Oppdrag through
experimentation, according to the framework’s description of an exploratory
department.
Next, one dictum is presented for each organizational mindset; discipline
and effectiveness for exploitation and learning by doing and trial and error
for exploration. For the exploitative part, the empirical material has rejected
the framework’s hypothesis, as the departments with the most evident
exploitative mindset don’t seem to be characterized by any excess discipline
or effectiveness at all. They have remarkably flexible schedules, and clear
potential of operating more cost-consciously, as pointed out by Ullereng and
Haneborg, respectively. For the exploratory part, the framework’s hypothesis
holds. The developing departments are indeed characterized by learning by
doing and trial and error. Asif and Haneborg points out, respectively, that
Finn indeed has an integrated culture of encouraging intrapreneurial success,
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and that the organization is appropriately configured to actually get the five
failures necessary before the one success.
The empirical material in this case study completely rejects the
framework’s point of most products conceived from exploratory strategy
being in direct competition with the organization’s existing products. This is
not the case at Finn, as none of the exploratory initiatives have the potential
of ever being able to cannibalize the exploitative markets.
7.2 Level 2: The Tool
Generally speaking, the empirical material confirms that the tools being
implemented in the different markets indeed do match the corresponding
mindsets determined by the S curve in each respective department. The
exploitative departments have the highest penetration rate of lean principles,
all ranking in top positions of Finn Way of Innovation’s certification system.
Simultaneously, the exploratory departments are setting up separate, closed
environments to employ organizational slack within.
Further, the framework states that organizations driven by an exploratory
mindset will not succeed in using lean thinking, and conversely that
organizations driven by an exploitative mindset will not succeed in using
extensive organizational slack. The first bisection of the hypotheses has
been completely confirmed, by Ribe Anderssen indicating every project’s
exploratory phase, where the sole objective is to reach the point of market
demand confirmation or invalidation with the least possible amount of time
spent. Also, Ullereng points out that excess lean will kill innovation, an
outcome not welcome in the exploratory phase. Therefore, lean thinking does
not contribute to exploratory departments succeeding. However, the second
bisection of the hypotheses has been partly rejected, as Jørgensen points out
that slack work style does not represent a barrier for effectiveness at all,
owing to the small number of expenditures in this phase apart from staffing.
Several departments within Finn are driven by an exploitative mindset,
but have still succeeded with implementing light versions of organizational
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slack. Jørgensen and Haneborg observe, respectively, that excess lean will
turn humans into robots and that people are more effective when they
feel comfortable and enjoy themselves at work. If organizational slack is
interpreted as the antidote for the kind of excess lean that could turn humans
into robots, a logical deduction would yield that slack work style actually
leads to increased effectiveness.
One final issue that needs to be discussed is the framework’s drawback of
not being able to explain why Torget, in the distinct exploitative mode, still
establishes separate environments for experimentation outside the vertical
itself. In true lean philosophy, the department trusts that its customers
know what they want, but if they don’t, separate exploratory arenas have
been established just in case. The issue remains unsolved, and is suggested
for further research. One hypothesis for such further research is that lean
principles bring different means of implementation in service industry than
in the product industry, by allowing some sort of experimentation.
7.3 Level 3: The Result
Finn has experienced an extraordinary success since its establishment in
2000, and may not even be representative for similar cases. But even
though a potential for raising cost awareness has been shown, the established
vertical markets do excel at financial performance. Further, Ullereng’s efforts
to deliberately eliminate all experimentation from Torget confirm that the
exploitative markets do not expect a particularly high innovation rate. This
is consistent with the framework, as innovation is fostered through slack
environments rather than lean. However, Jørgensen again points out that
organizational slack not necessarily is a barrier for effectiveness. This is
inconsistent with the framework, as the framework suggests that departments
with exploratory mindsets should not expect a particularly high effectiveness
performance.
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7.4 Level 4: Profit
There is no evidence that anyone within Finn questions the idea of profit
maximization as a fundamental attribute of all corporations. If every
department in Finn is considered individually, the analysis has confirmed
that the pathways to profit is an acceptable way of structuring the paradox,
and that Finn’s employees in general acknowledge the concept.
In Section 5, the analysis uncovered a certain unawareness in some parts
of the literature about the existence of these explicit pathways to profit.
Even though Finn appears more conscious about the concept, examples of
the opposite are still found: “We are in the middle of a certification process,
where the department with the highest level certificate has the highest
penetration rate of lean principles. With level 3 out of 4, Motor currently
has the best score, and is accordingly the most innovative department.”
(Jørgensen) Thus, a direct line is incorrectly drawn from high penetration
rate of lean principles to high innovation rate, indicating some confusion.
Retaining the pole position in lean principle penetration should rather
be interpreted as having the best chances among the other exploitative
departments to succeed in pursuing that particular path to profit, not as
excelling in the expected outcome of the opposite strategy. Top level lean
certification might perfectly well lead to organization-wide star performance
in profit, but that path does not intersect top innovation rate, and the line
should instead be drawn from lean penetration rate directly to profit, through
effectiveness.
Still, the overall level of awareness regarding the two paths is still high in
Finn. Torget has previously been presented as perhaps the most deliberate
employer of exploitative strategy, and the choice appears consistent, as
the department does not struggle to immediately implement procedures to
allow innovation. Correspondingly, they do not expect particularly high
innovation rate. Conversely, Oppdrag is right now one of the most deliberate
employers of exploratory strategy, and does not struggle to implement lean
principles prematurely, before an overall strategy direction has been set.
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Correspondingly, they do not expect to perform particularly good on profit
margins yet. The empirical material is inconclusive whether the paths are
leading to two different kind of profit; short-term and long-term, respectively.
Despite some independent hypotheses being rejected, it is in the authors’
view that sufficient evidence has been produced in the current section
to conclude that the framework’s theoretical concept of exploitation and
exploration being two distinct pathways to profit has been decisively
confirmed by the empirical material.
8 General Applicability of the Pathway
Framework
The previous sections have presented considerable empirical evidence that the
case company does concur with the pivotal ideas of the Pathway Framework.
The material identifies several areas in which Finn’s way of thinking coincide
with features of the framework. In general, exploitation and exploration has
been recognized as different mindsets in different departments, lean principles
and organizational slack has been identified as institutionalized tools, and
both effectiveness and innovation rate are key performance indicators used
within Finn.
8.1 Similarities
The analysis in the previous section highlighted some of the most important
similarities and differences. First, it was confirmed that exploitation builds
on the organization’s past, while exploration creates future opportunities
different from this past. Second, it was confirmed that exploratory
departments in fact are characterized by learning by doing and trial and
error. Third, it was confirmed that lean thinking is employed as the tool in
exploitative departments, and organizational slack as the tool in exploratory
departments. Fourth, it was confirmed that exploratory departments do
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not benefit from premature implementation of lean principles. Fifth, it
was confirmed that exploitative markets do not expect a particularly high
innovation rate.
8.2 Differences
However, there are some key points where the hypotheses and empirical
material differ. First, the framework claims that exploitative departments
are characterized by abundant discipline. This has been rejected with
flexible schedules and potential for improving cost-effectiveness performance.
Second, the framework claims that products conceived from exploratory
strategy often will be in direct competition with the organization’s existing
products. This is not the case in Finn, where none of the new initiatives
have potential of cannibalizing existing services. Third, the framework claims
that organizations driven by an exploitative mindset not will succeed in using
organizational slack. Light versions have been employed in these departments
without affecting the effectiveness. Fourth, the framework suggests that
departments with exploratory mindsets not should expect a particularly high
effectiveness performance. While the exact opposite is not the situation
either, the point has been invalidated with evidence of slack work style not
necessarily being a barrier for effectiveness.
8.3 General Applicability
The framework might be a valid approximation for the way of thinking
within individual departments. However, it is still unable to explain why
Torget as an exploitative market establishes separate environments for
experimentation. Further difficulties are encountered when considering Finn
as a single, organizational entity. The hypothesis about exploitation and
exploration being two mutually exclusive choices for organizational strategy
fails to model the case company adequately, as it is evident that Finn clearly
manages to follow both paths simultaneously.
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The framework’s applicability may thus be limited to corporations or
single departments located at either extreme point, such as Eiendom and
Oppdrag, or a dairy and a marketing firm. Together with the listed
differences, this calls for a new discussion about the exploitation/exploration
paradox. An increasing part of the scholars in the classic organizational field
of study now supports the idea of combining exploitation and exploration,
rather than consider them mutually exclusive choices for organizational
strategy. (Chen and Taylor, 2009) Organizations that succeed in capturing
the best concepts from both extremes will be the most beneficial and
competitive in the long term. (Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009; Chen and
Taylor, 2009) The next part will address the issue of balancing the paradox,
through intermixing the best ideas of the two extremes, rather than consider
them two opposing concepts of a paradox.
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Part III
Solving the Paradox
With the hypothesis about exploitation and exploration as two mutually
exclusive strategies being rejected in Part II, the current part will seek to
provide an understanding about how mature organizations rather can solve
this paradox to achieve ambidexterity. It will accordingly be suggested
that the two extreme points might not be a contradiction after all,
based on literature proposing that organizations can be able to manage
both extremes simultaneously. Different configurations and strategies an
organization can employ in order to achieve ambidexterity will be presented
as the Ambidexterity Framework, summarized by an overview map to assist
managers in the process of choosing strategies.
9 The Ambidexterity Framework: a New
Theoretical Framework for Ambidexterity
Strategies
9.1 Literature review
9.1.1 The Co-Existence of Exploitation and Exploration
Paradoxes often describe conflicting demands, opposing perspectives, or
seemingly illogical findings. (Lewis, 2000) A paradox often results in a tug-
of war between the two extremes. Successfully managing a paradox does
not mean eliminating it, but rather tapping into its energizing potential.
(Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009) In the process of managing tensions, it
is optimal to capture both extremes in a creative way. (Eisenhardt,
2000, cited in Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009) The ideal outcome has been
described as balance. Such balance does not denote a mediocre split
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or bland compromise, but truly excelling at both extremes. (Atuahene-
Gima, 2005) Paradoxes could be embraced in two ways—integration or
differentiation. (Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009) An integration strategy
involves finding means of linking contradictions, which could promote
synergies. Differentiation strategy invites the organization to focus on one of
the paradoxical extremes only. (Lewis, 2000)
The exploitation/exploration paradox is rooted in the competition for
scarce resources. March (1991) assumes that an organization’s resources are
finite. The absolute amount of resources is therefore to be divided between
exploitative and exploratory efforts, respectively, which leads to managers
choosing between the different strategies. Shapiro and Varian (1999) suggest
that not all resources are finite. (Gupta et al., 2006) An organization’s
external environment allows for some resources, like information and
knowledge, to be infinite. (Powell et al., 1996, cited in Gupta et al., 2006)
This reasoning has facilitated studies on how organizations can manage
both exploitation and exploration. These studies have been conducted
on a variety of different topics, such as organizational learning (March,
1991), organizational design (Tushman and O’Reilly III, 2006), knowledge
management (Brown and Duguid, 2001, cited in Lavie et al., 2010), and
adaptation (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997). The studies have further been
conducted in various contexts, such as product innovation (He and Wong,
2004), strategic alliances (Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004; Rothaermel, 2001),
and senior management teams (McGrath, 2001). Different levels of analysis
have also been considered, including the individual level (Mom et al., 2007,
cited in Lavie et al., 2010), business level (McGrath, 2001), corporate
level (Benner and Tushman, 2003; Jansen et al., 2008), network level
(Lavie and Rosenkopf, 2006; Rothaermel, 2001) and industry level (Gilsing
and Nooteboom, 2006, cited in Lavie et al., 2010). These studies have
promoted the development of proposition five in this thesis: H5: The
paradox can be balanced to combine exploitation and exploration. The
proposition will be examined theoretically in the current section, and further,
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empirically in Section 10.
9.1.2 Ambidexterity
Several studies have proposed that the answer to the exploitation/exploration
paradox is ambidexterity. (Duncan, 1976, cited in Andriopoulos and
Lewis, 2009) In organizational literature, ambidexterity refers broadly to
an organization’s ability to pursue two disparate things at the same time.
(Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004b) The term includes the organization’s ability
to manage several tensions; effectiveness and flexibility, differentiation and
low-cost strategic positioning, global integration and local responsibility,
adaptability and alignment, and exploitation and exploration. (Duncan,
1976, cited in Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004b)
The term ambidextrous organization in this context refers to an
organization that manages to synchronously pursue both exploitation and
exploration. (Gupta et al., 2006) These organizations excel at enabling
incremental innovation by exploiting existing products, but also foster radical
innovation by exploring new opportunities. (Yao et al., 2008; O’Reilly
and Tushman, 2004) An ambidextrous organization that has the ability to
be effective and innovative simultaneously will secure both short-term and
long-term success, and thereby the ability to achieve sustained competitive
advantage. (Abernathy, 1978, cited in Benner and Tushman, 2003)
Lavie et al. (2010) have viewed the context of which organizations
manage to strive towards ambidexterity. The antecedents of exploitation
and exploration include environmental factors, organizational factors and
managerial biases. The environmental factors comprise environmental
dynamism, exogenous shocks and competitive intensity, which are defined by
the extent of unpredictable change in the organization’s environment, sudden
and unexpected environmental jolts beyond control of any organization, and
the extent to which organizations are likely to maintain zero-sum relationship
with one another as they compete for the same pool of limited resources,
respectively. Organizational factors include absorptive capacity, slack
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Internal External
In-House Outsource
Mergers & Acquisitions Domain Separation
Table 2: Internal and External Strategies for Ambidexterity
resources, organizational structure, culture and identity, and organizational
age and size. Finally, managerial biases include the senior management
behavior ability to handle risk aversion, performance feedback, and how they
contribute with past experience.
The context of an organization makes up the tension between exploitation
and exploration. This tension is increased further by the organizations’ trade-
off created by resource allocation constraints, short-term versus long-term
focus, and stability versus adaptability. An organization’s tension can be
reduced by what Lavie et al. (2010) refer to as modes of balancing. These
modes are designed for organizations to be able to cope with the conflicting
demands of exploitation and exploration, and are described in organizational
literature as ambidexterity.
Duncan (1976) views ambidexterity in structural terms, and proposed
that an organization should develop “dual structures” in order to achieve
ambidexterity. (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004b) Further studies have
suggested other strategies organizations can utilize to attain ambidexterity.
These options can be applied by organizations as a single strategy or be
used in collaboration between two or more strategies. Ambidexterity can be
reached either by utilizing the organization’s external environment and the
actors within it, or by focusing solely on the organization itself, as illustrated
in Table 2. Studies have also shown that it is important to consider senior
management behavior when discussing ambidextrous organizations. (Raisch
et al., 2009)
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9.2 External Ambidexterity Strategies
According to Baden-Fuller and Volberda (1997), to overcome tensions,
organizations can use internal adaption or outsource the change problem
to others. (Siadat and Chaharmahali, 2010) Some studies have suggested
that companies need to look externally in order to become ambidextrous,
because a single company does not possess the necessary resources. (Powell
et al., 1996, cited in Siadat and Chaharmahali, 2010) It is important for
organizations to move beyond local search and take part in collaborations
to maintain sustained competitive advantage. These collaborations allow
for organizations to utilize external capabilities and resources that are not
possessed internally. (Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001) There are two options
when using external resources—outsourcing or domain separation (alliances
and networks).
9.2.1 Outsourcing
Ellram and Billington (2001) define outsourcing as a transfer of the
production of goods or services previously performed internally, to an
external party. An organization could achieve ambidexterity by outsourcing
either exploitative or exploratory operations. Chen and Taylor (2009) have
described successful organizations that outsourced their exploratory efforts
due to an exploitative internal focus (e.g. Toyota). An important thought to
have in mind when considering outsourcing is that companies should never
outsource core competencies.
9.2.2 Domain Separation
Another way to leverage external resources to solve the tension is domain
separation, also referred to as alliances or networks (Lavie et al., 2010),
where one domain focuses on exploitation and the other on exploration.
Collaboration between organizations could have positive effects on both
exploitation and exploration (Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004), and may
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contribute to transfer experimental knowledge between organizations and
facilitate collective learning. (Powell et al., 1996, cited in Holmqvist,
2004) The transfer and creation of knowledge between organizations
provides additional input to the intra-organizational learning of the various
collaborating partners. (Oliver, 2001, cited in Holmqvist, 2004)
Organizations have a tendency to eventually become behaviorally
“closed” in the sense that they only experiences what is in accordance
with its history. As Weick (1979) argued: “Organizations can and do
act like closed systems (...) Organizational attentiveness to one’s own
past experience can continue unpunished for surprisingly long periods.”
(Holmqvist, 2004) Alliances between organizations allow them to exploit each
other’s experiences, but also to produce new experiences jointly with the
other organizations. (Holmqvist, 2004)
Rothaermel and Deeds (2004) distinguish between exploitation domains
with focus on development, and exploration domains with focus on research.
A firm could enter an alliance either to exploit existing capabilities or
to explore for new opportunities. Several studies have provided evidence
for a positive relationship between a firm’s alliances and innovativeness.
Rosenkopf and Nerkar (2001) found empirical evidence that exploration
beyond organizational boundaries had more impact than exploration within
the boundaries. In addition, the risk of being obsolete will be high if
companies solely use their internal knowledge and resources. Learning
alliances allow firms to increase the speed of capability development and
minimize uncertainties by acquiring and exploiting knowledge developed by
others. (Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004)
There has been suggested that alliances often start with exploration and
continue through exploitation alliances, and that the exploitation/exploration
alliances occur in circles (Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004). When
an organization has expanded its experience through exploration, the
organization starts exploiting the new knowledge. (Holmqvist, 2004) The
exploiting of this new knowledge often happens in conjunction with a partner
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firm through exploitation alliances. (Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004)
9.3 Internal Ambidexterity Strategies
The exploitation/exploration tension could be solved by internal as well
as external strategies. The internal strategies for ambidexterity may
be categorized in in-house strategies by merger & acquisition strategies,
respectively.
9.3.1 Mergers & Acquisitions
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) have been proposed as a strategy for
renewal and redirection. M&A could be initiated for several reasons,
increasing shareholders’ wealth, creating more opportunities for managers,
fostering organizational legitimacy, and responding to pressure from the
acquisitions service industry. (Jemison and Sitkin, 1986) Nemanich and Vera
(2009) argue that this strategy can lead to ambidexterity, because M&As can
contribute as a platform for growth and innovation, or contribute to create
consistency and reduce costs.
In-house
Duncan (1976) suggested that the solution to ambidexterity was “dual
structures”, allowing for simultaneous pursuing of exploitation and
exploration through separation. (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004b) Opponents
of this view propose that the roadmap to ambidexterity is sequential
attention to exploitation and exploration. (Siggelkow and Rivkin, 2006;
Benner and Tushman, 2003; Siadat and Chaharmahali, 2010) Although some
research suggest that sequential attention should be paid to exploitation and
exploration, the majority of organizational ambidexterity research present
a range of solutions that enables organizations to simultaneously pursue
the two activities. (Raisch et al., 2009) Jansen et al. (2008) argue that by
pursuing exploitative and exploratory activities simultaneously, organizations
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will better overcome rapid changes in the environment and secure long-
term success. The different views on how to attain ambidexterity are
broadly divided in structural ambidexterity, contextual ambidexterity, and
punctuated equilibrium. (Gupta et al., 2006; Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009)
9.3.2 Structural Ambidexterity
This variety of ambidexterity involves dual organizational structures and
strategies. The organization is differentiating its efforts to focus on either
exploitation or exploration. (Gupta et al., 2006) Structural ambidexterity
can be executed in two ways: spatial separation, also called task partitioning
or “dual structures”, and temporal separation, also called temporal
partitioning. (Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009; Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004b)
Spatial Separation An organization utilizing spatial separation is made
up of distinct work units, where some focus on exploitation and other
on exploration. (Puranam et al., 2006, cited in Andriopoulos and Lewis,
2009) The work units that focus on exploration adopt an organic structure,
while the work units that focus on exploitation adopt a mechanic structure.
(Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004b) The exploratory units are often small
and decentralized, while the exploitative units are larger, more centralized
with tight cultures and processes. (Benner and Tushman, 2003) The
ambidexterity arises from parallel focus on exploitation and exploration,
where the exploratory units provide variation from which senior team can
learn and bet on the future, while exploitative units build capabilities for
short-term effectiveness. (McGrath, 1997, cited in Benner and Tushman,
2003)
Birkinshaw and Gibson (2004) have described an example of spatial
separation. The core business unit is given the responsibility to exploit
existing capabilities in order to align with existing products and markets.
The R&D department and business development group are given the job of
exploring new markets, developing new technologies and keeping track of
101
emergent trends. By examining this type of spatial separation, Birkinshaw
and Gibson (2004) discovered that separation in some cases could lead to
isolation of R&D departments and business development groups, and thereby
inhibit the acceptation of new ideas in the organization. A way to solve this
lack of linkage is to create small business development units attached to every
other regular business unit. (Birkinshaw and Gibson, 2004)
Temporal Separation The other way of exerting structural ambidexterity
is temporal separation—a system in which an entire unit focuses on one set of
tasks one day, then on a different set of tasks the next day. (McDonough and
Leifer, 1983; Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004b) In contrast to spatial separation,
temporal separation allows exploitation and exploration to be pursued by
the same business unit. (Puranam et al., 2006, cited in Andriopoulos and
Lewis, 2009) Managers decide when the unit should focus on exploitation
or exploration, and separate them based on time. (Gibson and Birkinshaw,
2004b) The length of the time periods is variable, and there is no evidence in
the literature that the exploitation periods necessarily should have the same
length as the exploration periods.
Studies comparing spatial and temporal separation have argued
that exploitation/exploration tensions are best managed through spatial
separation, because it ensures that each organizational unit is configured to
the specific needs of its task environment. (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004b;
Raisch et al., 2009)
Overall, structural ambidexterity, in form of spatial and temporal
separation, allows the competing demands for exploitation and exploration to
be met within an organization. The only constraint is that the strategy relies
on structural solutions, which require managers to divide resources between
groups and/or periods to meet the different needs. (Gibson and Birkinshaw,
2004b)
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9.3.3 Contextual Ambidexterity
Another approach to balance exploitation and exploration is contextual
ambidexterity, emphasizing behavioral and social means. It allows for
employees to use their own judgment as to how they divide their time and
attention between different activities. The individual employee has to make
choices between exploitation oriented and exploration oriented activities in
the context of his or her day-to-day work. (Birkinshaw and Gibson, 2004)
This results in each individual delivering value to existing customers in his
or her functional areas, but at the same time every individual is constantly
watchful for changes in the environment, and acts accordingly. (Gibson and
Birkinshaw, 2004b)
Organizations that utilize contextual ambidexterity are made up of a set
of processes and systems that facilitate and encourage the organizational
units to do contradictory tasks at the same time. Gibson and Birkinshaw
(2004b) suggest that contextual ambidexterity emerges when leaders in
a business unit develop a supportive organizational context. It is the
processes and systems that collectively define a context, which allows for
simultaneous exploitative and exploratory thinking. Managers facilitate
supportive social processes, culture, and interpersonal relationships that
promote ambidextrous thinking. (Birkinshaw and Gibson, 2004) This set of
stimuli and pressures can shape individuals and collective behaviors towards
ambidexterity. To be clear, the contextual ambidexterity does not arise from
charismatic leadership, formal organization structure or “strong cultures”.
(Birkinshaw and Gibson, 2004)
Hard Elements The processes and systems promoting contextual
ambidexterity could be summarized in four attributes: discipline, stretch,
support and trust. (Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1994, cited in Gibson and
Birkinshaw, 2004b) Discipline and stretch are categorized as hard elements,
and encourage organizational members to push for ambidextrous goals. A
disciplinary organization has established clear standards, and expectations
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of performance and behavior. The system is open and genuine with rapid
feedback and consistency in the application of sanctions. This organizational
culture facilitates individuals to voluntarily strive to meet expectations. The
other hard element is stretch, which leads individuals to voluntarily strive for
more ambitious objectives. The organization establishes shared values and
ambitions, which lead to development of a collective identity. (Gibson and
Birkinshaw, 2004b; Carmeli and Halevi, 2009)
Soft Elements Too many hard elements could lead to burnout and
disillusionment in the organization, and should therefore be implemented
in combination with soft elements. The soft elements are support and
trust. Support promotes members to offer assistance and countenance to
others, since the leaders allow for freedom of initiatives and give priority to
guidance and help. (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004b) It is achieved through
availability of resources, which make up an environment for initiatives and
entrepreneurial mindset. (Carmeli and Halevi, 2009) The last attribute is
trust, which induces members to rely on each other. Important factors
are fairness and involvement of individuals in decisions, which enhances
individual competences. The soft elements must be combined with hard
elements in an organization—too much focus on the soft elements will
promote an atmosphere in which no work gets done. (Gibson and Birkinshaw,
2004b)
The four attributes contribute to create a supportive environment that
inspires individuals to do “whatever it takes” to deliver results. The
attributes shape individuals and collective behavior, which results in a
shape of business units. (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004b) The senior
management team is responsible for building a context embracing these
attributes. (Carmeli and Halevi, 2009) If they are implemented successfully,
it will provide business units capacity for contextual ambidexterity. The
development of these capabilities takes many years, but will eventually lead
to superior performance. (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004b)
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9.3.4 Punctuated Equilibrium
Burgelman and Mittman (1994) propose yet another approach to manage
exploitation and exploration, namely punctuated equilibrium. (Gupta et al.,
2006) This approach suggests that the organization pursues temporal focus
on exploitation and exploration, respectively. Gupta et al. (2006) suggest
that cycling through periods of exploitation and exploration is a more viable
approach than a simultaneous pursuit of the two.
The punctuated equilibrium theory is designed to explain how
organizations can evolve over time (Gersick, 1991), and is an adversary to
traditional Darwinian evolution. The term punctuated equilibrium has been
used to explain several areas of development: individual adult development
(Levinson, 1986, cited in Gersick, 1991), group development (Gersick and
Hackman, 1990, cited in Gersick, 1991), and organizational development
(Romanelli and Tushman, 1994). The organizational development part
has been used as a way to explain and suggest a strategy for attaining
ambidexterity.
As described by its proponents, punctuated equilibrium theory depicts
organizations as evolving through long periods of stability (equilibrium
periods) that are punctuated by relatively short bursts of fundamental change
(revolutionary periods). (Romanelli and Tushman, 1994) Organizations that
are in the equilibrium period are focusing on exploitation and organizations
in the revolutionary period are focusing on exploration. The exploratory
periods substantially disrupt established and initial pattern of activities.
(Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990, cited in Romanelli and Tushman, 1994)
As a result, organizations develop coherent systems of shared understanding.
(Romanelli and Tushman, 1994)
9.3.5 Summary of in-house strategies
Table 3 summarizes the different types of in-house strategies to attain
ambidexterity. The table is built upon the framework presented by
Birkinshaw and Gibson (2004), which cover structural and contextual
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ambidexterity. It has been expanded to comprise the two forms of
structural ambidexterity—spatial separation and temporal separation—as
well as contextual ambidexterity and punctuated equilibrium.
Table 3 reveals that in-house strategies varies when it comes to where
the decision of the exploitation and exploration split is made, and the
management team’s role. Contextual ambidexterity differs from the other
strategies because it requires individuals or employees to take an active
role in effectuation of the strategy. In addition, the summary suggests
that ambidexterity is achieved at different organizational levels. Structural
ambidexterity, both spatial and temporal separation, flows at business level,
contextual ambidexterity at the individual level, and punctuated equilibrium
at the corporate level. These distinctions indicate that the different in-
house strategies can give rise to ambidexterity at different levels, and as
the background of the thesis’ sixth proposition: H6: The balance (of the
exploitation/exploration paradox) can be applied at different levels in the
organization simultaneously. Section 11 will provide a thorough, empirical
examination of this proposition.
When comparing the four different in-house strategies to achieve
ambidexterity, there are similarities between temporal separation and
punctuated equilibrium. Earlier studies has either compared structural and
contextual ambidexterity or spatial separation and punctuated equilibrium
(Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009; Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004b; Gupta
et al., 2006; Raisch et al., 2009); the terms punctuated equilibrium and
temporal separation has not been compared. This could indicate that
punctuated equilibrium and temporal separation are two names of the same
strategy. They are identical when it comes to the temporal cycling between
exploitation and exploration, the actors that perform the temporal focus
and actors that allow for and trigger the focus switch. The punctuated
equilibrium theory for ambidexterity is based on the generic punctuated
equilibrium theory, which describes organizational evolution. This could
indicate that organizations are bound to switch between exploitation and
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Structural ambidexterity Contextual
ambidexterity
Punctuated
equilibrium
Spatial
separation
Temporal
separation
How is
ambidexterity
achieved?
Exploitative
and exploratory
focused
activities are
done in separate
business units
or teams
Exploitative
and exploratory
activities done
by the same
units, but at
different time
period
Individual
employees
divide their
time between
exploitative
and exploratory
activities
The entire
organization
focuses on either
exploitation or
exploration for
a period of time
Where are
decisions
made about
the split
between
exploitation
and
exploration?
At the top of the
organization
At the top of the
organization
Individual level,
by salespeople,
plant
supervisions,
office workers
At the top of the
organization
Role of top
management
To define the
structure, to
make trade-
offs between
exploitation and
exploration
To define the
periods, to
make trade-
offs between
exploitation and
exploration
To develop the
organizational
context in which
individuals act
To define the
periods, to
make trade-
offs between
exploitation and
exploration
Nature of
roles
Relatively
clearly defined
Relatively
clearly defined
Relatively
flexible
Relatively
clearly defined
Skills of
employees
More specialists More generalists More generalists More generalists
Table 3: In-house Strategies for Ambidexterity
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exploration, no matter what the interested party decides. But the common
view is based on the manager’s ability to identify the need for, and
promote the switch from, exploitation to exploration, or vice versa. This
view indicates that there is a linkage between punctuated equilibrium and
structural ambidexterity—temporal separation.
9.4 Managing Ambidexterity
Several studies have argued that senior management behavior is essential to
attaining ambidexterity. (Lubatkin et al., 2006; He and Wong, 2004) Senior
management behavior will shape individuals’ behavior and thereby facilitate
teams’ ability for better performance through appropriate coaching. (He and
Wong, 2004; Jansen et al., 2008) Ambidextrous organizations should have
heterogeneous senior teams capable of appreciating and focusing on process
activities as well as limiting their damage. (Benner and Tushman, 2003)
They allow variety and local adoption, yet facilitate collective actions and
strategic coherence. (Siggelkow and Rivkin, 2006)
The senior management, in the light of spatial separation, must develop
processes that include forward-looking cognitive models for exploratory
units, as well as allowing backward-looking learning for exploitative units.
(Benner and Tushman, 2003) This results in exploratory units utilizing and
exploring new knowledge, yet establishing cross-fertilization and synergies
with ongoing businesses in exploitative units. (Tushman and O’Reilly III,
2006) Another important task for senior management teams is to allocate
scarce resources, and thereby inhibit resource constraints in exploitative or
exploratory units. (Jansen et al., 2008) The senior team is expected to
recognize and translate different ambiguous, and conflicting expectations into
workable strategies. (Jansen et al., 2008) When senior management teams
have succeeded with separation, they can realize, control, direct, and organize
within and across organizational units. In addition, this entails that they can
develop supportive contexts for enhancing learning capabilities. (Lavie et al.,
2010)
108
The senior management team is also crucial when organizations
achieve ambidexterity through punctuated equilibrium, temporal separation,
contextual ambidexterity and domain separation. Temporal separation and
punctuated equilibrium require the senior management team to play a
proactive role. The transition between exploitation and exploration requires
planning and execution of synchronized operation. (Lavie et al., 2010)
Even though contextual ambidexterity and domain separation probably
are less demanding for a management team than temporal separation,
punctuated equilibrium and spatial separation, their role is still crucial for
the ambidexterity. (Lavie et al., 2010)
Jansen et al. (2008) presented a set of senior team attributes that facilitate
ambidexterity: shared vision, social integration, and group contingency
rewards.
The senior management should promote a shared set of goals and values
for the organization. The goals and values must be articulated through
a common strategy that improves conflicting interest and disagreement.
The common goals and values in an organization lead to a motivation
among senior management to generate opportunities for resource exchange
and combination across exploratory and exploitative organizational units.
(Tushman and O’Reilly III, 2006; Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997; Jansen et al.,
2008) The lack of shared values in an organization can thus lead to distrust
and suspicion within management teams and throughout the organization.
The distrust makes it hard to identify, extract and combine skills, abilities,
and perspectives within exploratory and exploitative units.
Jansen et al. (2008) described social integration as a multifaceted
phenomenon, reflecting the attraction to the group, satisfaction with other
members of the group, and social interaction among the group members.
The social interaction is closely related to negotiation, compromise and
collaboration across organizational units, and helps increase collaborative
problem solving (Michel and Hambrick, 1992; Dailey, 1978, cited in Jansen
et al., 2008). Social integration promotes a comfortable and familiar
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organization, which enables senior executives to articulate and develop
arguments more effectively and to build realistic understanding of key
preferences in the organization. (Eisenhardt et al., 1997, cited in Jansen
et al., 2008)
The last senior management attribute required to achieve ambidexterity
is contingency reward. Contingency rewards foster collaboration and create
commitment to organizational goals. (Bloom, 1999, cited in Jansen et al.,
2008) The senior management team is encouraged to achieve value through
identifying ways to use shared resources across exploratory and exploitative
units. (Smith and Tushman, 2005) Contingency rewards reduce competition
among individuals by facilitating negotiation of mutual adjustment necessary
for the co-existence of exploitative and exploratory units. (Jansen et al.,
2008)
Carmeli and Halevi (2009) argue that these four attributes lead
to contextual ambidexterity in the senior management team. Top
management’s behavioral complexity arrives from information sharing,
collaboration and joint decision making, and leads to ambidexterity.
9.5 The Complete Ambidexterity Framework
As described, there are several strategies to follow in order to achieve
organizational ambidexterity. The complete framework for these strategies is
illustrated as an index map in Figure 7. The map shows that ambidexterity
could be achieved either by internal or external efforts. The external activities
include outsourcing and alliances, and the internal activities include mergers
& acquisitions and in-house activities. The in-house activities are further
divided on the basis of sequential and simultaneous focus. Punctuated
equilibrium and temporal separation are strategies organizations could
choose if they want to pursue a sequential path, whereas spatial separation
and contextual ambidexterity are paths to follow if the organization prefers to
solve the paradox simultaneously. There exists a common understanding that
ambidexterity are tightly aligned with senior management behavior. Several
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Figure 7: The Ambidexterity Framework
studies have argued that no matter what type of strategy an organization
chooses, it needs to be pursued in accordance with senior management
behavior. The behavior facilitates and adjusts for ambidexterity and is a
crucial tool for success. (Siadat and Chaharmahali, 2010)
On basis of The Ambidexterity Framework and the theoretical evidence
produced in Section 9, considering various ambidexterity strategies, a last
proposition has been suggested: H7: Solving the paradox redound to
ambidexterity. Sections 10 and 12 will provide an empirical investigation
of this proposition.
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10 Empirical Assessment of the Ambidexterity
Framework
The main objective of the current section is to examine the empirical material
from Finn in the context of ambidexterity. The assessment will comprise
why Finn may be regarded as ambidextrous, the different modes Finn
uses to balance exploitation and exploration, and the contribution senior
management teams provide to achieve ambidexterity.
Information captured from the interviews indicates that Finn does, to
some extent, meet the formal definition of an ambidextrous organization
from the literature, as a company synchronously pursuing both exploitation
and exploration. (Gupta et al., 2006) To verify and enrich this perspective,
the ambidextrous efforts have been considered through three antecedents of
exploitation and exploration—organizational factors, environmental factors
and senior management teams. These antecedents are selected to define the
context of what constitutes ambidexterity. (Lavie et al., 2010)
Organizational factors include absorptive capacity, slack resources,
organizational structure, culture and identity, and organizational age and
size. (Lavie et al., 2010) As discussed in Part II, Finn holds slack resources,
when it comes to both time and money—the employees are allowed to
administer their own workday, and Finn is willingly funding new projects,
e.g. Penger. Wakas Asif explains that Finn’s organizational structure is
decentralized, and he further puts forward a theory about the origin of the
culture encouraging intrapreneurial success and ad-hoc pitching: “Finn has
a relatively flat structure; we work in an open landscape. The door to the
CEO’s office is always open, inviting anyone to stop by for an informal chat.”
As Ole Kristian Ullereng has reported, the organizational culture and identity
are imprinted by continuous improvement efforts combined with innovation
tools. Bent Ove Jørgensen elaborates: “Many companies present lots of
plans and visions, but they don’t always go through with them. Here, these
plans are followed.” In addition, Finn’s remarkable success does obviously
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characterize the culture.
The senior management team has articulated in the corporate strategy
that an extensive expansion is imminent:
“We aim to build a new Finn over the next four years. It took
about ten years to build the current Finn, and now the purpose is
to build another one at half the time. It’s very ambitious, but also
extremely exciting.” (Niklas Larsson)
Ullereng argues that all innovation at Finn is more or less administrated
through the corporate strategies. The CEO has at several occasions used
public press and social media to demonstrate his simultaneous attentiveness
on continuous improvement and innovation.
Finn operates in an environment characterized by rapid changes in
technology, offers and customer demand. According to Nina Moi Edvardsen,
Finn is observant of the present changes in technology, customer behavior and
customer preferences. It is for example important for the long-term viability
to take part in the switch from laptops to tablets and mobile phones. She
explains: “We have been courageous ever since the beginning. Back in those
days, the newspapers were reluctant and afraid to move from physical paper
to online format.” Another example of the attention towards environmental
changes are described by Christian Haneborg: “I told my boss that Penger
was a business case I believed in, and something Finn ought to bet on, to
prevent the future from catching up with us.”
When it comes to modes of balancing exploitation and exploration, the
information provided from the interviews indicated that Finn uses several
of them: punctuated equilibrium, contextual ambidexterity, structural
ambidexterity and, to a questionable extent, domain separation. They will
be subject to closer examination in the following pages.
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10.1 Domain Separation
Domain separation is defined as alliances of exploitation or exploration.
At the beginning of Finn’s venture, the market verticals did not include
separate development teams and all technology progression was organized
within a central unit. Management realized that they had a unique classifieds
platform, with potential for synergies if collaborating with other actors in the
classifieds business. The technology platform was demerged from Finn into
the new company Finntech, with a 50/50 shared ownership between Finn
and the English classifieds company Fishforce. Ribe Anderssen reveals that
this alliance soon experienced some difficulties:
“The two owners had contradictory interests. First, Fishforce was
dissatisfied by Finntech being located physically closer to Finn,
and therefore executed most projects in a fashion most favorable to
Finn. Second, Finntech was dissatisfied by being forced to always
make solutions compatible for both Fishforce and Finn. The joint
venture turned out differently than expected, without the desired
synergies.” (Lars Erik Ribe Anderssen)
The two companies separated, and Finn re-acquired Finntech. This has
been Finn’s only attempt to establish an exploitation domain.
Penger is another attempt on domain separation, where Finn owns 70%
and Dine Penger 30%. Penger did not fit in with the company’s core activities
and Edvardsen explains: “Penger didn’t arise because of Finn, but in spite of
Finn.” The domain separation was based on exploratory efforts. Haneborg
elaborates the synergies:
“Penger will benefit from Dine Penger on several aspects. We’ll be
able to transfer some of their already incorporated credibility on
personal finance, instead of having to establish our own credibility
from scratch. In addition, Dine Penger is owned by VG, making
Norway’s largest newspaper an owner of Penger. Consequently,
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they’ll be willing to integrate us and make Penger a natural part
of their services.” (Christian Haneborg)
10.2 Structural Ambidexterity
As described in Section 9, structural ambidexterity can be divided into
two distinct modes—spatial separation and temporal separation. When
considering Finn in the light of structural ambidexterity, it was discovered
that their main focus was spatial separation as a balancing mode: “The
forces should be balanced with processes, not separation based on time.”
(Jørgensen) With the general presence of Finn’s remarkable profitability in
the established verticals, several interviewees have emphasized the lack of
separate working environments for intrapreneurial efforts. It is crucial to
isolate the exploratory efforts from these verticals, allowing them to establish
separate environments. As Ullereng previously described in Section 6,
celebrating with cake every second day does influence people’s attitude, and
is part of the reason why he would relocate his exploratory department to
Oslo Innovation Center with other entrepreneurs, if he were to decide.
Market verticals The interviews revealed that the distribution of
attention between exploitation and exploration varies across different
business units and market verticals. Ullereng has stated that his first course
of action after being appointed CEO of Torget was to deliberately eliminate
all experimentation within this vertical, on basis of Torget holding the leading
position in acquiring brand equity and generating site traffic. To mitigate
the risk of compromising the brand, or having the traffic reduced, Ullereng
is cautious with experimentation efforts and wants the vertical to continue
exploiting its existing capabilities and resources. Similar tendencies are also
found in other verticals. Eiendom is the market leader in its sector, causing
experimentation reluctance in this department as well. The reluctance is
further amplified by the fact that Norway’s largest real estate trader is a
shareholder in Eiendom. The result is a rigid and complex decision making
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structure.
Finn also comprises more exploratory verticals such as Reise, a vertical
operating in a competition-intensive landscape, leading to a more exploratory
approach for survival. The approach is characterized by the broad focus and
a desire to develop a marketplace embracing every element of its competitors’
products. Vangstein elaborates: “The dominating markets, such as Eiendom,
Motor (Bil) and maybe Jobb, must be more careful than for example Reise
which is currently a market underdog.”
Support Functions Separation of exploitative and exploratory efforts at
Finn is also identified in departments not directly related to specific market
verticals. Exploratory efforts has traditionally been conducted in small units,
based on Ullereng’s testimonial of the unsuccessful attempts engaging in
experimentation within the corporate environments. But when they succeed,
the ideas often originate by establishing separate environments within Finn,
usually with six people having an explicit mandate and backing resources.
(Ullereng) Both Oppdrag and Penger were developed in these formats. This
recipe for success has been captured within the organization, resulting in
the New Markets department being established medio March 2012. The new
section is a place where entrepreneurial mindset and the ability to explore
are valuated. Ullereng explains: “It will be a pure innovative environment,
with both business and concept developers.”
Finn also comprises more exploitative support units, e.g. Platform
and Architecture. Ribe Anderssen describes: “There is no reason to
grant the happy-go-lucky people complete access to the system architecture.
It’s more advantageous to build up modular stand-alone units, preventing
programmers from altering others’ code.” Ullereng advocates again to avoid
experimentation within these departments, arguing that not only Torget, but
also exploitative support units have comprehensive maintenance and upkeep
operations preventing the same team to relieve themselves sufficiently from
other duties to produce good innovation anyway.
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10.3 Contextual Ambidexterity
Contextual ambidexterity is to utilize behavioral and social means to
integrate exploitation and exploration within the organizational boundaries.
Finn has created a working environment allowing employees to distribute
their own time between exploitative and exploratory tasks at a day-to-day
basis. Together with the senior management team, each work unit has
developed a roadmap setting clear goals of performance and behavior among
the members, which is supported by tailor-made processes and systems
for lean and slack. Examples are Finnopp, Sandbox and Finnovasjon,
developed as ways to create novel business ideas and features. Even though
several interviewees claim these tools to still be suboptimal (Jørgensen,
Ullereng, Asif, Haneborg), they contribute to make innovation visible
inside the organization and promote exploratory efforts among employees.
(Kristiansen) On the other hand, the lean program developed by Finn Way
of Innovation contributes to the awareness of effectiveness. Kristiansen points
out that the overall objective of this program is to establish a culture where
the employees are aware of what they are supposed to do, why they are
doing it, and what effects that work may produce for the organization, the
customers and the users. The exploitative focus is amplified by the roadmaps
developed for each business unit. According to Kristiansen, the roadmaps
are vital for the ongoing operations: “It provides a recipe for prioritizing
work tasks and communicate tangible goals.”
It is evident that Finn has managed to develop a culture where
individuals strive for ambitious objectives. Ullereng argues that some sort
of Finn totality exists among the employees, making them committed to
the organization and willing to walk that extra mile to ensure satisfactory
results. This totality may have arisen from the fact that employees are
proud of working at Finn, in addition to regarding Finn as a comfortable
and rewarding company. However, this totality invites managers to trust the
employees, making room for maximal performance.
The interviews revealed that employees are invited to assist and
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countenance others. As director of Platform and Architecture, Lars Erik
Ribe Anderssen is responsible for four system architects, within the fields
of application, search, front-end, and database, respectively. As the rest of
Finn’s work force, they are also allowed to choose how to administer their
own workday: “These people are technically competent, but they are also
committed to the Finn totality. It is extremely important to show them trust,
and so far, they’ve never abused it.” (Ribe Anderssen) This philosophy is
identified across the entire organization, and Asif explains that he is allowed
to schedule the workday at his own convenience:
“I don’t get micromanaged by my boss. It is, of course, important
to deliver pursuant to budgets and roadmaps, but I’m free to
manage my own workday. I have, at several occasions, used an
afternoon to work with a case.” (Wakas Asif)
The employees are free to initiate and prioritize projects. When Haneborg
started the work with Penger, he was allowed to simultaneously focus on his
daily work as well as further develop the new idea. The senior management
team encouraged him to continue the focus on Penger for two reasons—they
believed in the idea and they believed in Haneborg. Larsson summarizes
their expectations:
“As a side effect of the product Penger itself, Christian was given
the best education he could possibly get. The work with Penger
has been hard and Christian has experienced a lot of bumps. I
think, even though it will be a success, the greatest outcome will
be the next project Christian will lead. That I am certain of. He
has learned how to do this, and as you see in Silicon Valley, success
is often a result of the second, third or fourth attempt.” (Niklas
Larsson)
The way Finn’s employee evaluation process is structured indicates a
mindset emanated from contextual ambidexterity, based on Asif’s affirmation
of result, activity and quality as the three dimensions along which employees
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are being monitored. The result and activity assessments are intuitive
parameters tightly connected to the roadmap, and may thus be regarded
as measurements of exploitation. However, quality is a more subjective
and comprehensive parameter, and may in some cases be regarded as a
measurement of exploration. The quality assessment is based on a task or
a project chosen by the employee, and approved by the manager. That
way, the members are included in the personal KPI development process,
and engaged in defining Finn’s future path. Asif’s last quality measurement
project in 2011 was to put forward a proposition for solving a challenge
related to banner advertisements at Jobb:
“A few months ago, customers were unable to buy banner ads
related to a specific occupation, such as engineering, because of
a technical bug. I decided to solve the problem, starting with
a Finnopp post and some internal e-mails. Naturally, we had to
spend a lot of time and it was hard work, but it paid off. The
product is sold today; it has become a huge success. We have
happy customers.” (Wakas Asif)
During the interviews, the senior management team’s desire for
contextual ambidexterity was identified. Edvardsen stated that they
encourage employees to focus on both effectiveness and innovation
simultaneously.
10.4 Punctuated Equilibrium
As previously described, punctuated equilibrium refers to an organizations
ability to cycle between periods of exploitation and exploration, respectively.
This is often used to describe an organization’s evolution over time, and
thereby describe an organization’s ability to change focus in order to cope
with uncertainties in the environment.
During the interviews, it was identified that Finn has evolved in pursuance
of a punctuated equilibrium pattern, cycling between exploitation and
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exploration during its entire operating time. It started as an exploratory,
entrepreneurial company, followed by a period of exploitation, and is now,
apparently, starting another period of exploration. The venture started
in 2000, and the organization was permeated by an exploratory mindset,
allowing for creative thinking and experimentation. During this period
several market verticals were established mainly based on intuition, and new
ideas were conceived and tested rapidly and uncritically. In the words of
Nina Moi Edvardsen, Finn’s early phase is described: “We were in this
entrepreneurial phase, where it was arms and legs. We were like a frisky
child.”
After a while, Finn grew and became a market leader in several of its
verticals. The interviews indicate that this made the management team
realize the importance of structuring the entrepreneurial mindset. Ullereng
explains Finn’s history: “There is still much left of the entrepreneurial work
style around here. Structure has not been our strongest side, but it’s starting
to be.” Finn introduced several sets of procedures to cope with the increasing
number of employees, market verticals, customers and revenue. The first
attempt to structure the organization was through lean thinking, and
Ullereng recalls: “We started with Scrum, but it killed any creative thinking
and innovation immediately because everything was methodology. We
started with a misunderstood form of lean.” The interviewees explain that
the contrived deliveries required to conclude all three-week sprints caused an
exaggerated quest for customer value, ignoring continuous improvement of
operations not explicitly linked to customers. This experience was how the
need for a department like Finn Way of Innovation emerged, and why they
developed the new tailor-made effectiveness improvement program with the
seven principles. The program is a mix of Scrum method and lean principles,
“designed to help business units gain more effect with less programming.”
(Kristiansen & Vangstein) It is a measure taken by the Finn Way of
Innovation to get rid of people’s gut feeling and force them to articulate
it clearly.
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As of today, most of the market verticals and support units are
participating in the program, and Finn is running smoothly. The
management team is reflected on their current situation, and eager to enter
a new period of exploration. Edvardsen states:
“Yes, we have realized that we must be careful not to be too
structured and bounded in our current operational mode. We’re
hunted by the great ghost of not becoming Aftenposten. And
it’s not only Aftenposten—Telenor and SAS are other examples,
all well established companies where processes overshadows the
creativity.” (Nina Moi Edvardsen)
As mentioned, Finn plans to double its operation the next four years.
Exploration efforts make up a significant part of the strategy to reach this
goal, due to an obvious need for new verticals. Haneborg explains how he
interprets the management team’s strategy: “In my experience, the CEO
is very focused on innovation and development of new market verticals. I
don’t think he will give up in the near future, even if he eventually is forced
to start acquiring companies.” This innovation focus is already possible to
identify as the establishment of new initiatives, like New Markets and Finn
Way of Innovation’s seven principle framework. Kristiansen explains that
as of today, since the new initiatives are in the development process, the
main resources are still allocated to existing verticals. But she thinks that
this potentially could shift. Edvardsen argues that Finn has not entered
an exploitation phase just yet, but she is confident that the organization
re-adjusts to meet the innovation goal.
10.5 Senior management team
As discussed in Section 9, the behavior, culture and encouragement
from senior management teams are crucial when forming ambidextrous
organizations. Jansen et al. (2008) argue that senior management teams
should possess shared vision, social integration and contingency rewards.
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Shared vision refers to a shared set of goals and values, and contingency
rewards foster collaboration and create commitment to organizational goals.
Finn’s roadmaps contribute to create goals and values penetrating the entire
organization. The efforts to create shared vision are done through roadmap
planning. The development is done in different, mandated groups, where
each group creates one part of the entire roadmap. That way, middle
managers and other employees are able to contribute to form the corporate
strategy and the strategic direction for the next three years. An important
principle in the process is to appoint certain employees to communicate
the roadmap within the organization, and ameliorate conflicting interests
and disagreements, thereby avoid the traditional, hierarchical layout, where
senior managers make decisions behind closed doors. Ullereng emphasizes:
“don’t underestimate the process of making strategy, it promotes involvement
and anchoring. If you succeed, you’ll be able to exploit much more of the
energy and hunger present in the organization.”
Social integration reflects attraction to the group, satisfaction with other
members of the group, and integration among the group members themselves.
As mentioned, the flat structure at Finn combined with events and forums
(such as Finnopp, Finnawards, and Tech Lead Forum) invite to collaboration
across business units. These efforts are formation stones for social integration
and yield greater effectiveness and aspire for team success.
10.6 Summary of Section 10
Finn is aware that it is vital for the organization to strive towards
innovation to secure long-term sustainability and to focus on effectiveness
improvement to gain maximal outcome of the existing operation. This view
is communicated to the organization and the outside world through Finn’s
strategy, efforts inside the organization, and visibility from the spin-offs.
Finn’s history and current performance allow one to believe that the efforts
have, to some extent, been successful.
The interviews have provided clear evidence of Finn using multiple modes
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to attain ambidexterity. The organization’s lifetime is characterized by an
alternation between exploitative and exploratory periods. It started as an
entrepreneurial company, evolved into a mature enterprise, and has now
shown indications of entering a new phase of exploration. This separation in
time is based both on the evolution of Finn as an organization, and on the
senior management team’s deliberate efforts to promote it. It is important
to operate effectively and attain optimal yield from existing resources, as
well as understand what effects their efforts gain. On the other hand,
employees and senior management teams are invited to intercept and follow
new opportunities, with that doing an attempt to secure the future. Finn
has also done some structural actions to balance the exploitation/exploration
paradox. There is a distinction in different market verticals and business
units, allowing some to focus purely on innovation and other purely on
effectiveness. Finn has further demerged both existing operation units and
new ventures in domains, allowing each domain to focus solely on exploitation
and exploration, respectively. The exploitation domain failed to provide
the desired synergies, and ultimately Finn brought the unit back inside the
organization. The other attempt of domain separation is the demerger of an
exploration unit, consequently separating the new venture from the success
environment at Finn and giving it distance to build up and maintain an
entrepreneurial mindset. It is evident that Finn desires to succeed with
short-term profit as well as attain long-term viability.
11 Theoretical and Empirical Juxtaposition
of the Ambidexterity Framework
Researchers have discussed whether ambidexterity manifests itself at the
individual or organizational level. There is a predominance of studies
arguing that organizational mechanisms enable ambidexterity through formal
structures or lateral coordination. (Benner and Tushman, 2003; Jansen et al.,
2008; Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004a) However, researchers have questioned
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whether structural mechanisms are required to enable ambidexterity at an
individual level, and thereby indicate that structural mechanisms are the vital
mode to achieve ambidexterity, or if ambidextrous individuals are vital in the
use of structural mechanisms. The latter implies that ambidexterity is rooted
in the individual’s ability to exploit and explore. (Raisch et al., 2009) Several
studies on structural ambidexterity acknowledge that senior management
teams can engage in both exploitative and exploratory activities. But why
are these managers, as opposed to other members in the organization, able
to enter and manage the paradox? (Raisch et al., 2009) To examine this
uncertainty, the current thesis will attempt to capture ambidexterity across
multiple levels at Finn, and investigate what level ambidexterity originates
from. The empirical investigation has indicated a possibility of employing
multiple balancing modes simultaneously, as this is evident at Finn. Further,
a framework for separation of the modes according to organizational levels
has been suggested.
11.0.1 Contextual Ambidexterity
Contextual ambidexterity efforts flow at the individual level. The
organization desires to create a Finn totality, inviting employees to
continuously delegate their efforts between exploitative and exploratory
tasks. For senior management teams, this is attained by hiring technically
competent people anxious to take a “what ever it takes to succeed”-approach,
making micromanagement unnecessary. (Ribe Anderssen) From the
employees’ point of view, this is attained by being proud of their workplace,
and trusted by the senior managers. Ultimately, the result is mental
ownership. (Ribe Anderssen) Individuals’ ability to act ambidextrously
will have a cumulative effect on the organization’s overall ambidexterity.
However, the ambidexterity is different from the sum of its members’
individual level of ambidexterity, and rather likely to be a function of closely
interrelated individuals and organizational effects, most cases greater than
the sum of the individual activities. (Raisch et al., 2009)
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11.0.2 Structural Ambidexterity
Structural ambidexterity efforts are employed at the next organizational
level, where the modes of balancing flows at the business level. As described
in Section 9, the structural means are applied on different organizational
units, choreographing some to operate purely exploitative and others to
operate purely exploratory. Birkinshaw and Gibson (2004) argue that
structural separation is necessary due to the incongruous nature of the
two sets of activities. The most apparent piece of evidence on structural
separation is the establishment of New Markets, an exploratory unit solely
pursuing new business opportunities.
11.0.3 Punctuated Equilibrium & Domain Separation
Punctuated equilibrium flows at the corporate level. Finn has evolved
through one exploration period and one exploitation period, and is now
starting once again to enter a new period of exploration. These business
cycles are mainly administered by the senior management team, and promote
the entire organization to switch between the two extremes.
Domain separation is employed at the network level, to target
collaboration with subsidiaries or partners on the separation of exploitation
or exploration. Finntech is one example on exploitative domain separation.
11.1 The Hierarchical Ambidexterity Framework
The Hierarchical Ambidexterity Framework is a new framework for
separation of the modes according to organizational levels, illustrated in
Figure 8.
After thoroughly examining the Pathway Framework in combination
with the different modes in the Ambidexterity Framework, a coherence
was observed—the different modes could be implemented at different levels
of the Pathway Framework to solve the tension. The first level in the
Pathway Framework is the mindset of the organization, and the employees’
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Figure 8: The Hierarchical Ambidexterity Framework
possession of either exploitative or exploratory mindset. To balance the
opposing mindsets, the organization could utilize contextual ambidexterity
and/or punctuated equilibrium. The second level is the corresponding tools.
Structural ambidexterity could be applied in organizations at the group or
business level, allowing lean and organizational slack to be exerted at different
points. The organization consists of several groups or business units with
different foci, and the sum of these units gives rise to ambidexterity. As
an attempt to balance effectiveness and innovation, the third level in the
Pathway Framework, organizations could employ domain separation. An
organization could either pursue effectiveness within the organization and
innovation at another domain, or vice versa, thereby making it possible to
become ambidextrous without mixing the two extremes inside one business
unit. Figure 9 indicates the merger of the Pathway Framework and the
126
Hierarchical Ambidexterity Framework.
Summarized, Finn utilizes contextual ambidexterity, structural ambidexterity,
punctuated equilibrium and domain separation. The empirical data revealed
that contextual and structural ambidexterity were the most common
balancing modes, and that domain separation and punctuated equilibrium
not were part of Finn’s everyday balancing efforts. These finding were
expected, due to both structural and contextual ambidexterity being
feasible to apply in an organization’s everyday operation, while punctuated
equilibrium is a long-term mode utilized as an evolution path, and domain
separation is achieved in collaboration with other organizations.
As described in the current section, Finn’s ambidextrous capabilities
are built from applying different modes simultaneously, both at different
levels in the Pathway Framework and at different levels in the Hierarchical
Ambidexterity Framework. Every individual are invited to develop a mindset
simultaneously embracing both exploitative and exploratory thoughts. These
contradictory thoughts are not always necessary for their day-to-day work
inside a business unit, but should be a part of the Finn totality and benefit
Finn as an organization. Contextual ambidexterity is therefore applied at an
individual level, forcing the employees to embrace both an exploitative and
exploratory mindset.
These contradictory thoughts are supported by structural mechanisms,
where some business units utilize lean as a tool, and others utilize slack.
The structural mechanisms secure a familiar environment for the employees
by mitigating the contradictions. Although every employee is able to
simultaneously focus on exploitation and exploration, the structural means
function as a guideline for the employees when balancing the efforts.
Structural ambidexterity is applied at the business unit level, enabling the
organization to utilize both lean and organizational slack as a tool.
Punctuated equilibrium and domain separation at Finn are deployed
by the senior management team at the corporate and network levels of
strategy, respectively. Punctuated equilibrium efforts at Finn are visible
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Figure 9: The Hierarchical Ambidexterity Framework merged with the
Pathway Framework
for the organization through corporate strategies and roadmaps, affecting
the mindset of the employees. Currently, the management team has
initiated a path switch, and now promotes more exploratory efforts. The
switch has affected the employees to increase the focus on innovation and
experimentation initiatives. Domain separation allows Finn to separate
either the innovation or effectiveness focus from the organization, leaving
the employees affected only by the outcome of the separation—innovation
and effectiveness, respectively.
The aim for this section has been to investigate what organizational
level ambidexterity originates from, and why utilization of several modes
simultaneously is possible. The study indicates that ambidexterity can
be achieved in several ways and manifest itself on different levels in the
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organization. Ambidexterity at the individual, business, corporate and
network levels of strategy, respectively, have been observed at Finn, but
one particular level for organizational ambidexterity more important than
the others has not been identified. The determination of one such level
superior to the others in the context of ambidexterity balancing modes is
suggested for further research. However, it appears that ambidexterity at
one level would promote ambidexterity at another, and it is crucial that the
senior management team plays an active role. Although exploitation and
exploration make up a paradox within the organization, management teams
are implementing modes to solve it. The different modes differ, and one
could therefore imagine that the utilization of several modes would lead to
conflicts and diffuse directions inside an organization. But since the different
modes flows at different levels in the organization as well as targeting different
levels in the pathways to profit, utilization of multiple modes are feasible and
perhaps even desirable.
12 Level of Ambidexterity
Organizational theories have recently adopted the human trait of
ambidexterity as a metaphor to describe competent organizations (Carmeli
and Halevi, 2009), and that these competent organizations are able to pursue
exploitation and exploration simultaneously. But what is a competent
organization? And what is the ideal balance between exploitative and
exploratory efforts? How much focus on exploitation and exploration are
required for an organization in order to be categorized as ambidextrous?
Gibson and Birkinshaw (2004a) insinuate that there exist different levels
of ambidexterity, but the levels cannot be measured as a product of
exploitation and exploration because that will imply that exploitation and
exploration are both equally important elements of ambidexterity. This
indicates that ambidexterity can appear from different exploitative and
exploratory efforts, allowing organizations to have unequal focus on the two
129
extremes. The case study on Finn revealed evidence of different focus on
exploitation and exploration that ultimately has resulted in success for the
company.
Even though Finn allocates resources to both exploitative and exploratory
activities, and has implemented strategies to embrace both extreme points
of the paradox, the interviewees reveal that Finn holds a potential for even
higher levels of effectiveness and innovation. Haneborg points to the fact
that Finn’s short-term success will be positively affected, if the existing
resources and capabilities were utilized in a better way. On the other hand,
some interviewees is of the opinion that several of the innovation efforts
do not yield the desired outcomes, and they believe Finn has a potential
to foster a much larger amount of innovation projects. Despite this, Finn
has shown a positive growth and performance ever since it was established.
This indicates a chance to achieve ambidexterity without excelling at both
extremes, and that organizations can balance the paradox by operating close
to each extreme instead of necessarily at the extreme itself.
However, an open question is if the performance could have been even
better if both extremes were thoroughly captured, and that Finn has not
exploited its full potential for ambidexterity. As of today, Finn is eager
to expand its focus on innovation and secure effect on the efforts, while still
maintaining and further developing the effectiveness. This business approach
implies a desire to move measures further towards the two extremes, to attain
an even higher level of ambidexterity. This strategy might result in a higher
performing organization and securing a sustainable future.
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Part IV
Conclusions & Further
Research
The paradox of exploitation and exploration is extensively debated in
organizational theory literature, as two opposing strategies. Even though the
concepts may be regarded as two extreme points of a managerial paradox,
several recent studies have argued that they can coexist. This coexistence has
been named ambidexterity. An emerging imperative is for organizations to
manage both exploitation and exploration to achieve sustainable advantage,
by capturing the best components from both extremes. This thesis has
introduced strategies for solving the paradox, presented available, theoretical
alternatives for organizations to attain ambidexterity, suggested three new
theoretical frameworks and performed an empirical assessment of this theory
in the context of Finn.
13 Conclusion
13.1 Objective A
Objective A of the current thesis was to provide an understanding of the
exploitative and exploratory organizational strategies, respectively. The
answer was introduced in Part I, and further elaborated in Part II. The
literature review found exploitation to be characterized by production,
convergent thinking, reduction of variance, and continuous innovation, and
exploration to be characterized by experimentation, divergent thinking,
increasing variance, and discontinuous innovation. The research hypothesis
formulated to verify or reject this theory has simply been that these two
strategies exist. Torget is a market vertical with continuous innovation only,
while Reise currently is in the early, exploratory phase. Torget’s objective is
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to exploit its current potential completely, while Reise, on the other hand,
attempts to escape this exploitative culture. Also, the empirical material has
confirmed that exploitative departments like Eiendom and Torget builds on
Finn’s past, while exploratory departments like Oppdrag and Reise creates
future opportunities different from the past. Thus, H1 is confirmed—
exploitation and exploration are in fact empirically acknowledged as two
distinct pathways to profit.
13.2 Objective B
Objective B of the thesis was to provide an understanding of why these
strategies traditionally have been considered two mutually exclusive extreme
points of a paradox. Part II suggested a new, theoretical framework (the
Pathway Framework) as the answer, where the opposing forces from both
strategies have been decomposed into a structure of four conceptual levels.
The top level is a choice between exploitation or exploration as the fundament
for future strategy formation, where exploitative values such as discipline
and effectiveness as one extreme point, conflicts with exploratory values
such as learning by doing and trial and error as the other. The second
level is the optimal tool corresponding to each of the two generic strategies,
where the exploitative tool is lean thinking and the exploratory tool is
organizational slack. The third level is the specific key performance indicator
where the organization is expected to perform best. Organizations following
an exploitative strategy should expect high effectiveness performance if
lean thinking is properly institutionalized, while organizations following
an exploratory strategy should expect a high innovation rate if slack is
properly employed. Finally, the fourth level is where the paths coalesce
in organizational profit. An integral corollary of the framework is that once
a choice of generic strategy has been made, organizations should only expect
the single corresponding KPI as result, not both. The paths are parallel and
organizations do not necessarily have to achieve both simultaneously in order
to maximize profit.
132
The main features of the Pathway Framework were transformed into
three theoretical hypotheses subject to subsequent empirical assessment.
Finn’s most exploitative department, Torget, has deliberately terminated
all experimentation, and does consequently not expect a particularly high
rate of innovation. The interviews further revealed that lean thinking is
in fact employed as the tool in exploitative departments. Conversely, the
exploratory departments do not benefit from premature implementation of
lean principles, after witnessing that such activity inhibits entrepreneurial
spirit. However, proof of flexible schedules and experimental initiatives
such as Finnopp and Sandbox being employed also in the exploitative
departments, indicates traces of organizational slack that also here may lead
to useful innovation. Thus, H2 is partly confirmed and partly rejected—
exploitation does yield high effectiveness, but not necessarily low innovation
rate. The story about Penger’s conception proves that Finn is prepared
to get the five profitless intrapreneurial initiatives before one success, and
that the exploratory umbrella encapsulating these attempts indeed does
result in innovation. However, the evidence also suggests that exploration
is not necessarily a barrier for effectiveness, with such departments having
few other true expenses than staffing, and using directed experimentation
to avoid useless outcomes. Thus, H3 is also partly confirmed and partly
rejected—exploration does yield high innovation rate, but not necessarily low
effectiveness. Exploitation and exploration has been recognized as different
mindsets in different departments in Finn, lean principles and organizational
slack has been identified as institutionalized tools, and both effectiveness and
innovation rate are key performance indicators used within Finn. Further
empirical evidence shows that mixing the two concepts damages both. Thus,
H4 is confirmed—the two pathways does in fact represent extreme points of
a managerial paradox.
While the Pathway Framework might be a valid approximation within
individual departments, it fails to model the case company adequately,
as Finn manages to follow both paths simultaneously. Still, a prior
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understanding of exploitation and exploration as two contradictory pathways
to profit is necessary in order to decipher their coalescence. The Pathway
Framework is necessary for such enlightenment. In order to comply
with objective C and provide an understanding of how exploitation and
exploration may be combined to a common path to profit, a prior
understanding of the individual paths themselves is a prerequisite.
13.3 Objective C
Objective C of the thesis was to provide an understanding of how mature
organizations can solve the paradox in order to achieve ambidexterity. Part
3 suggested a new, theoretical framework (the Ambidexterity Framework) as
the solution, where the efforts of balancing the extreme points of exploitation
and exploration have been hierarchically categorized according to the locus
of implementation within the organization. The first distinction is whether
the activities are conducted inside or outside the organizational perimeter.
External efforts include outsourcing and domain separation through alliances
and strategic networks, while internal efforts are categorized further into
the next hierarchical level. The second distinction within internal efforts is
whether the activities are in-house or a result of mergers or acquisitions. In-
house efforts are categorized further into the next level, between sequential
and simultaneous execution and the balancing modes themselves are found
at the subsequent hierarchical level beneath. Simultaneous balancing modes
include contextual ambidexterity, where employees use their own judgment
for allocating their time and attention on exploitative and exploratory tasks,
and spatial separation, where the organization’s business units are configured
in a fashion where some focus on exploitation and others on exploration.
Sequential balancing modes include temporal separation, where an entire unit
operates exploitatively one day, and exploratory the other, and punctuated
equilibrium, where the entire organization cycles through longer periods of
exploitation and exploration, respectively. Temporal and spatial separation
are both called structural ambidexterity.
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The Ambidexterity Framework was also transformed into theoretical
hypotheses, and subject to empirical assessment. During the assessment,
a different way of structuring the balancing modes emerged, linking the
balancing modes more directly to the locus of implementation. The
outcome was the Hierarchical Ambidexterity Framework, where the internal
and external balancing modes are decomposed into a structure of four
organizational levels. The empirical material revealed that contextual
ambidexterity flows at the individual level, structural ambidexterity at
the team or business level, punctuated equilibrium at the corporate level,
and domain separation at the network level. Finn wields multiple of
these balancing modes simultaneously. Staff distributing their own time
between exploitative and exploratory activities at their own convenience is
contextual ambidexterity, Torget’s pure exploitative operating mode and
the establishment of New Markets are structural ambidexterity, and the
evolutionary cycle through entrepreneurial start-up, an exploitative period
and yet another exploratory period currently erupting is a punctuated
equilibrium. Penger is the last example of domain separation. Still, H5
is confirmed, the paradox can be balanced to combine exploitation and
exploration. The employees’ schedules are administered by themselves at
the individual level, Torget and New Markets are on the business level
and the evolutionary cycles are on the corporate level. Thus, H6 is
confirmed, the balance can be applied at different levels in the organization
simultaneously. Finn’s remarkable success and profitability shows that the
contradicting dictums of the two extreme points may perfectly well be
combined without compromising yields. The empirical analysis in this master
thesis has decisively confirmed that the organization is intermixing ideas from
exploitative and exploratory work style every day, with overall distinction
in both effectiveness and innovation rate, despite an identified potential of
increasing the effectiveness even more. Thus, H7 is confirmed, solving the
paradox does redound to ambidexterity.
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In conclusion, exploitation and exploration are recognized as
organizational strategies, confirmed by the related literature and empirical
material. The interviews have confirmed that the strategies involve
contradictory ideas, but that both paths coalesce in operating profit. The
solution of the paradox is balance, and ambidexterity is the outcome.
Implementing multiple balancing modes simultaneously is beneficial, and
possible by distributing the ambidextrous efforts more deliberately at
different levels in the organization. Finn is an ambidextrous organization,
wielding multiple balancing modes simultaneously.
14 Further Research
The Pathway Framework was constructed as an attempt to better understand
the tension between exploitation and exploration. The empirical material
from Finn has partly rejected this as an adequate approximation for the
entire organization as one unit, due to the company’s ambidextrous nature.
However, an organization pursuing only one of the generic strategies of
exploitation and exploration would be an interesting perspective to consider.
An obvious research question to examine is whether the framework in
fact could be applicable for entire organizations, given a commitment to
one strategy only. Another unresolved matter in this thesis is whether
exploitation and exploration yields different types of profit. A recommended
issue for researchers casting into this subject would be to examine the validity
of exploitation resulting in short-term profit and exploration resulting in long-
term sustainability. One additional recommendation is to investigate why
Torget, as the most exploitative vertical at Finn, still establishes separate
environments for experimentation outside the brand itself.
In terms of ambidexterity, further research could be conducted on how to
combine internal and external strategies in order to attain ambidexterity.
Another interesting approach would be to examine how these strategies
could be implemented, and how the ideal choice of strategy varies across
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industries and organizational size. Yet another important perspective to
consider is the importance of senior management along the different strategic
pathways to ambidexterity. Further, Section 11.1 has examined what
organizational level ambidexterity originates from, trying to identify one
particular level more important than the others to initiate the balancing
efforts. The determination of one such level superior to the others in the
context of ambidexterity balancing modes did not succeed in that Section,
and is thus suggested for further research. A final research topic is the
level of ambidexterity. This thesis indicates that organizations can achieve
different levels of ambidexterity, depending on how well they capture the
two extremes. The authors recommend further research to focus on what
the minimum amount of exploitation and exploration need to be in order for
attaining ambidexterity. In addition, it would be exciting to investigate if
an organization could achieve a higher level of ambidexterity if it increased
exploitative or exploratory efforts, respectively.
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Part V
Appendices
A Interview Guides
A.1 Interviews with Exploitative Perspective
Used in the following interviews:
• Wakas Asif
• Lars Erik Ribe Anderssen
• Bente Mari Kristiansen and Bjørn Henrik Vangstein
Exploitation/Lean/Effectiveness (25 min)
1. What is your position at Finn?
a) Work tasks?
b) Job description and level in the organization?
2. What is the main strategy for continuous improvement of Finns
services?
3. Is it a distinct path to profit in your department?
4. Have you observed a particular mindset in departments with lean focus
at Finn?
a) How much focus is it on maximizing resources and minimizing
waste?
5. Can lean thinking ever promote discontinuous innovation?
a) How?
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6. Can you describe the lean efforts at Finn?
7. What are the KPIs connected to lean efforts?
a) Who are responsible for defining them?
b) Are there similar KPIs for every market vertical and department or
are they tailor-made?
8. What are the results of the lean efforts?
a) Do you demand tangible and measurable results (reduce costs etc.)?
b) What about the intangible results (work environment etc.)?
c) Have you experienced any negative results or trade-offs connected
to the lean efforts?
9. Do the employees accept and appreciate the lean efforts? Do you
experience a percussion force for the program?
a) Employees?
b) Senior management team?
10. Can you define lean?
Exploitation/Exploration Structure at Finn (20 min)
1. Which department(s) are regarded as lean/effective and which are
regarded as slack/innovative?
2. Where are the clearest distinctions?
a) Between market verticals?
b) Between support functions?
c) Within a department?
d) Entire Finn, but it varies in time?
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3. Does it exist exceptions/combinations?
4. Is it less demand for an innovative/slack unit to demonstrate the net
present value of its experiments, than for effective/lean units?
a) Are there delegated more resources to innovative/slack units or
effective/lean units?
5. What is your opinion on how Finn should be managed, plenty of
organizational slack or plenty of control?
Exploration/Organizational Slack/Innovation (15 min)
1. What is Finn’s main strategy for developing tomorrow’s solutions and
features?
2. Is it important for Finn to make sure that the employees have time to
experiment in order to create new business opportunities?
a) Where in Finn is experimentation accomplished?
3. Is the profit from established markets used as capital for new ventures?
4. Have you experienced experimentation in your department?
a) Have you ever terminated experimentation processes in your
department?
5. Do you often prioritize allocation of resources between established,
profitable business units and uncertain, development projects?
6. Have you ever attended any innovation processes at Finn?
Bonus
1. Do you have a definition of innovation?
2. Does Finn have a definition of innovation?
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A.2 Interviews with Exploratory perspective
Used in the following interviews:
• Ole Kristian Ullereng
• Bent Ove Jørgensen
• Christian Haneborg
• Nina Moi Edvardsen and Niklas Larsson
Exploration/Organizational Slack/Innovation (25 min)
1. What is your position at Finn?
a) Work tasks?
b) Job description and level in the organization?
2. What is Finn’s main strategy for developing tomorrow’s solutions and
features?
3. Is it a distinct path to profit in your department?
4. Have you observed a particular mindset in departments with innovation
focus at Finn?
a) How much focus is it on experimentation?
5. Is it important for Finn to make sure that the employees have time to
experiment in order to create new business opportunities?
6. Is the profit from established markets used as capital for new ventures?
7. Where in Finn does experimentation occur?
a) Can those departments ever become resource effective?
8. Can you describe the innovation efforts at Finn?
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9. What are the KPIs connected to new ventures and new features?
a) Who are responsible for defining them?
b) Are there similar KPIs for every venture/project?
10. How can innovation be measured?
a) Do you demand tangible and measurable results?
b) What about the intangible results?
c) Have you experienced any negative results or trade-offs connected
to innovation efforts?
11. Do the employees at Finn accept and appreciate experimentation?
a) Employees
b) Senior management team
12. Can you define innovation?
Exploitation/Exploration structure at Finn (20 min)
1. Which department(s) are regarded as lean/effective and which are
regarded as slack/innovative?
2. Where are the clearest distinctions?
a) Between market verticals?
b) Between support functions?
c) Within a department?
d) Entire Finn, but it varies in time?
3. Does it exist exceptions/combinations?
4. Is it less demand for an innovative/slack unit to demonstrate the net
present value of its experiments, than for effective/lean units?
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a) Are more resources delegated to innovative/slack units or
effective/lean units?
5. What is your opinion on how Finn should be managed—organizational
slack or discipline?
Exploitation/Lean/Effectiveness (15 min)
1. What is the main strategy for continuous improvement of Finns
services?
2. Where is continuous improvement conducted?
3. In what way do you get involved in the lean efforts at Finn?
a) What are the result of these efforts?
4. Do you often prioritize allocation of resources between established,
profitable business units and uncertain, development projects?
Bonus
1. Do you have a definition of lean/effectiveness?
2. Does Finn have a definition of lean/effectiveness?
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